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HomeMy WebLinkAbout08/04/2015 09 "Mission Uses" Definition; YMC Amendment 15.04.030'1111111 1, nun 11,1:1141r10 BUSINESS OF THE CITY COUNCIL YAKIMA, WASHINGTON AGENDA STATEMENT Item No. 9. For Meeting of: August 4, 2015 ITEM TITLE: Ordinance regarding the Yakima Planning Commission's recommendation related to the City Council's remand of the use and definition for "Mission" in the GC, CBD, and M-1 zoning districts SUBMITTED BY: Joan Davenport, AICP Community Development Director Jeff Peters, Supervising Planner (509) 575-6163 SUMMARY EXPLANATION: On May 19, 2015, in an open record public hearing, the Yakima City Council considered the Yakima Planning Commission's recommendation to incorporate a new use and definition for "Mission" into the City of Yakima's Municipal Code. Following significant public testimony, the Yakima City Council voted to remand the ordinance and recommendation back to the Planning Commission to provide for more public input and involvement from property owners along N. 1st Street, and consideration of increasing the level of review of a "Mission" use from a Type (2) Review without a public hearing to a Type 3 Review with a public hearing and development agreement. As requested, the City of Yakima Planning Commission conducted two public study sessions on May 27, June 10, and a public hearing on June 24, 2015, to consider the issues. On July 21, 2015, the Yakima City Council held and closed the required public hearing considering the Planning Commission's remand recommendation defining a "Mission" use. During the City Council's discussion of the item at its regular meeting on July 21, 2015, questions were raised regarding why the proposed mission use would be proposed as a Class (2) use as opposed to a Class (3) use. The answer is that, under provisions of the federal Fair Housing Act, a city may face a challenge of discrimination against persons protected by the act if such persons are denied housing based on their physical or mental impairment status, or subjected to additional procedural hurdles not required for other residential uses in the zoning district. A request was made for additional legal research regarding application of the fair housing laws. Attached is a legal opinion on this matter from the City Attorney's Office. Given this response, the matter has been rescheduled for August 4, 2015, rather than waiting until September 1, 2015. Now the Yakima City Council is being requested to consider adoption of the accompanying ordinance incorporating a "mission" use into the City of Yakima's Municipal Code. Resolution: Ordinance: X Other (Specify): Contract: Contract Term: Start Date: End Date: Item Budgeted: Amount: Funding Source/Fiscal Impact: Strategic Priority: Insurance Required? No Mail to: Phone: APPROVED FOR SUBMITTAL: RECOMMENDATION: Improve the Built Environment City Manager The City of Yakima Planning Division recommends that the Yakima City Council consider the Planning Commission's recommendation, and adopt the draft ordinance incorporating the definition and use of a "mission" into the City of Yakima's Municipal Code. ATTACHMENTS: Description D memo D articles D Proposed Ordiirna nce IMllisslio n IReirnair D Comlpllete Record Mission IReinrrairnd Upload Date 7/29/2015 7/29/2015 #001-15 7/9/2015 7/9/2015 Type Omer Memo Omer Memo Ordiirna nce E aclkulp Mateirii<All CITY OF YAKIMA LEGAL DEPARTMENT aASotthlh tshe$Yakimawashinai lF5fOD1ii c(9A5361ffl TO: FROM: SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM July 23, 2015 Honorable Mayor and City Council Tony O'Rourke, City Manager Mark Kunkler, Senior Assistant City Attorney Fair Housing Act — Mission Uses — Vesting A. Introduction. The Yakima Planning Commission recently presented to the City Council a recommendation regarding "Mission" uses. The Planning Commission, after conducting a number of study sessions and public hearing, recommended adoption of an ordinance amending Title 15 YMC to (a) adopt a definition of "mission," (b) amend Table 4-1 to allow mission uses as Class (2) uses (with Type (3) hearing — which requires a public hearing) and a separate "development agreement" between the developer and the City. The proposed amendment further provided that such mission uses would only be allowed in the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts. During the City Council's discussion of the item at its regular meeting on July 21, 2015, questions were raised regarding why the proposed mission use would be proposed as a Class (2) use as opposed to a Class (3) use. The answer is that, under provisions of the federal Fair Housing Act, a city may face a challenge of discrimination against persons protected by the act if such persons are denied housing based on their handicapped status, or subjected to additional procedural hurdles not required for other residential uses in the zoning district. A request was made for additional legal research regarding application of the fair housing laws. B. Applicable Laws. Both state and federal laws have been enacted to prevent discrimination against individuals with disabilities with regard to housing. In an excellent article by Ted H. Memorandum to Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council Page 2 Gathe, City Attorney for the City of Vancouver, entitled "Regulating Group Homes in the Twenty First Century: The Limits of Municipal Authority" (April 2013)(hereafter called "Article"), the applicable laws were summarized as follows: In 1988, the Federal Housing Act Amendment (FHAA) was enacted to extend protection of the 1968 Fair Housing Act (FHA) to people with disabilities. Congress intended that municipal land use as well as health and safety regulations comply with the provisions of the FHAA, stating: "The Act is intended to prohibit the application of special requirements through land use regulations, restrictive covenants, and conditional or special use permits that have effect of limiting the ability of such individuals to live in the residence of their choice in the community." H. Rep. No. 100-711, at 24 (1988), reprinted in, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2185. The FHAA prohibits intentional discrimination as well as other forms of discrimination in zoning, including discriminatory classification of persons with disabilities, facially neutral zoning laws that have disparate impact on persons with disabilities, and failure of municipal officials to reasonably accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities. In response to the FHAA, the Washington State Legislature in 1993 added a new section to Chapter 35.63 RCW, also known as the Washington Housing Protection Act (WHPA). Article, at page 6-2. The portion of the Washington Housing Protection Act (WHPA) applicable to the City of Yakima is found at RCW 35.63.220 and states: No city may enact or maintain an ordinance, development regulation, zoning regulation or official control, policy, or administrative practice which treats a residential structure occupied by persons with handicaps differently than a similar residential structure occupied by a family or other unrelated individuals. As used in this section, "handicaps" are as defined in the federal fair housing amendments act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3602). The FHAA defines "handicaps" as follows: (h) "Handicap" means, with respect to a person -- (1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment, but such term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21). 42 U.S.C. § 3602. Memorandum to Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council Page 3 While the definition excludes "current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance," courts have held that a person recovering from such use or addiction is "handicapped" and worthy of the protections of the FHAA.1 Likewise, certain "homeless shelters" or treatment facilities have been found, in some circumstances, to constitute "dwellings" eligible for protection under the FHAA and WHPA.2 Persons residing and admitted for services provided by the Union Gospel Mission receive medical treatment and counseling and are not allowed to use drugs or alcohol. "Residency" for such participating individuals is more than transitory. In view of the services provided by the Union Gospel Mission, coupled with the fact that residency of 1 Residents of group homes for recovering alcoholics and drug addicts were disabled and/or handicapped for the purposes of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); their testimony established that they had a handicap and/or a disability that substantially limited their major life activities. Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, La., 932 F.Supp.2d 683 (M.D.La.2013). Recovering alcoholics and drug addicts suffered "handicap," and thus had standing to bring action alleging that city's restrictions on placement of substance abuse treatment facilities violated Fair Housing Act (FHA), where recovering individuals were not engaged in current drug or alcohol use, had because of their addiction been unable to perform major life activities, and intended to return to facilities if they relapsed. Jeffrey O. v. City of Boca Raton, 511 F.Supp.2d 1339 (S.D.FIa.2007). 2 Emergency homeless shelter qualified as a "dwelling" under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), as required in action alleging discrimination based on handicap, although the shelter was not designed to be a place of permanent residence, where residents generally stayed at shelter for one to 90 days, residents received mail at the shelter, residents had medication dispensed by staff at shelter, and residents returned to their sleeping areas in the evening. Defiore v. City Rescue Mission of New Castle, 995 F. Supp.2d 413 (W.D.Pa.2013). Homeless shelter qualified as a "dwelling," within meaning of Fair Housing Act section prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, where homeless person intended to stay at the shelter as long as he could, and he had no other home to go to. Jenkins v. New York City Dept. of Homeless Services, 643 F.Supp.2d 507 (S.D.N.Y.2009), affirmed on other grounds 391 Fed. Appx. 81, 2010 WL 3393761, certiorari denied 131 S. Ct. 1532, 179 L.Ed.2d 347. Shelter for homeless families was a "dwelling" within meaning of the FHA, notwithstanding that facility was not designed to be a place of permanent residence, considering that shelter residents were not mere transients such as hotel or motel guests, and had nowhere else to "return to." Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D.III.1995). Memorandum to Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council Page 4 participants in such programs meets the qualification of a "dwelling," it is my opinion that the Union Gospel Mission would qualify for protection under both the FHAA and WHPA. Because it is reasonable to expect that a number of individuals receiving services from, while residing at, a "mission" will qualify as handicapped individuals "recovering from" alcohol or drug addiction, or mental disabilities, it is prudent to shape land use regulations so as to avoid, if at all possible, liability for a discrimination claim based on the FHAA and WHPA. At the same time, it is important to recognize legitimate land use concerns arising from the siting of such facilities. State statutes and the City's Comprehensive Plan also apply. The City of Yakima has elected to plan under the Washington State Growth Management Act, Chapter 36.70A RCW. RCW 36.70A.200 provides in pertinent part: 36.70A.200 Siting of essential public facilities — Limitation on liability. (1) The comprehensive plan of each county and city that is planning under RCW 36.70A.040 shall include a process for identifying and siting essential public facilities. Essential public facilities include those facilities that are typically difficult to site, such as airports, state education facilities and state or regional transportation facilities as defined in RCW 47.06.140, regional transit authority facilities as defined in RCW 81.112.020, state and local correctional facilities, solid waste handling facilities, and inpatient facilities including substance abuse facilities, mental health facilities, group homes, and secure community transition facilities as defined in RCW 71.09.020. (2) Each county and city planning under RCW 36.70A.040 shall, not later than September 1, 2002, establish a process, or amend its existing process, for identifying and siting essential public facilities and adopt or amend its development regulations as necessary to provide for the siting of secure community transition facilities consistent with statutory requirements applicable to these facilities. *** (5) No local comprehensive plan or development regulation may preclude the siting of essential public facilities. (6) No person may bring a cause of action for civil damages based on the good faith actions of any county or city to provide for the siting of secure community transition facilities in accordance with this section and with the requirements of chapter 12, Laws of 2001 2nd sp. sess. For purposes of this subsection, "person" includes, but is not limited to, any individual, agency as defined in RCW 42.17A.005, corporation, partnership, association, and limited liability entity. Memorandum to Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council Page 5 (Emphasis added.) While "homeless shelters" are not specifically listed as a specific type of "essential public facility," the definitions of dwellings and protected alcohol and drug recovery activities protected in the FHAA and WHPA would include homeless shelters or "missions" that meet the residency and "handicap" service criteria. Moreover, Chapter 74.50 RCW establishes a state licensed "shelter assistance program" to assist those under treatment for alcohol addiction. RCW 74.50.060 includes a mechanism whereby the state may contract with either a public or private provider of shelter services to house participants. This constitutes at least a recognition that homeless service shelters constitute a form of "group home" or treatment center combined with a residency element, which would qualify as a type of "essential public facility." Pursuant to the GMA, the City of Yakima has adopted its Yakima Urban Area Comprehensive Plan 2025. Chapter 111 describes the land use element and contains the following provisions and pages 111-29, 30, regarding essential public facilities: Siting Essential Public Facilities Essential public facilities include those that are often difficult to place because no one wants them in or near their community. These include airports, State education facilities, State or regional transportation facilities, correctional facilities, solid waste handling facilities and in-patient facilities including hospitals, substance abuse facilities, mental health facilities and group homes. The Growth Management Act requires the Comprehensive Plan to include a process for identifying and siting essential public facilities. The GMA also states that no local comprehensive plan for any neighborhood may forbid the placement of essential public facilities within that neighborhood. It is important to recognize that the location of these facilities may have negative impacts on surrounding land use areas and different essential public facilities may have different needs in terms of their physical location. GOAL 3.16: PROVIDE ADEQUATE LOCATIONS FOR SITING ESSENTIAL PUBLIC FACILITIES. Policies: 3.16.1 All essential public facilities shall be located and developed to be compatible with adjoining land uses to the greatest possible extent. 3.16.2 Essential public facilities shall be located in areas where they are best able to serve the individuals they are intended to serve. 3.16.3 All essential public facilities providing County -wide or Statewide services shall be identified according to the requirements under the Yakima County -wide Planning Policies Section C.3.1 through C.3.2 (see Appendix F). Memorandum to Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council Page 6 3.16.4 A review process for siting or the expansion of essential public facilities shall be established according to the requirements under the Yakima County -wide Planning Policies Section C.3.3 through Section C.3.6 (see Appendix F). 3.16.5 The criteria for determining the location of essential public facilities should be coordinated and consistent with other planning goal requirements, such as -reducing sprawl, promoting economic development, protecting the environment, and supporting affordable housing. (Emphasis added.) Appendix E to the Comprehensive Plan further states in part: Siting Public Facilities of a County -wide or State-wide Nature (Cited from Yakima County -wide Planning Policy) C.1. STATEWIDE GOALS RELATING TO THE SITING OF PUBLIC FACILITIES OF A REGIONAL OR STATEWIDE NATURE The GMA requires local governments to inventory existing capital public facilities to identify location and to determine capacities to meet future demand for growth without decreasing levels of service and to include within their comprehensive plans a process for identifying and siting essential public facilities. The Washington State Office of Financial Management is responsible for identifying and maintaining a list of essential State public facilities that are required or likely to be built within the next six years as required by the GMA. Counties and cities are also required to coordinate the siting of countywide and statewide capital facilities to mitigate potential adverse impacts from the location and development of these facilities. C.2. COUNTY -WIDE POLICIES RELATING TO THE SITING OF FACILITIES OF A COUNTY -WIDE OR STATE-WIDE NATURE The siting of essential public capital facilities such as landfills and jails is a difficult task at best. Although these facilities are necessary for the common good, they are seldom welcome into a community or neighborhood. Recognizing that public facilities of a statewide or countywide nature are an essential part of our society, policies for their siting and construction are necessary to ensure a reasonable approval process. Each jurisdiction will utilize an appropriate public process for siting essential public facilities, as outlined in their respective comprehensive plans, policies or regulations. (Emphasis added.) C. Procedural Barriers. Memorandum to Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council Page 7 In Sunderland Family Treatment Centers v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash. App. 109, 26 P.3d 995 (2001), the city required a "Special Use Permit" for "group care facilities," but did not require any special use permit for other "family" or residential uses. The court held that this "extra" procedural requirement or level of review violated the WHPA. As stated and held by the court: The Legislature adopted the WHPA to, among other things, "[i]ncrease the supply of housing for persons with special needs." RCW 43.185B.005(2)(e). The WHPA, in pertinent part, reads as follows: No city may enact or maintain an ordinance, development regulation, zoning regulation or official control, policy, or administrative practice which treats a residential structure occupied by persons with handicaps differently than a similar residential structure occupied by a family or other unrelated individuals. As used in this section, "handicaps" are as defined in the federal fair housing amendments act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. § 3602). RCW 35A.63.240 (emphasis added). The WHPA is a broad provision tailored to address municipal ordinances, practices, or policies that treat similar residential structures "differently" based on the residents' handicap and familial status. Significantly, the WHPA does not contain an intent requirement or require a showing of "discrimination." In other words, the WHPA prohibits ordinances, practices, or policies that distinguish between residential structures based on the residents' handicaps and familial status, regardless of a city's intent when enacting or enforcing the ordinance, policy or practice. Sunderland, id. at 118. In the GC and CBD zoning districts, similar (permitted) residential structures occupied by a family or other unrelated individuals, include: Use Class Multifamily Dwelling Class (2) (0 to 7 Dwelling Units per Net Residential Acres) Multifamily Dwelling Class (2) (8 to 12 Dwelling Units per Net Residential Acre) Multifamily Dwelling Class (2) (13 -plus Dwelling Units per Net Residential Acre) YMC 15.02.020 defines "family" as follows: Memorandum to Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council Page 8 A. The term "family" shall include: 1. State -licensed adult family homes required to be recognized as residential uses pursuant to RCW 70.128.175; 2. State -licensed foster family homes and group care facilities as defined in RCW 74.15.180, subject to the exclusions of subsection B of this definition; and 3. Group homes for the disabled and consensual living arrangements equivalent to a familial setting required to be accommodated as residential uses pursuant to the Fair Housing Act and the Washington Housing Policy Act, RCW 35.63.220 and RCW 35A.63.240, respectively. B. The term "family" shall exclude individuals residing in halfway houses, crisis residential centers as defined in RCW 74.15.020(3)(g), group homes licensed for juvenile offenders, or other facilities, whether or not licensed by the state, where individuals are incarcerated or otherwise required to reside pursuant to court order under the supervision of paid staff and personnel. (Emphasis added.) Thus, under the principles of Sunderland, the existence of similar residential uses classified as Class (2) uses, and the city's existing definition of "family" to include those persons protected by the FHAA and WHPA, our opinion is that retaining a Class (3) use for "missions" in these zoning districts constitutes a risk of liability under the FHAA and WHPA. Primarily, this is so because it may appear that the only reason supporting a Class (3) designation for "mission" uses in these zoning districts is based on the "type of individual" housed in the mission. The primary differences between a Class (2) and a Class (3) use are (a) the "presumptions of compatibility" attached to each class, and (b) the different "burdens of proof" resulting from such presumptions. YMC 15.04.020 defines these different classes as follows: B. Class (2) uses are generally permitted in the district. However, the compatibility between a Class (2) use and the surrounding environment cannot be determined in advance, and occasionally a Class (2) use may be incompatible at a particular location. Therefore, a Type (2) review by the administrative official is required in order to promote compatibility with the intent and character of the district and the policies and development criteria of the Yakima urban area comprehensive plan. The procedures in YMC Chapter 15.14 shall be used to review and evaluate Class (2) uses. In certain circumstances, the administrative official may require that a Class (2) use undergo a Type (3) review, as provided within this title. C. Class (3) uses are generally not permitted in a particular district, but may be allowed by the hearing examiner after a Type (3) review and public hearing. The hearing examiner may approve, deny, or impose conditions on the proposed land use and site improvements to promote compatibility with the intent and character of the district and the policies and development criteria of the Yakima Memorandum to Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council Page 9 urban area comprehensive plan. The procedures in YMC Chapter 15.15 shall be used to review and evaluate Class (3) uses or Class (2) uses that have been forwarded to the hearing examiner for review. The Class (2) uses are "generally permitted" in the designated zoning district, but may "occasionally" require certain mitigations to achieve compatibility with the surrounding environment. These mitigations may be imposed by the City's administrative staff — or the department director may refer the matter to a public hearing before the hearing examiner in a Type (3) process. The applicant in a Class (2) use starts with the premise that his or her proposed use is generally permitted — other persons, including third parties, neighbors and planning staff, would have the "burden" to identify any adverse secondary effects associated with the project and convince the decision -maker to craft and impose a suitable mitigation. In a Class (3) use, the use is "generally not permitted" in the designated zoning district, but "may be allowed" after a public hearing conducted by the hearing examiner. The burden would be on the applicant to identify and propose mitigations to "promote compatibility" with the intent and character of the zoning district. As shown above, other multifamily dwelling uses are currently designated as Class (2) uses in the GC and CBD zoning districts and are thus "generally permitted" but subject to imposition of mitigations designed to reduce incompatibility with surrounding neighborhoods. Assigning a Class (3) use to a "mission" in these same zoning districts would impose a significantly different presumption of incompatibility and burden of proof on a type of multifamily dwelling — based primarily on the "type of person" residing in the mission. This is the factor that runs afoul of the FHAA and WHPA as described in Sunderland Family Treatment Centers v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash. App. 109, 26 P.3d 995 (2001). Furthermore, assigning a classification that makes a mission "generally not permitted" creates a threshold presumption that the City is precluding siting of a type of "essential public facility" contrary to the Growth Management Act and the City's Comprehensive Plan. D. A Word on Vesting. A further question was asked regarding vesting, and whether the adoption of the proposed mission ordinance would affect a separate application for interpretation presented by Yakima Neighborhood Health for a mission -type use at the Roy's Market site. This argument will be fully developed and presented in conjunction with the appeal of the Hearing Examiner's Interpretation, but here are the general principles. For many years, courts have issued a number of decisions regarding the doctrine of vesting. In short, an applicant in a land use case was deemed "vested" if he or she Memorandum to Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council Page 10 submitted a "complete application" for a permit. He or she would "vest" to the zoning and/or development standards in effect at the time the complete application was submitted. For example, if zoning was changed to prohibit a use after the applicant submitted a complete application for a development permit for that use, the doctrine of vesting would allow the developer to proceed under the development standards that existed before the change. Courts had tended to expand the application of the vesting doctrine to include a variety of land use applications beyond building permits and applications for subdivisions — such as conditional use permit applications, grading permit applications, shoreline substantial development permit applications, and septic permit applications.3 This changed last year when a new court decision was issued. Now, under Washington law, a developer only "vests" to a right to construct a specific project when a complete application for a (a) building permit or (b) subdivision of land is filed. RCW 19.27.095(1) and RCW 58.17.033(1), respectively. Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash. App. 191, 334 P.3d 1143 (2014), review denied, 182 Wash.2d 1004, 342 P.3d 326 (Table) (2015). Under Potala, an application for an Interpretation, or even an application for a Class (3) review, is not an application for a building permit or subdivision. In fact, the ultimate decision of the hearing examiner, if he or she approves a Class (3) application, is to authorize the City to issue a "certificate of zoning review" or "CZR." It is the issuance of a CZR that authorizes the issuance of a building permit. There has been no submission of an application for any building permit by Yakima Neighborhood Health Services for development of the proposed facility at the Roy's Market site. Yakima Neighborhood Health Services does not even yet own the Roy's Market property. Consequently, it is the position of the City that an amendment of Title 15 YMC to formally include a definition of mission and to limit such uses to the GC, CBG and M-1 zoning districts will clarify the issues argued in the Hearing Examiner's Interpretation, and will establish the clear legislative intent that mission uses are in fact legislatively established as permissible uses in the three listed zoning districts — and not permitted in any other zoning district. The question thus becomes whether or not the Yakima Neighborhood Health Services proposal constitutes a "mission." If the proposed use is a mission, it is not allowed in the SCC zoning district. 3 See Juanita Bay Valley Cmty. Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wash.App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973) (grading permit applications); Talbot v. Gray, 11 Wash.App. 807, 525 P.2d 801 (1974) (shoreline permit applications); Ford v. Bellingham—Whatcom County Dist. Bd. of Health, 16 Wash.App. 709, 558 P.2d 821 (1977) (septic tank permit application); Beach v. Bd. of Adjustment, 73 Wash.2d 343, 438 P.2d 617 (1968) (conditional use permit applications); Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 95 Wash.App. 883, 976 P.2d 1279 (1999) (conditional use permit applications). Memorandum to Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council Page 11 E. Conclusion and Recommendation. In order to maintain compliance with the FHAA and WHPA, it was determined that the better course would be to maintain consistency with the Class (2) use associated with other similar residential uses, and to address any impacts by increasing the review to a Type (3) review — with increased public notice, a required public hearing, and a development agreement in which the City is a party.4 Classifying the mission use as a Class (2) use retains the original designation established in 1992 and 1995 by the Hearing Examiner Interpretations for the Union Gospel Mission, and maintains consistency with other types of multifamily uses within such zoning districts. By retaining the Class (2) use designation but requiring a Type (3) procedure for approval, the city retains a consistent burden of proof standard for multifamily uses within the zoning districts, but attaches an enhanced public notice and public hearing procedure. This provides an increased opportunity for neighboring property owners and interested parties to identify concerns and present recommended mitigations. Additionally, the proposed ordinance would require a separate development agreement between the applicant and the City. This would give the City standing to enforce the terms of such agreement if such becomes necessary. In conclusion, the recommendation to retain the Class (2) use, but require a Type (3) mandatory public hearing process and development agreement, was based on the need to maintain compliance with federal and state fair housing laws and the City's Comprehensive Plan, while enhancing public participation in the process and providing an individualized method of enforcement through a separate development agreement. 4 In response to a question whether even an increased public participation and development agreement requirements might constitute a violation, I would indicate that a public hearing may be required in any event for a Class (2) use. The hearing examiner would then conduct a public hearing and include any mitigations within his or her decision. The only significant change in the suggested process would be the addition of a development agreement that includes the city as a party. Memorandum to Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council Page 12 Sunderland Family Treatment Services v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash.App. 109 (2001) 26 P.3d 955, 21 NDLR P 125 107 Wash.App. 109 Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3, Panel Six. SUNDERLAND FAMILY TREATMENT SERVICES, a Washington non-profit corporation, Respondent, v. CITY OF PASCO, a Washington municipal corporation, Appellant. No. 18951-1-111. 1 July 3, 2001. Applicant appealed city's denial of a special use permit to operate, in residential area, a group care facility for handicapped youths. The Superior Court, Franklin County, Duane Taber, J., reversed. Upon granting applicant direct review, the Supreme Court, 127 Wash.2d 782, 903 P.2d 986, remanded. Thereafter, applicant appealed city's denial of amended application. The Superior Court, Franklin County, Craig Matheson and Philip Raekes, JJ., reversed. City appealed. The Court of Appeals, Kurtz, C.J., held that city violated the Washington Housing Policy Act (WHPA) by adopting a regulatory scheme that permitted a "family" to obtain immediate occupancy of a residential structure but required "group care facilities" to obtain a special use permit. City's land use decision reversed. West Headnotes (13) 111 Zoning and Planning 0—Dismissal Dismissal of applicant's appeal of city's denial of a special use permit to operate, in residential area, a group care facility for handicapped youths was not required under rule governing dismissal for want of prosecution, as the matter was noted for fmal hearing before the hearing on the motion to dismiss. CR 41(b)(1). Cases that cite this headnote 121 [31 141 [s1 Appeal and Error 4 -Grounds of Review The appellant has the burden of providing a record sufficient to review the issues raised. 1 Cases that cite this headnote Zoning and Planning 4 -Nature and Form of Remedy By petitioning under Land -Use Petition Act (LUPA), a party seeks judicial review by asking the superior court to exercise appellate jurisdiction. West's RCWA 36.70C.030(1). 4 Cases that cite this headnote Administrative Law and Procedure 4 -Scope In administrative appeals, the Court of Appeals stands in the same position as the Superior Court when reviewing the underlying administrative decision. 1 Cases that cite this headnote Zoning and Planning 4 -De novo review in general Issues of law are reviewed de novo on petitions for judicial review filed pursuant to the Land -Use Petition Act (LUPA). West's RCWA 36.70C.030(1). 5 Cases that cite this headnote WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U S. Government Works. 1 Sunderland Family Treatment Services v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash.App. 109 (2001) 26 P.3d 955, 21 NDLR P 125 161 171 181 Civil Rights 6 -Discrimination by reason of handicap, disability, or illness Civil Rights 6—Discrimination by reason of marital, parental, or familial status The Washington Housing Policy Act (WHPA) prohibits ordinances, practices, or policies that distinguish between residential structures based on the residents' handicaps and familial status, regardless of a city's intent when enacting or enforcing the ordinance, policy, or practice. West's RCWA 35A.63.240. Cases that cite this headnote Civil Rights 6—Discrimination by reason of handicap, disability, or illness A violation of the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHA) may be established under any or all of three theories: disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure to make reasonable accommodations. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 804(1), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(1). 1 Cases that cite this headnote Civil Rights Public regulation; zoning The disparate treatment theory of establishing a violation of the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHA) applies when an ordinance is facially discriminatory and the disparate impact theory applies when an ordinance is neutral on its face, but has a disparate impact. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 804(1), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(1). 191 110] 1 Cases that cite this headnote Civil Rights 6 -Discrimination by reason of handicap, disability, or illness The disparate treatment theory of establishing a violation of the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHA) requires a showing of discriminatory intent and the disparate impact theory requires a showing of a discriminatory effect. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 804(1), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(1). 1 Cases that cite this headnote Civil Rights 6 -Discrimination by reason of handicap, disability, or illness When applying a valid ordinance, a government's failure to make a reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities may give rise to a cause of action under the reasonable accommodations theory of establishing a violation of the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHA). Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 804(f), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(1). Cases that cite this headnote Civil Rights 6 -Discrimination by reason of handicap, disability, or illness City violated the Washington Housing Policy Act (WHPA) by adopting a regulatory scheme that permitted a "family" to obtain immediate occupancy of a residential structure but required "group care facilities" to obtain a special use permit before occupying a similar residential structure. West's RCWA 35A.63.240. WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Sunderland Family Treatment Services v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash.App. 109 (2001) 26 P.3d 955, 21 NDLR P 125 [121 1131 Cases that cite this headnote Civil Rights 0 -Discrimination by reason of handicap, disability, or illness Washington Housing Policy Act (WHPA) requires only that the residential structures occupied by handicapped persons and those occupied by a family be "similar," not that the living arrangements and supervision of a structure occupied by handicapped persons be similar to that in a family. West's RCWA 35A.63.240. Cases that cite this headnote Civil Rights 0 -Discrimination by reason of handicap, disability, or illness Civil Rights 0 -Discrimination by reason of marital, parental, or familial status City's home occupation ordinance violated the Washington Housing Policy Act (WHPA) as applied to applicant seeking a special use permit to operate a group home for handicapped children; under the ordinance, handicapped children who required specialized care were denied access to a single-family home based on their handicap and familial status. West's RCWA 35A.63.240. Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms **957 *111 Greg A. Rubstello, Ogden, Murphy, Wallace PLLC, Seattle, for Appellant. Timothy G. Klashke, Pasco, for Respondent. Opinion *112 KURTZ, C.J. The City of Pasco denied Sunderland Family Treatment Services' application for a special use permit to operate a group care facility for handicapped youth in a residential area. Sunderland filed a Land -Use Petition Act (LUPA) petition. On appeal to the superior court, the court concluded that the City's denial of the special use permit constituted an erroneous interpretation of the law violating the Washington Housing Policy Act (WHPA), the Washington Law Against Discrimination, the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHA), the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. On appeal to this court, we address whether the City's regulatory scheme violated the WHPA. We conclude that it did and reverse the City's land use decision. FACTS Sunderland I. In March 1993, Sunderland Family Treatment Services applied to the City for a special use permit (SUP) to operate a youth crisis residential center in a Sunderland -owned residence located in an R-1 zoning district. This crisis residential center was to be operated under RCW 74.13.032. The City denied the application for the SUP, but the Franklin County Superior Court reversed, concluding that the City's denial constituted handicap discrimination under the WHPA, RCW 35A.63.240. Sunderland sought and received direct review by the Washington Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending, Sunderland, a nonprofit community mental health agency, lost funding for the crisis residential center. Sunderland Family Treatment Servs. v. City of Pasco, 127 Wash.2d 782, 787, 903 P.2d 986 (1995) (Sunderland I). Sunderland informed the court of the loss of funding and explained that funding from a different source had been obtained to operate the facility. Id. *113 In Sunderland I, the court considered whether the planned population of the Sunderland crisis residential center -abused and neglected children -were handicapped under the WHPA. Id at 789, 903 P.2d 986. The court determined that the children to be served by the Sunderland facility were not handicapped and, consequently, the WHPA was inapplicable. Id. at 791-92, 798, 903 P.2d 986. However, the court also found that the City's denial appeared to rest on neighborhood opposition to the facility. Id. at 797, 903 P.2d 986. Hence, the court WestlawNext- © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 Sunderland Family Treatment Services v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash.App. 109 (2001) 26 P.3d 955, 21 NDLR P 125 concluded that the denial of the SUP was not based on competent and substantial evidence. Id. Because of the loss in funding and the failure of either Sunderland or the City to create a sufficient record, the court remanded the matter to the City for further proceedings. Id. at 798, 903 P.2d 986. Amended SUP Application. On remand, Sunderland amended its SUP application, explaining that the application was essentially the same as the initial application but that the proposed facility would now be used to house youths ages 12-17 with a diagnosed mental impairment. These children would be referred through mental health professionals and would have a diagnosed mental illness requiring a group setting with 24-hour professional staff supervision as part of a proscribed treatment plan. **958 The proposed group home would operate under state licensing standards to serve the residential needs of seriously and severely disturbed minor children. The children would be prescreened and preassessed for placement in the home by a mental health professional pursuant to the provisions and criteria contained in chapter 71.24 RCW, chapter 71.34 RCW, WAC 275-57, and WAC 388-73. Children who posed a danger to themselves or others would not be eligible for admission to the facility; neither would children actively using drugs or alcohol, or children with pending criminal charges. Under the applicable state regulations, the proposed home would be required to maintain a one -to -four ratio of staff to children, and a staff person with a bachelor degree *114 would be required to be on site at all times. As a result, the proposed home would operate with at least three staff people on duty. Testimony indicated that there would usually be two staff people coming and going every eight hours. The primary use of the house would be residential, as the children would be transported off site to school, counseling, and treatment. Children residing in the home would most likely stay for a period of six to nine months. While in the home, the children would live in a very structured environment and would not be permitted to have friends visit. The proposed home would have to meet higher supervision requirements than those imposed on a foster family home. The type of service offered by the proposed home is not currently available in either Franklin or Benton Counties other than as part of an inpatient stay at Carondelet Psychiatric Care Facility. The location of the proposed group home is property located within an R-1 single-family, low density residential zoning district designated in the Pasco Municipal Code (PMC) as the City's "Low Density Residential District." The property is developed with a residential structure that is currently vacant. The proposed group home would not require any physical alterations to its exterior and would appear physically indistinguishable from other single-family homes in the area. The properties surrounding the site are similarly zoned R-1. There are single-family residential dwellings to the east, south and north of the proposed group home. The Joyce Apartments are located directly to the west. After holding a public hearing, the Pasco Planning Commission recommended approval of the SUP with 14 conditions. Despite this recommendation, the city council held a second hearing and issued a decision denying approval. At both proceedings, Sunderland contended that the City had no authority to require the SUP proceeding. Nonetheless, the City apparently took the position that a SUP proceeding was required because the proposed group home was either a "group care facility" or a "community service facility" as *115 defined by PMC 22.12.385 and PMC 22.12.215. Significantly, the City's determination that Sunderland must apply for a SUP prevented Sunderland from taking immediate occupancy of the home and operating the home as a group care facility. When evaluating Sunderland's application for a SUP, the City applied the home occupation ordinance that was designed to determine whether "the conduct of business may be permitted as a use accessory to an established residence." PMC 22.35.010. In denying Sunderland's application for a SUP, the City applied the environmental standards contained in PMC 22.35.050, which require that all home occupations be: (1) clearly subordinate to the principal use of the property for residential purposes; (2) conducted by persons residing within the dwelling unit upon the premises; and (3) an occupation that does not require the customer or client to be present upon the premises while the profession, trade, skill or services are performed. The City based its denial of the SUP on the conclusions that (1) the nature and intensity of the use was not subordinate to the principal permitted use of the property, and (2) the proposed use was not in harmony with the existing WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 Sunderland Family Treatment Services v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash.App. 109 (2001) 26 P.3d 955, 21 NDLR P 125 residential development in the neighborhood. Sunderland appealed to the superior court by filing a LUPA petition. Sunderland alleged the children who would reside in the home were legally "handicapped" and that the WHPA and/or the FHA prevented the **959 City from denying Sunderland's right to operate the proposed home. Additionally, Sunderland reserved the right to subsequently file and pursue claims for monetary damages against the City in an independent action for damages pursuant to the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, the Washington Law Against Discrimination (chapter 49.60 RCW), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The superior court concluded the City's denial of the SUP constituted an erroneous interpretation of law violating the anti -handicap discrimination provisions in the WHPA, the FHA, the Washington Law Against Discrimination, the Americans With Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act *116 of 1973. The superior court also concluded that the City's land use decision (1) was not supported by factual evidence that was substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court; (2) was clearly an erroneous application of the law to the facts; (3) was not supported by sufficient factual evidence; and (4) violated constitutional rights, and was arbitrary and capricious in that it constituted willful and unreasonable action taken in disregard of the relevant facts and circumstances. The court further concluded that the denial of the SUP constituted a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts. Accordingly, the superior court reversed the City's land use decision and found that "as a matter of law, Sunderland is and shall be entitled to immediately occupy and operate the proposed Home at the proposed location as a matter of right and without the need or requirement of a SUP or any other authorization or approval of or by the City." Clerk's Papers at 40. The City appeals contending its decision to deny Sunderland's application for a SUP was not erroneous and was supported by sufficient evidence. The City also contends the superior court erred by failing to grant the City's motions to dismiss under CR 41(b) and CR 41(b)(1). 111 121 Motion to Dismiss. The City first contends the trial court erred by failing to grant its motion to dismiss under CR 41(b) or CR 41(b)(1). This court cannot review the denial of the CR 41(b) motion because the City has failed to provide a report of proceedings of the court's hearing on the CR 41(b) motion. Without a record of proceedings, this court would have to speculate as to the reasoning behind the court's decision to deny the motion. As the appellant, the City has the burden of providing a record sufficient to review the issues raised. State v. Garcia, 45 Wash.App. 132, 140, 724 P.2d 412 (1986). Moreover, dismissal was not required under CR 41(b)(1) because the matter was noted for the final hearing before the hearing on the motion to dismiss. *117 ANALYSIS OF LUPA APPEAL 131 141 151 Scope and Standard of Review. With limited exceptions, LUPA provides "the exclusive means of judicial review of land use decisions." RCW 36.70C.030(1). By petitioning under LUPA, a party seeks judicial review by asking the superior court to exercise appellate jurisdiction. Chaney v. Fetterly, 100 Wash.App. 140, 142 n. 2, 995 P.2d 1284, review denied, 11 P.3d 824 (2000). The court may affirm or reverse the land use decision under review or remand the decision for modification or for further proceedings. RCW 36.70C.140. This court stands in the same position as the superior court when reviewing the underlying administrative decision. Biermann v. City of Spokane, 90 Wash.App. 816, 821, 960 P.2d 434 (1998), review denied, 137 Wash.2d 1004, 972 P.2d 466 (1999). Under LUPA, a reviewing court may grant relief under any or all of the six circumstances set forth in RCW 36.70C.130(1). Issues of law are reviewed de novo. City of University Place v. McGuire, 102 Wash.App. 658, 667, 9 P.3d 918 (2000); Girton v. City of Seattle, 97 Wash.App. 360, 363, 983 P.2d 1135 (1999), review denied, 140 Wash.2d 1007, 999 P.2d 1259 (2000). LUPA Petition. Sunderland's LUPA petition seeks reversal of the City's land use decision to deny approval of a SUP for Sunderland's proposed home. Sunderland's petition alleges the City's land use decision: (1) constituted an erroneous interpretation and application of the WHPA and the FHA; and (2) was not supported by evidence that was substantial when viewed in light of the whole record. Claims for damages or compensation **960 may be set forth in the same complaint with a land use petition and the judge who hears the land use petition may, if appropriate, preside at a trial for damages or compensation. RCW 36.70C.030(1)(c). However, in its petition, Sunderland reserved the right to subsequently file and pursue claims for monetary damages against the City in an independent action for damages pursuant to the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, the Washington Law Against Discrimination (chapter 49.60 RCW), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S:. Government Works. 5 Sunderland Family Treatment Services v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash.App. 109 (2001) 26 P.3d 955, 21 NDLR P 125 *118 The superior court reversed the City's land use decision but treated the LUPA proceeding as a summary judgment proceeding addressing liability issues under the WHPA, the Washington Law Against Discrimination, the FHA, the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because we are exercising appellate jurisdiction, we limit our review to those issues raised by Sunderland in its LUPA petition. We first consider the applicability of the WHPA and the FHA. [6] WHPA v. FHA. The Legislature adopted the WHPA to, among other things, "[i]ncrease the supply of housing for persons with special needs." RCW 43.185B.005(2)(e). The WHPA, in pertinent part, reads as follows: No city may enact or maintain an ordinance, development regulation, zoning regulation or official control, policy, or administrative practice which treats a residential structure occupied by persons with handicaps differently than a similar residential structure occupied by a family or other unrelated individuals. As used in this section, "handicaps" are as defined in the federal fair housing amendments act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. § 3602). RCW 35A.63.240 (emphasis added). The WHPA is a broad provision tailored to address municipal ordinances, practices, or policies that treat similar residential structures "differently" based on the residents' handicap and familial status. Significantly, the WHPA does not contain an intent requirement or require a showing of "discrimination." In other words, the WHPA prohibits ordinances, practices, or policies that distinguish between residential structures based on the residents' handicaps and familial status, regardless of a city's intent when enacting or enforcing the ordinance, policy or practice. 171 181 191 1101 The trial court suggests that the WHPA and the FHA are coextensive. We disagree. A violation of the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f), may be established under any or all of three theories: disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure to make reasonable accommodations. Smith & Lee *119 Assocs. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 790 (6th Cir.1996). The disparate treatment theory applies when an ordinance is facially discriminatory and the disparate impact theory applies when an ordinance is neutral on its face, but has a disparate impact. Children's Alliance v. City of Bellevue, 950 F.Supp. 1491, 1495 (W.D.Wash.1997); Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 911 F.Supp. 918, 938 (D.Md.1996), aff'd, 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir.1997). The disparate treatment theory requires a showing of discriminatory intent and the disparate impact theory requires a showing of a discriminatory effect.' Significantly, the FHA also defines discrimination to include "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling[.]" 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (West 1994). Consequently, when applying a valid ordinance, a government's failure to make a reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities may give rise to a cause of action under the reasonable accommodations theory. Bryant Woods, 911 F.Supp. at 928. **961 We conclude that reference to the FHA is helpful when applying the WHPA but we do not believe these provisions are coextensive because the FHA prohibits discriminatory housing practices based on handicap or familial status whereas the WHPA has no intent requirement and requires only a showing that an ordinance, practice, or policy treats residential structures occupied by handicapped persons "differently" than a structure occupied by a family or other unrelated individuals. Furthermore, the WHPA does not contain language that would require a city to make reasonable accommodations to permit a person with a handicap to occupy a dwelling. *120 Sunderland encountered two separate obstacles when it attempted to open a group home for handicapped children in Pasco. First, the City ordinances required Sunderland to obtain a SUP before occupying the selected residential structure. Second, the City denied the SUP based on the requirements contained in the City's home occupation ordinance. Sunderland contends the ordinances triggering these events violated the WHPA and the FHA. Because we have only the administrative record before us, we limit our inquiry to the application of the WHPA and the question of whether the application of the City's ordinances caused the proposed Sunderland home to be treated differently than a similar residential structure occupied by a family.2 SUP Requirement. Sunderland was required to obtain a SUP because it did not fit within the definition of "family" contained in PMC 22.12.330, which defines "family" as "one or more related persons, or five or less unrelated persons over the age of sixteen years occupying premises and living as a single housekeeping unit as distinguished from a group home, group care facility, lodging house, boarding home, club, fraternity or hotel." WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works, 6 Sunderland Family Treatment Services v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash.App. 109 (2001) 26 P.3d 955, 21 NDLR P 125 (Emphasis added.) The City apparently took the position that a SUP proceeding was required because the proposed group home was either a "group care facility" or a "community service facility" as defmed by PMC 22.12.385 and .215. A group care facility or a community service facility is an unclassified use that is permissible in any zoning district under a SUP. PMC 22.80.010; .020(3), (7). However, a "family," irrespective of size, or a chapter 74.15 RCW foster family home may occupy a residential structure in the same neighborhood without having to obtain a SUP. As a residential facility, the proposed group home is best categorized as a "group care facility," rather than a *121 "community service facility." A "community service facility" includes daycare centers, nursery schools, churches and other providers of social, health, and welfare services. PMC 22.12.215. A "group care facility" is defmed as "any number of unrelated persons living together as a single housekeeping unit sponsored by a public or private service entity whether supervision of the residents is provided on a full or part-time basis." PMC 22.12.385. It follows then that the proposed home could be categorized as a "family" unless the home consisted of six or more 17 year olds. But the proposed Sunderland home was not treated as a "family" because the proposed home fell within the defmition of a "group care facility" based on the supervision needs of the proposed residents. Hence, Sunderland was required to obtain a SUP for the proposed home because the residents were unrelated and required "supervision." Our analysis under the WHPA is guided by City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 115 S.Ct. 1776, 131 L.Ed.2d 801 (1995) and Children's Alliance v. City of Bellevue, 950 F.Supp. 1491 (W.D.Wash.1997), two cases that consider the application of the FHA to city ordinances. In Edmonds, the Supreme Court considered whether an ordinance that defmed "family" based on an occupancy limitation qualified under a FHA provision that exempted " 'any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.' " Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 728, 115 S.Ct. 1776 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1)). The court held that this provision exempts only total occupancy limits that **962 are intended to prevent overcrowding, and not ordinances that are designed to promote the "family character" of a neighborhood. Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 735, 115 S.Ct. 1776. The ordinance in question governed single-family dwelling units and defined "family" to include any number of persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer unrelated persons. Id. at 728, 115 S.Ct. 1776. The Supreme Court concluded the FHA applied to "rules designed to preserve the *122 family character of a neighborhood, fastening on the composition of households rather than on the total number of occupants living quarters can contain...." Id. at 735, 115 S.Ct. 1776. In Children's Alliance, the court considered the language of Bellevue Ordinance No. 4861. As here, the definition of "family" in Ordinance 4861 could have included a group home. Ordinance 4861 defined a "family" as "[o]ne or more persons (but not more than six unrelated persons) living together as a single housekeeping unit." The ordinance went on to define a "group facility" as a " `staffed living facility for a group of persons, which may include both children and adults....' " Children's Alliance, 950 F.Supp. at 1496. The court determined that the language of Ordinance 4861 was facially invalid because the ordinance distinguished between group facilities and families based on the presence of "staff" who provide " 'care and supervision for and assistance with the daily living activities of the Residence in a Group Facility.' " Id. The court concluded that the use of "staff' was a proxy for a classification based on the presence of individuals under 18 and individuals with handicaps as both groups require supervision and assistance. Id. The Children's Alliance court further concluded that the distinction drawn between families and groups constituted a FHA violation because of the burdens placed on the latter but not on the former. Each group facility was required to be at least 1,000 feet from another group facility of the same type; group facilities located in residential zones R-1 through R-7.5 were limited to six residents, two resident staff, and minor children of the residents and the staff even though any number of related individuals could reside together. Id. at 1497. 1111 Applying the reasoning of Edmonds and Children's Alliance, in the context of the WHPA, we conclude that the City violated the WHPA by defining "family" in such a way as to impose additional burdens on residential care facilities for the handicapped. The City violated the WHPA by adopting a regulatory scheme that permitted a *123 "family" to obtain immediate occupancy of a residential structure but required "group care facilities" to obtain a SUP before occupying a similar residential structure. But for the City's definition of family, the residents of the proposed facility would have been entitled to immediate occupancy of the home. Instead, the residents of the proposed facility were denied access based on their handicap and familial status. WestlawNexf © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 Sunderland Family Treatment Services v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash.App. 109 (2001) 26 P.3d 955, 21 NDLR P 125 The City contends the SUP requirement does not treat persons with handicaps differently. The City argues that the handicapped children were not completely excluded from the neighborhood in that they could live in the neighborhood as part of a foster family home. In making this argument, the City ignores the fact that the WHPA targets ordinances, practices, and policies that distinguish between residents of similar residential structures based on handicap and familial status. The ordinances here would permit a handicapped child to live in a foster family home in the same neighborhood, but this child would not receive the level of supervision available in the Sunderland home unless the foster parents had the same certification and employed the same supervision techniques required by the regulations governing the proposed Sunderland home. By limiting these children to the type of care provided in a foster home, the City prevented these children from residing in a setting tailored to meet their special needs solely because of their familial status. In short, the City's arguments concerning foster homes address issues related to handicap discrimination, but not discrimination based on the presence of a handicap and familial status. The City next argues that a SUP was required because the proposed home is different **963 than a foster family home in that the Sunderland home requires paid staff and an increased intensity of use in terms of the level of supervision within the home. In other words, the City argues that its treatment of foster family homes demonstrates that similar families are treated the same and that the proposed Sunderland facility is treated differently because the *124 supervision within the facility is not similar to that required in a typical family or foster home. In short, the City suggests that the WHPA is inapplicable in the absence of a showing that the handicapped person will live in a residential social setting similar to that found in a family. [121 This argument is without merit. The WHPA prohibits a city from treating "a residential structure occupied by persons with handicaps differently than a similar residential structure occupied by a family or other unrelated individuals." RCW 35A.63.240 (emphasis added). Contrary to the position advocated by the City, the WHPA requires that only the residential structures must be "similar," not that the living arrangements and supervision must be similar to that in a "family." Nothing in the WHPA authorizes cities or courts to examine the level of supervision within a residential structure in order to determine that the handicapped persons will be living in a setting similar to a "family." The City also contends the SUP proceeding was proper because the home occupation ordinance is applied equally to families and group facilities. In making this argument, the City attempts to justify its definition of "family" with considerations of intensity of use drawn from its home occupation ordinance. The City's definition of "family" must be evaluated separately. Here, the City's definition of "family" treats similar residential structures differently based on the potential residents' familial status and need for supervision. Lastly, the City argues that the SUP requirement was proper under the WHPA because a SUP requirement would be permitted under the FHA. To this end, the City cites cases resolved under the FHA reasonable accommodation theory. See Smith & Lee Assocs. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781 (6th Cir.1996); Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096 (3rd Cir.1996); Oxford House -C v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir.1994). But the WHPA does not encompass the reasonable accommodation analysis. *125 The City also relies on a FHA case applying the disparate treatment analysis, Keys Youth Services, Inc. v. City of Olathe, 52 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1301 n. 18 (D.Kansas 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 248 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir.2001), where the court concluded that an aggrieved party could not claim that the City of Olathe intentionally discriminated against potential residents by requiring them to go through a permit process. But, the WHPA does not require a showing of intentional discrimination. In conclusion, the proposed Sunderland home was treated differently than a family because the supervision needs and familial status of the potential residents triggered the SUP requirement. Consequently, the applicable ordinances, including the definition of "family," violated the WHPA as set forth in RCW 35A.63.240. Home Occupation Ordinance. We next consider the City's application of the home occupation ordinance. PMC 22.35.010 states the purpose of the home occupation chapter as follows: "A home occupation chapter is established to provide a means whereby the conduct of business may be permitted as a use accessory to an established residence within a residential district." (Emphasis added.) Sunderland has established that the home will be used for only residential purposes and that all other services will be performed offsite. As a result, Sunderland does not seek approval for a "use accessory" to residential use. Sunderland's use of the property also does not fall within • WestlawNext• © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works 8 Sunderland Family Treatment Services v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash.App. 109 (2001) 26 P.3d 955, 21 NDLR P 125 the general definition of "home occupation" found in PMC 22.35.020, which provides, in part: " 'Home occupation' means a profession, trade, skill or service possessed and utilized, in whole or in part, by a family member(s) for monetary gain within or upon the premises of a permanent dwelling unit in a residential district." (Emphasis added.) **964 The supervision performed at the Sunderland home will generally not be performed by "family" members. Nevertheless, the City applied the home occupation ordinance because PMC 22.35.020 also provides that the "home occupation" definition does not apply to conditional or *126 unclassified uses that require a special use permit. The City argues its application of the home occupation ordinance grants preferential treatment to group care facilities by permitting group care facilities to operate home occupations in circumstances where a family would not be permitted to do so. But this "preferential treatment" allows the City to exclude any group care facilities from a residential neighborhood because the home occupation ordinances are applied differently to families than to group care facilities. When applied to a "family," the home occupation ordinance evaluates accessory uses in addition to the dwelling's primary use as a residence. When applied to the Sunderland home, the home occupation ordinance permitted the City to deny residential use based on standards developed to evaluate an accessory use. In short, the City's "preferential treatment" permitted the City to apply the home ordinance standards to residential care facilities that would not otherwise fall within the definition of "home occupation." The City denied the SUP based on PMC 22.35.050, which sets forth the environmental standards for home occupations. This provision reads as follows: 22.35.050 ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS. All home occupations shall conform to the following standards: (a) Be clearly subordinate to the principal use of the property for residential purposes; (b) Not involve modification of the property or exterior of its structures that indicates other than residential uses of the premises; (c) Is performed entirely within a permanent structure upon the premises; (d) No signs, display or other advertisement upon the property; (e) No media or other off -premises advertising shall give the address or location of the home occupation; (f) No outside storage of materials, supplies, products or by-products, or equipment, except a single occupational vehicle *127 not exceeding 10,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW); (g) Be conducted solely by persons residing within the dwelling unit upon the premises, subject to the definition offamily; (h) Except for articles produced thereon, no merchandise, products, goods or wares may be displayed or offered for sale upon the premises; (i) No occupation requiring the customer or client to be present upon the premises while the profession, trade, skill or service is performed shall be allowed; (j) Noise generated by the home occupation, detectable at any property line, shall not be in excess of the following standards: (1) 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.: 55 dba, (2) 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.: 45 dba; (Emphasis added.) In its decision denying the SUP, the City applied PMC 22.35.050(a), (g), and (i). These environmental standards rely on the concept of accessory use and the definition of family. Effectively, a "family" was the only entity that could meet these standards. First, the environmental standards require that the home occupation be subordinate to the principal use of the property for dwelling purposes. PMC 22.35.050(a). Here, the "business" is necessary to permit residential use -not an accessory use -of the property by handicapped children. Second, the environmental standards require that the business must be conducted by persons residing in the residence, "subject to the definition of family." PMC 22.35.050(g). This standard disallows the presence of any residential or nonresidential staff, denying specialized supervision and care unless it can be performed by a family member. Third, the environmental standards require that the home occupation be one that does not require the customer or client to be on the premises. PMC **965 22.35.050(i). Here, the "clients" are residents, not visitors. A reading of the City's decision denying the permit demonstrates the difficulty of applying these provisions to *128 the "family" composed of potential Sunderland WestlawNext• © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works_ 9 Sunderland Family Treatment Services v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash.App. 109 (2001) 26 P.3d 955, 21 NDLR P 125 residents. Although the City made a fmding related to increased traffic intensity, the City also found that the proposed home would require greater professional supervision, and that "[n]o other residential structure in the neighborhood can have a licensed business on premises with non-resident employees and clientele that do not reside at the structure independent of the home business activity." Administrative Record: Findings, Conclusions and Decision for Denial of Special Use Permit, at tab 18, p. 3. Consequently, the City based its denial of the SUP on the conclusions that (1) the nature and intensity of the use was not subordinate to the principal permitted use of the property, and (2) that the proposed use was not in harmony with the existing residential development in the neighborhood. In effect, the City exempted Sunderland from the defmition of "home occupation," in order to apply the home occupation standards. When applying the standards, however, the City complained that the nature and intensity of the use was different precisely because the facility required "professional staff, rotating nonresident shift employees, volunteers and other professionals providing services" and none of the neighboring residential structures would be able to operate a home business with nonprofessional staff and clientele. Administrative Record: Findings, Conclusions and Decision for Denial of Special Use Permit, at tab 18, p. 5. Simply stated, the City denied the SUP because the proposed Sunderland home would not be occupied by a "family" and because the proposed home needed to employ paid staff in order for handicapped children to live there. 1131 Because of the City of Pasco's definitions of "family" and "home occupation," and the application of the home 2 Footnotes occupation environmental standards, handicapped children who required specialized care were denied access to a single-family home in Pasco based on their handicap and their familial status. In short, handicapped children who required specialized care offered by the proposed Sunderland home were denied access to such care because *129 the care was not offered in a setting that fit within the City's defmition of "family." In effect, the Pasco regulatory scheme is even more restrictive than the scheme challenged in Children's Alliance. While the Children's Alliance scheme imposed restrictions on group homes, the Pasco scheme operated to prevent handicapped children from receiving the residential care and supervision they require under any circumstances. Our scope of review is limited; we review the administrative record to determine whether the City's land use decision here should be affirmed, reversed, or remanded. We reverse the City's land use decision because it violates the WHPA. Sunderland is entitled to immediately occupy and operate the proposed home at the location for which it made application. In view of our disposition, we need not consider the other issues raised on appeal. WE CONCUR: SCHULTHEIS, J., and SWEENEY, J, All Citations 107 Wash.App. 109, 26 P.3d 955, 21 NDLR P 125 " 'The ultimate question in a disparate treatment case is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff.' " Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Nonce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir.1993)). The disparate impact analysis examines a facially -neutral policy or practice for its differential effect on a particular group. Id. at 1501 (citing Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-39 (2nd Cir.), aff'd in part, 488 U.S. 15, 109 S.Ct. 276, 102 L.Ed.2d 180 (1988)). Several courts have concluded that a discriminatory impact cannot be established based on one isolated claim. Bryant Woods, 911 F.Supp. at 939. Because the issues here revolve around the definition and use of the term "family," our discussion is limited to the portion of the WHPA that addresses disparate treatment caused by handicapped and familial status. End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 Sunderland Family Treatment Services v. City of Pasco, 107 Wash.App. 109 (2001) 26 P.3d 955, 21 NDLR P 125 IyIn',"c,sT L() Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 183 Wash.App. 191 Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1. POTALA VILLAGE KIRKLAND, LLC, a Washington limited liability company, and Lobsang Dargey and Tamara Agassi Dargey, a married couple, Respondents, v. CITY OF KIRKLAND, a Washington municipal corporation, Appellant. No. 70542-3—I. I Aug. 25, 2014. Synopsis Background: Property developers filed action against city seeking writ of mandamus directing city to accept and process building permit application for proposed project. The Superior Court, King County, Monica Benton, J., granted summary judgment in favor of developers and issued writ. City appealed. [Holding:] The Court of Appeals, Cox, J., held that developers' filing of application for shoreline substantial development permit did not vest rights to zoning ordinances for entire project that existed on date of application. Reversed and remanded with directions. West Headnotes (5) ['I Zoning and Planning Change of regulations as affecting right "Vested rights doctrine," under which, upon the filing of a valid and fully complete building permit application, the zoning or other land use control ordinances in effect on the date of the application control, strongly protects the right to develop property. West's RCWA 19.27.095(1). Cases that cite this headnote [21 [31 [41 Zoning and Planning Change of regulations as affecting right Under the date certain standard used in the vested rights doctrine, developers are entitled to have a land development proposal processed under the regulations in effect at the time a complete building permit application is filed, regardless of subsequent changes in zoning or other land use regulations. West's RCWA 19.27.095(1). Cases that cite this headnote Constitutional Law Particular issues and applications Zoning and Planning Change of regulations as affecting right A date certain standard, as used in the vested rights doctrine, which provides that the zoning or other land use control ordinances in effect on the date the developer's complete building permit application is filed, ensures that new land -use ordinances do not unduly oppress development rights, thereby denying a property owner's right to due process under the law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's RCWA 19.27.095(1). 2 Cases that cite this headnote Zoning and Planning Change of regulations as affecting right Developers' filing of completed application for shoreline substantial development permit for portion of project prior to city's moratorium on certain building permits did not vest rights to zoning or other land use control ordinances for entire project that existed on date of filing, absent filing of completed building permit ,,Next © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U_S, Government Works. Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 151 application; statute governing vested rights doctrine only referred to building permits and did not include shoreline substantial development permits, and no law prevented developer from filing building permit application prior to moratorium. West's RCWA 19.27.095(1). 1 Cases that cite this headnote Zoning and Planning W -Change of regulations as affecting right Filing of an application for the shoreline substantial development permit, without filing an application for a building permit, does not vest rights to zoning or other land use control ordinances. West's RCWA 19.27.095(1). Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms **1144 Stephanie Ellen Croll, Keating Bucklin & McCormack Inc. PS, Seattle, WA, Robin Jenkinson, City Attorney, Kirkland, WA, for Appellant. Duana Theresa Kolouskova, Johns Monroe Mitsunga Kolouskova PLLC, Bellevue, WA, for Respondent. Roger D. Wynne, Seattle City Attorney's Office, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Wa State Association of Municipal Attorneys. Tim Trohimovich, Futurewise, Jeffrey M. Eustis, Aramburu & Eustis LLP, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Futurewise. Opinion COX, J. *194 ¶ 1 Washington's vested rights doctrine originated at common law but is now statutory.' Under RCW 19.27.095(1), vesting occurs on the filing of a "valid and fully complete building permit application." In such an "'°" e,1VerwNext' © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works event, the "zoning or other land use control ordinances in effect on the date of the application" shall control.' ¶ 2 Here, Lobsang Dargey, Tamara Agassi Dargey, and Potala Village Kirkland, LLC (collectively "Potala Village") sought to develop certain real property in the City of Kirkland. Potala Village filed a complete application for a shoreline substantial development permit on February 23, 2011. But it did not file an application for a building permit before the City imposed a moratorium on the issuance of certain permits. The filing of the application for the shoreline substantial development permit is not a building permit application. Thus, it did not vest on February 23, 2011 rights to then -existing zoning or other land use control ordinances. We reverse the grant of summary judgment to Potala Village and remand with directions to grant summary judgment to the City. ¶ 3 The material facts are undisputed, as all parties expressly acknowledge in their appellate briefmg.' ¶ 4 Potala Village sought to construct a large mixed-use project in the Neighborhood Business ("BN") Zone of the City. The project is to include residential, retail, and commercial space. ¶ 5 Potala Village had two meetings with the City in 2009 and 2010. These meetings resulted in a determination that multiple permits for the project would be required. Because a small portion of the project is to be located within an area subject to state and local shoreline laws, Potala Village was *195 required to file an application with the City for a shoreline substantial development permit. ¶ 6 On February 23, 2011, Potala Village filed an application for a shoreline substantial development permit for the portion of the proposed development within the shoreline area.4 It did not file an application for a building permit for the entire proposed development, although no law prohibited it from doing so. On May 11, 2011, the City issued a letter of completeness for the shoreline substantial development permit application. ¶ 7 An organized group of neighbors publicly voiced objections to the proposed development. The group particularly objected to the proposed residential density for Potala **1145 Village. It appears that surrounding residential properties are zoned for a maximum density of 12 units per acre. 118 On November 15, 2011, the City enacted an ordinance imposing an emergency development moratorium on the 2 Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 BN zone. The moratorium temporarily precluded the issuance of permits in the BN zone. As of the date of the moratorium, Potala Village still had not filed an application for a building permit. ¶ 9 On May 1, 2012, the City Council extended the moratorium for six months. Shortly thereafter, Potala Village commenced this action against the City, alleging multiple causes of action and seeking declaratory and other relief. ¶ 10 Potala Village attempted to file a building permit application on October 16, 2012. The City declined to accept it because of the existing moratorium. Later that same day, the City extended the moratorium for the fmal time. ¶ 11 On December 11, 2012, the City Council amended the city zoning code in a number of ways. For purposes of this action, the code changes to the BN zone placed a limit on residential density of 48 units per acre. As amended, the *196 code limits Potala Village's project to 60 units instead of the 143 units that it sought to construct. ¶ 12 The City approved Potala Village's shoreline substantial development permit application on January 17, 2013. ¶ 13 All parties to this litigation moved for summary judgment. The City argued that Potala Village's failure to file a completed building permit application before the building permit moratorium of November 15, 2011 precluded vesting of rights to zoning or other land use control ordinances in effect prior to that date. It argued that the filing of the shoreline substantial development permit application on February 23, 2011 did not vest such rights. ¶ 14 Potala Village disagreed. It took the position that the filing of its completed shoreline substantial development permit application on February 23, 2011 for a portion of the project was sufficient to vest rights to the zoning or other land use control ordinances in effect on that date for the entire project. It sought a writ of mandamus directing the City to accept and process a building permit application for the project. ¶ 15 The trial court granted summary judgment to Potala Village and issued a writ of mandamus. The court denied the City's motion for reconsideration. ¶ 16 The City appeals. VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE ¶ 17 The City argues that Potala Village did not file an application for a building permit and, thus, it had no right to vest to the zoning or other land use control ordinances that existed at the time it filed its shoreline substantial development permit application on February 23, 2011. We agree. *197 ¶ 18 This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo.' Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law!' This case presents a question of law, which this court reviews de novo! Background ['] [2] ¶ 19 The vested rights doctrine "originated at common law.'" "Washington's vested rights doctrine strongly protects the right to develop property."' This doctrine uses a "date certain" standard."° "Under the date certain standard, developers are entitled 'to have a land development proposal processed under the regulations in effect at the time a complete building permit application is filed, regardless of subsequent **1146 changes in zoning or other land use regulations.' "" 131 ¶ 20 A date certain standard "ensures that 'new land -use ordinances do not unduly oppress development rights, thereby denying a property owner's right to due process under the law.' "°' This is the minority approach within the United States, and " 'it offers [greater] protection of [developers' *198 ] rights than the rule generally applied in other jurisdictions.' "' ¶ 21 In the 1950s, the supreme court first adopted the common law vested rights doctrine. In Ogden v. City of Bellevue" and Hull v. Hunt, "y the supreme court explained that the right to construct in accordance with the "zoning ordinances and building codes in force at the time of application for the permit" vests when a party applies for a "building permit.""6 ¶ 22 In cases that followed, Washington courts applied the vested rights doctrine to permit applications other than building permit applications."' They included conditional use permit applications,` grading permit applications,' shoreline substantial development permit applications,'" Westia Next © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works, 3 Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 and septic permit applications." 1123 In 1987, the legislature enacted legislation regarding the vested rights doctrine. The session laws added two new sections to chapter 19.27 RCW and chapter 58.17 RCW, which were later codified at RCW 19.27.095(1) and *199 RCW 58.17.033(1) respectively.22 The session laws provide in relevant part as follows: NEW SECTION. Sec. 1. A new section is added to chapter 19.27 RCW to read as follows: (1) A valid and fully complete building permit application for a structure, that is permitted under the zoning or other land use control ordinances in effect on the date of the application shall be considered under the building permit ordinance in effect at the time of application, and the zoning or other land use control ordinances in effect on the date of application. NEW SECTION. Sec. 2. A new section is added to chapter 58.17 RCW to read as follows: (1) A proposed division of land, as defined in RCW 58.17.020, shall be considered under the subdivision or short subdivision ordinance, and zoning or other land use control ordinances, in effect on the land at the time a fully completed application for preliminary plat approval of the subdivision, or short plat approval of the short subdivision, has been submitted to the appropriate county, city, or town official.23 **1147 As shown by the emphasized language, these statutory sections only refer to building permit applications and subdivision applications.' ¶ 24 In 1994, the supreme court considered whether the vested rights doctrine applied to master use permit (MUP) applications» In Erickson & Associates, Inc. v. McLerran, a developer filed a completed MUP application."' After the application filing, a city ordinance became effective, which adversely impacted the proposed project that was the *200 subject of the application." The developer argued that the vested rights doctrine applied to the MUP application» The supreme court disagreed, holding that the doctrine did not apply to the filing of MUP applications.' ¶ 25 In its analysis, the court referred to the 1987 legislation that codified the common law doctrine, at least to the extent specified in the statutes.'" The developer argued that the doctrine was not limited to building permit applications." In support, the developer cited a 1974 case from this court, Talbot v. Gray, which applied the doctrine to a shoreline permit» The developer also cited other case authority applying the doctrine to other types of permit applications." Notably, all of the cited cases preceded the 1987 legislation codifying the doctrine to the extent specified in the statutes." ¶ 26 The supreme court agreed with the developer in Erickson that prior cases applied the doctrine in other contexts besides building permits» But it concluded that the vested rights doctrine was not a "blanket rule" requiring municipalities to process all permit applications according to the rules in place at the outset. a Rather, this doctrine was designed to place limits on the municipalities' *201 discretion to allow developers to plan with " `reasonable certainty.' ¶ 27 Years later, in Abbey Road Group, LLC v. City of Bonney Lake, the supreme court further developed what it said in Erickson concerning the effect of the 1987 legislation.There, the issue was whether the filing of a site plan without also filing a building permit application vested Abbey Road's development rights." The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, which held that filing a building permit application was necessary.4° ¶ 28 In reaching that result, the supreme court stated that Erickson largely controlled its decision." The court confirmed that in the absence of a local vesting ordinance specifying an earlier vesting date, "RCW 19.27.095(1) is the applicable vesting rule."42 Noting Abbey Road's failure to address this statute, the court rejected the request to overrule its decision in Erickson.43 And the court expressly rejected the invitation to extend **1148 the vested rights doctrine to other situations, stating in a footnote: Abbey Road also argues that we should expand the vested rights doctrine based on case law, contending that there is no "rational reason" for refusing to expand the doctrine to site plan applications when the courts have done so in other contexts.... See Juanita Bay Valley Cmty. Ass 'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wash.App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973) (grading permit applications); Talbot v. Gray, 11 Wash.App. 807, 525 P.2d 801 (1974) (shoreline permit applications); *202 Ford v. Bellingham—Whatcom County Dist. Bd. of Health, 16 Wash.App. 709, 558 P.2d 821 (1977) (septic tank permit application); Beach v. Bd. of Adjustment, 73 Wash.2d 343, 438 P.2d 617 (1968) (conditional use permit applications); Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 95 Wash.App. 883, 976 P.2d 1279 (1999) (conditional use permit applications). Again, in Erickson, we '"'kstLNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters No claim to original U.S. Government Works 4 Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 considered and rejected similar arguments, and we are not persuaded to overrule our analysis or holding in Erickson."' ¶ 29 The court then stated that it could not ignore the legislative directive set forth in RCW 19.27.095(1)." And it also said that this 1987 statute and the analysis in Erickson superseded a prior case to the contrary 46 ¶ 30 Importantly, the Abbey Road court stated that the legislature, not the judiciary, is best suited to reform the vested rights doctrine: Abbey Road urges this court to establish a uniform vesting point "for every land use permit application regardless of the permit's name or what it does or does not do." We find that such a rule would eviscerate the balance struck in the vesting statute. While some of Abbey Road's arguments could support a change in the law, instituting such broad reforms in land use law is a job better suited to the legislature.47 ¶ 31 Most recently, in Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County, the supreme court reiterated that "[w]hile it originated at common law, the vested rights doctrine is now statutory."" This statement is fully consistent with the case law and statutes that we have discussed in tracing the development of the vested rights doctrine. *203 Application 141 ¶ 32 Here, the issue is whether, in the absence of filing a building permit application, the vested rights doctrine applies to vest rights to zoning or land use control ordinances for the project that existed at the time Potala Village filed its shoreline substantial development permit application on February 23, 2011. The validity of the moratorium on the issuance of permits that the City imposed before Potala Village attempted to file its building permit application is not at issue in this appeal. ¶ 33 To resolve the issue on appeal, we are guided by the supreme court's decisions in Erickson and Abbey Road and its most recent statement in Town of Woodway: "While it originated at common law, the vested rights doctrine is now statutory." 151 ¶ 34 With these points in mind, we hold that the filing of the application for the shoreline substantial development permit, without filing an application for a building permit, did not vest rights to zoning or other land use control ordinances. ¶ 35 We turn first to RCW 19.27.095(1), which states: **1149 A valid and fully complete building permit application for a structure, that is permitted under the zoning or other land use control ordinances in effect on the date of the application shall be considered under the building permit ordinance in effect at the time of application, and the zoning or other land use control ordinances in effect on the date of application.1i6 As previously noted, the plain words of this statute include "building permits" but do not include shoreline substantial development permits. We must presume that the legislature *204 was aware of the then -existing common law regarding the vested rights doctrine when it passed this legislation." Yet the legislature only codified the vested rights doctrine to the extent of building permits in this section of the session laws» Thus, we further conclude from the exclusion of shoreline substantial development permits that the legislature intended that the vested rights doctrine would not extend to such permits." ¶ 36 The Final Bill Report for enactment of this legislation in 1987 reinforces our conclusion. It states as follows: FINAL BILL REPORT SSB 5519 SYNOPSIS AS ENACTED BACKGROUND: Washington State has adhered to the current vested rights doctrine since the Supreme Court case on State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, 45 Wash.2d 492 [275 P.2d 899] (1954). The doctrine provides that a party filing a timely and sufficiently complete building permit application obtains a vested right to have that application processed according to zoning, land use and building ordinances in effect at the time of the application. The doctrine is applicable if the permit application is sufficiently complete, complies with existing zoning ordinances and building codes, and is filed during the period the zoning ordinances under which the developer seeks to develop are in effect. If a developer complies with these requirements, a project cannot be *205 obstructed by enacting new zoning ordinances or building codes. West Main Associates v. Bellevue, 106 Wash.2d 47 [720 P.2d 782] (1986). vw,,,;ttawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 SUMMARY: The vested rights doctrine established by case law is made statutory, with the additional requirement that a permit application be fully completed for the doctrine to apply. The vesting of rights doctrine is extended to applications for preliminary or short plat approval. The requirements for a fully completed building permit application or preliminary on short plat application shall be defined by local ordinance." 1137 The background statement shows that the legislature was aware of the common law origins of this doctrine, citing Ogden. Notably, that was a case that applied the doctrine to a building permit." Thus, the legislature chose to codify the vested rights doctrine, but only to the extent of building permits, as the plain language of the statute specifies. 1138 We also note that the legislature also chose to extend the vested rights doctrine to completed applications for preliminary plat approval of subdivisions or short plat approval for short subdivisions at the same time it codified the doctrine to the extent of building permits. We conclude from this that the legislature considered a wider scope of permit **1150 types to which the doctrine might apply beyond building permits. Yet, the legislature chose not to include applications for shoreline substantial development permits within its 1987 codification of the vested rights doctrine. Because these statutes are essentially the same now as when first enacted, we conclude the extent of codification of the vested rights doctrine remains the same. ¶ 39 Potala Village ignores RCW 19.27.095(1). It also fails to persuasively address Town of Woodway, Abbey Road, and *206 Erickson, all of which trace the supreme court's evolving views on whether and to what extent the vested rights doctrine applies. ¶ 40 The trial court granted Potala Village's motion for summary judgment and issued a writ of mandamus directing the City to accept and process Potala Village's building permit application In doing so, the trial court cited in its order this court's 2013 decision that preceded the supreme court's decision in Town of Woodway.'7 We view this citation as likely a reference to language in this court's opinion that cited Talbot in the discussion of the development of the vested rights doctrine over time." Accordingly, we turn to this court's 1974 decision in Talbot to consider its effect on the question before us. ¶ 41 There, the City of Seattle granted the Grays "a permit" authorizing them to construct a dock.'' The Grays' neighbors, the Talbots and the Hartmans, brought an action to permanently enjoin the City from authorizing the construction of a dock in the shoreline area along Lake Washington." ¶ 42 Primarily at issue was whether the City had correctly applied the provisions of its zoning ordinance in issuing the permit for construction of the dock.6 This court construed the City zoning ordinance and rejected the contention that the dock was not permitted as an "accessory use."67 *207 ¶ 43 The court then considered the contention that the owners of the property where the dock was to be built had not given proper notice under the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, as implemented by Seattle's ordinance." Specifically, the notice was given as required by the state statute and before the effective date of the Seattle implementing ordinance/4 Thus, the question was which notice provision prevailed." 1144 This court answered the question as follows: [The permit applicant's] obligations and rights to develop vested on November 18, 1971, when they applied for a substantial development permit The applicable rule adopted by the court in Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash.2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958) and recently approved in Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assoc., Inc., 82 Wash.2d 475, 481, 513 P.2d 36 (1973) is "[T]he right vests when the party ... applies for his building permit, if that permit is thereafter issued. This rule, of course, assumes that the permit applied for and granted be consistent with the zoning ordinances and building codes in force at the time of application for the permit."" ¶ 45 Potala Village argues that we should read Talbot to require applying the vested rights doctrine to this case, despite its failure to file an application for a building permit **1151 before passage of the moratorium. We decline to do so. 1146 First, in that case, the property owners who sought to construct a dock in the shoreline area applied for and received what can properly be described as a building permit under the City's zoning ordinances.' Here, unlike *208 that case, Potala Village failed to file any application for a building permit before the moratorium went into effect. 1147 Second, as the above excerpt from Talbot shows, this court applied the common law rule regarding vested rights for building permit applications to the shoreline uI "Ate:; Next © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works....._ __.._., ®.... 6 Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 substantial development permit application under the facts of that case .8 But we do not read that 1974 decision to support Potala Village's argument in this case—that the February 23, 2011 filing of an application for a shoreline substantial development permit for a portion of this project vests rights to the zoning or land use control ordinances for the entire project that existed as of that date. We simply cannot agree with this argument because it directly contradicts the development of the law in Erickson, Abbey Road, and Town of Woodway.59 ¶ 48 Potala Village makes a number of arguments to support its assertion that the vested rights doctrine applies to shoreline substantial development permits. None are persuasive. ¶ 49 First, Potala Village cites a number of cases to support its assertion. ¶ 50 Two of these cases on which it relies were decided before the 1987 legislation that we discussed previously in this opinion» Thus, they are not persuasive. ¶ 51 Potala Village also relies on the supreme court case, Buechel v. State Department of Ecology, which was decided after 1987.'6 But that case did not expressly consider the issue present in this case because the landowner applied for a building permit and a variance.T Thus, that case is unlike this case where there is no building permit application. *209 ¶ 52 Two other cases that Potala Village cites are not supreme court cases and were decided before Abbey Road and Town of Woodway.''J' Thus, they are not persuasive. ¶ 53 Second, Potala Village contends that Abbey Road and Erickson recognize that statutes "supplement[ 1 common law vesting."" It points to language in these opinions that it claims supports recognizing the common law vested rights doctrine.75 Abbey Road points to Erickson, which stated, Erickson contends the Court of Appeals decision in this case conflicts with prior decisions applying the vested rights doctrine in other contexts. See, e.g., Talbot v. Gray, 11 Wash.App. 807, 811, 525 P.2d 801 (1974) (shoreline permit).... We agree with Erickson that our prior cases apply the vested rights doctrine in other contexts besides building permits." ¶ 54 But, as previously discussed, the supreme court also explained in those cases that the legislature "codified these judicially recognized principles" in 1987." And most **1152 recently the supreme court expressly stated that "the vested rights doctrine is now statutory."P8 Given the supreme court's statements in these cases, we reject Potala Village's arguments to the contrary. ¶ 55 Third, Potala Village argues that "Abbey Road and Erickson are substantively irrelevant because both cases addressed permits which were exclusively created by cities, unlike the state's shoreline permit requirement."" It *210 also asserts that the shoreline permit review process is rigorous and much like the building permit review process."" Whether or not these assertions are true, the legislature has not extended vested rights principles to shoreline permits. Potala Village points to no authority that allows this court to "ignore the legislative directive" that vested rights principles applies in specified circumstances, which do not include shoreline permits.' Thus, these arguments are not persuasive. ¶ 56 Fourth, Potala Village cites Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County to assert that the "vested rights doctrine was originally established through common law, but now is based on both common law and statutory authority, depending on the type of permit application involved."" ¶ 57 There, the supreme court was concerned with the filing of a short plat application.' It explained the development of vested rights: At common law, this state's doctrine of vested rights entitled developers to have a land development proposal processed under the regulations in effect at the time a complete building permit application was filed. Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 123 Wash.2d 864, 867-68, 872 P.2d 1090 (1994). The doctrine at common law was extended to a number of different types of permits, but it was never extended to applications for preliminary plat approval or short plat approval. In 1987, the Legislature (1) codified the traditional common-law vested rights doctrine regarding vesting upon application of building permits, and (2) enlarged the vesting doctrine to also apply to subdivision and short subdivision applications. The two parts of that statute were codified at *211 RCW 19.27.095 (in the state building code statute) and RCW 58.17.033 (in the plats and subdivision statute).B4 Importantly, the supreme court did not consider whether these statutes replaced the common law doctrine for "different types of permits."85 The court did not need to address this issue because the short plat permit application was addressed by the statutes.' ¶ 58 However, Noble Manor contains language that "wA,i!mwNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S Government Works. 7 Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 supports Potala Village's argument that the vested rights doctrine is now "based on both common law and statutory authority, depending on the type of permit application involved.'"' There, the Noble Manor court explained why Erickson did not extend the vested rights doctrine to master use permit applications: There was no case law or statutory authority to support extending the vested rights doctrine to MUP applications. This is in contrast to the present case where the Legislature has extended the doctrine to plat applications. The Erickson decision stands for the proposition that this Court will not extend the vested rights doctrine by judicial expansion. However, the Court of Appeals decision in the present case is **1153 based not on common-law extension of the doctrine but on the legislative extension of the doctrine to subdivision applications in RCW 58.17.033.88 ¶ 59 While this language from Noble Manor supports Potala Village's argument, this case came before Abbey Road and Town of Woodway, where the supreme court appears to have rejected the notion that the vested rights doctrine is based on both common law and statutes. *212 ¶ 60 Similarly, Potala Village cites Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County to assert that the "vested rights doctrine, and the protections it affords, are the same protections irrespective of whether the doctrine applies as a result of common law or statute."8' But, as just discussed, that Division Two case also came before Abbey Road and Town of Woodway. Moreover, the Abbey Road court expressly rejected a similar argument regarding Weyerhaeuser.`' Thus, that case is also not helpful. ¶ 61 Fifth, Potala Village contends that the City "improperly frustrated the building permit application process by asserting it could require a new building permit application in the event it required any changes to the project after shoreline review."G" Potala Village asserts that this case is like West Main Associates v. City of Bellevue.''Y But that case is distinguishable. ¶ 62 There, the supreme court explained that a person's right to develop property is "beyond question a valuable right in property.'" And this right is partly protected by the vested rights doctrine.'" ¶ 63 The court then considered whether a Bellevue ordinance met the due process standards of the Fourteenth Amendment's That ordinance required a person to take a number of steps before filing a building permit application, which would give the person the ability to vest rights in the existing *213 laws.' The court concluded that the ordinance violated due process: The City denies a developer the ability to vest rights until after a series of permits is obtained. The ordinance thus is unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the trial court noted, the pre -application procedures established by the ordinance are vague and discretionary. The City delays the vesting point until well after a developer first applies for City approval of a project, and reserves for itself the almost unfettered ability to change its ordinances in response to a developer's proposal. The ordinance completely upsets our vesting doctrine's protection of a citizen's constitutional right to develop property free of the "fluctuating policy" of legislative bodies." ¶ 64 Here, Potala Village fails to cite any law that prevented it from filing a building permit application before the November 2011 moratorium. Thus, West Main Associates does not support the argument. ¶ 65 The parties have expressly agreed that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Thus, we do not consider arguments to the extent they are based on alleged factual disputes over communications between Potala Village and the City regarding the possible filing of a building permit prior to the time Potala Village actually applied for one. And, as we stated previously in this opinion, the validity of the moratorium is not at issue in this appeal. Thus, there is no reason to apply the principles of West Main Associates to this case. **1154 ¶ 66 To summarize, Potala Village's failure to file a completed application for a building permit before enactment of the City's moratorium on certain permits bars the vesting of rights to zoning or other land use control ordinances for the entire project. The filing of Potala Village's completed application for a shoreline substantial development permit for a portion of the project on February 23, *214 2011 did not vest rights to the zoning or other land use control ordinances for the entire project that existed on that date. ¶ 67 The City states in its briefmg that Talbot, the 1974 decision of this court, may support permit vesting to the "shoreline regulations in effect" at the time of its application for the shoreline substantial development permit.'$ Because that question is not before us, we express no opinion on it. ¶ 68 Finally, we express no opinion on whether or to what extent the vested rights doctrine applies to permits other than shoreline substantial development permits. These questions are not before us. Wesi awNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters, No claim to original U.S, Government Works. 8 Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT directions to the trial court to grant the City's cross-motion for summary judgment and dismissal. ¶ 69 The City argues, in the alternative, that even if Potala Village's rights vested to zoning or other land use control ordinances for the project upon filing of the completed application for the shoreline substantial development permit application, it is not entitled to relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act." Because the vested rights doctrine does not apply to shoreline substantial development permits permit, we need not address that argument. ¶ 70 We reverse the order granting Potala Village's motion for summary judgment. We remand with Footnotes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Wes wNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters No claim to original U S. Government Works. WE CONCUR: TRICKEY and LEACH, JJ. All Citations 183 Wash.App. 191, 334 P.3d 1143 Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County, 180 Wash.2d 165, 173, 322 P.3d 1219 (2014). RCW 19.27.095(1). Appellant City of Kirkland's Opening Brief at 5-6; Respondents' Opening Brief at 3. Respondents' Opening Brief at 6. Snohomish County v. Rugg, 115 Wash.App. 218, 224, 61 P.3d 1184 (2002). CR 56(c). Town of Woodway, 180 Wash.2d at 172, 322 P.3d 1219. Id. at 173, 322 P.3d 1219. Id. at 172, 322 P.3d 1219. Id. Id. at 172-73, 322 P.3d 1219 (quoting Abbey Road Group, LLC v. City of Bonney Lake, 167 Wash.2d 242, 250, 218 P.3d 180 (2009)). Abbey Road, 167 Wash.2d at 251, 218 P.3d 180 (quoting Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash.2d 621, 637, 733 P.2d 182 (1987)). Town of Woodway, 180 Wash.2d at 173, 322 P.3d 1219 (alterations in original) (quoting Abbey Road, 167 Wash.2d at 250, 218 P.3d 180). 45 Wash.2d 492, 496, 275 P.2d 899 (1954). 53 Wash.2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856 (1958). Id.; see also Ogden, 45 Wash.2d at 496, 275 P.2d 899 ("The right accrues at the time an application for a building 9 Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 permit is made." (emphasis added)). See Roger D. Wynne, Washington's Vested Rights Doctrine: How We have Muddled a Simple Concept and How We Can Reclaim It, 24 SEATTLE U.L.REV. 851, 866-67 (2001). Beach v. Bd. of Adjustment of Snohomish County, 73 Wash.2d 343, 347, 438 P.2d 617 (1968). Juanita Bay Valley Cmty. Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wash.App. 59, 84, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973).: Talbot v. Gray, 11 Wash.App. 807, 811, 525 P.2d 801 (1974). Ford v. Bellingham—Whatcom County Dist. Bd. of Health, 16 Wash.App. 709, 715, 558 P.2d 821 (1977); Thurston County Rental Owners Ass'n v. Thurston County, 85 Wash.App. 171, 182, 931 P.2d 208 (1997). Laws of 1987, ch. 104, §§ 1-2. Id. (emphasis added). Id. Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 123 Wash.2d 864, 867, 872 P.2d 1090 (1994). 123 Wash.2d 864, 866, 872 P.2d 1090 (1994). Id. at 866-67, 872 P.2d 1090. Id. at 867, 872 P.2d 1090. Id. at 877, 872 P.2d 1090. Id. at 868, 872 P.2d 1090. Id. at 871-72, 872 P.2d 1090. Id. at 871, 872 P.2d 1-090 (citing Talbot v. Gray, 11 Wash.App. 807, Wash.2d 1001, 1975 WL 48163 (1975)). Id. at 871-72, 872 P.2d 1090 (citing Juanita Bay Valley Cmty. Ass'n, 9 Wash.App. at 715, 558 P.2d 821; Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 97 811, 525 P.2d 801 (1974), Wash.App. at 83-84, 510 P. Wash.2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 See id. Id. at 872-73, 872 P.2d 1090. Id. at 873, 872 P.2d 1090. Id. (quoting West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash.2d 47, 51, 720 P.2d 782 (1986)), 167 Wash.2d 242, 251, 218 P.3d 180 (2009) (citing RCW 19.27.095(1)), Wstu.�:liwNext. © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U,S. Government Works, review denied, 85 2d 1140; Ford, 16 (1982)). 10 Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 Id. at 249, 218 P.3d 180. Id. at 248, 261, 218 P.3d 180. Id. at 252, 218 P.3d 180. Id. Id. 252-53, 218 P.3d 180.. Id. at 253 n. 8, 218 P.3d 180 (emphasis added), Id. at 253, 218 P.3d 180. Id. at 254, 218 P.3d 180 (citing Victoria Tower P'ship v. City of Seattle, 49 Wash.App. 755, 745 P.2d 1328 (1987)). Id. at 260-61, 218 P.3d 180 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing Wynne, supra, at 916-17), 180 Wash.2d 165, 173, 322 P.3d 1219 (2014) (emphasis added) (citing Erickson, 123 Wash.2d at 867-68, 872 P.2d 1090; RCW 19.27.095(1) (building permits); RCW 58.17.033(1) (subdivision applications); RCW 36.706.180 (development agreements)). Id. (Emphasis added.) Woodson v. State, 95 Wash.2d 257, 262, 623 P.2d 683 (1980) ("[T]he legislature is presumed to know the existing state of the case law in those areas in which it is legislating."). Laws of 1987, ch. 104, § 1, Ellensburg Cement Prods., Inc. v. Kittitas County, 179 Wash.2d 737, 750, 317 P.3d 1037 (2014) ("Where a statute specifically designates the things or classes of things upon which it operates, an inference arises in law that all things or classes of things omitted from it were intentionally omitted by the legislature under the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius—specific inclusions exclude implication." (internal quotations marks omitted)). 54 FINAL B. REP. on S.S.B. 5519, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.1987). 55 Ogden, 45 Wash.2d at 493, 496, 275 P.2d 899. 56 Clerk's Papers at 992-95. 57 Id. at 995 (providing the citation, "Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County, 172 Wash.App. 643 [291 P.3d 278] (2013)"). 58 P.3d 1219 (2014) (citing Talbot, 11 Wash.App. at 811, 525 P.2d 801). 59 Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County, 172 Wash.App. 643, 652, 291 P.3d 278 (2013), aff'd, 180 Wash.2d 165, 322 Talbot, 11 Wash.App. at 808-09, 525 P.2d 801. wdNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U S. Government Works. 11 Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 Id. Id. Id. at 811, 525 P.2d 801. Id. Id. Id. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Eastlake Cmty. Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wash.2d 475, 481, 513 P.2d 36 (1973)). See Id., at 809, 525 P.2d 801. Id., at 811, 525 P.2d 801 Town of Woodway, 180 Wash.2d at 173, 322 P.3d 1219. Respondents' Opening Brief at 27 (citing Norco Constr., Inc., 97 Wash.2d at 684, 649 P.2d 103; Carlson v. Town of Beaux Arts Vill., 41 Wash.App. 402, 405, 704 P.2d 663 (1985)). Id. (citing Buechel v. State Dep't of Ecology, 125 Wash.2d 196, 884 P.2d 910 (1994)). Buechel, 125 Wash.2d at 199 n. 2, 884 P.2d 910. Respondents' Opening Brief at 27 (citing Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 95 Wash.App. 883, 893 n. 12, 976 P.2d 1279 (1999); Westside Bus. Park, LLC v. Pierce County, 100 Wash.App. 599, 603, 5 P.3d 713 (2000)). Id., at 35-36. See Abbey Road, 167 Wash.2d at 253 n. 8, 218 P.3d 180; Erickson, 123 Wash.2d at 871-73, 872 P.2d 1090. Erickson, 123 Wash.2d at 871-73, 872 P.2d 1090. Abbey Road, 167 Wash.2d at 251, 218 P.3d 180; see also Erickson, 123 Wash.2d at 868, 872 P.2d 1090, Town of Woodway, 180 Wash.2d at 173, 322 P.3d 1219 (emphasis added), Respondents' Opening Brief at 39-42. Id. at 23-27, 39-42. Abbey Road, 167 Wash.2d at 253, 218 P.3d 180; see also Town of Woodway, 180 Wash.2d at 173, 322 P.3d 1219, Next" © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12 Potala Village Kirkland, LLC v. City of Kirkland, 183 Wash.App. 191 (2014) 334 P.3d 1143 82 Respondents' Opening Brief at 29 (citing Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash.2d 269, 943 P.2d 1378 (1997)). 83 Noble Manor, 133 Wash.2d at 272, 274, 943 P.2d 1378, 84 Id. at 275, 943 P.2d 1378 (some emphasis added) (some citations omitted). 85 Id. 86 Id. 87 Respondents' Opening Brief at 29. 88 Noble Manor, 133 Wash.2d at 279-80, 943 P.2d 1378 (emphasis added). B9 Respondents' Opening Brief at 29 (citing Weyerhaeuser, 95 Wash.App. 883, 976 P.2d 1279). 90 See Abbey Road, 167 Wash.2d at 253 n. 8, 218 P.3d 180. 91 Respondents' Opening Brief at 47-50. 92 Id. at 49 (citing West Main Assocs., 106 Wash.2d 47, 720 P.2d 782). 93 West Main Assocs., 106 Wash.2d at 50, 720 P.2d 782, 94 Id. 95 Id. at 52, 720 P.2d 782. 96 Id. at 49, 52-53, 720 P.2d 782. 97 Id. at 52-53, 720 P.2d 782, 98 Appellant City of Kirkland's Opening Brief at 39, 99 Id. at 41-43. End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Wu Lsw vNexf © 2015 Thomson Reuters No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 13 AN ORDINANCE ORDINANCE NO. 2015 - relating to land use; amending Section 15.02.020 of the Yakima Municipal Code to add definition of mission use, and amending Table 4-1 of Section 15.04.030 of the Yakima Municipal Code designating such use as a Class (2) use only within the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts of the City of Yakima. WHEREAS, the City Council has previously adopted ordinances establishing zoning districts within the City of Yakima, defining certain land uses, and designating such uses within the zoning districts, all as codified in Title 15 of the Yakima Municipal Code (YMC); and WHEREAS, the City Council previously adopted Ordinance No. 2014-027 implementing a moratorium on the acceptance of applications for, processing and issuance of, land use approvals and permits for "mission uses" within the SCC Small Convenience Center zoning district pending adoption of a comprehensive regulation governing such uses; and WHEREAS, the Planning Commission of the City of Yakima has conducted meetings and a public hearing on March 25, 2015 pursuant to notice, and after consideration of all comments, evidence and testimony presented has presented a recommendation, supported by appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted April 8, 2015, to the City Council; and WHEREAS, the City Council held a public hearing on May 19, 2015 to receive and consider the recommendation of the Planning Commission, and after receiving public comment and testimony, remanded the recommendation to the Planning Commission to consider whether new mission uses should be considered Class (3) uses in the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts of the City of Yakima; and WHEREAS, the Planning Commission has held a study session and conducted a public hearing on June 24, 2015 concerning such issues, and having considered all evidence and testimony presented, has adopted Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Recommendation; and WHEREAS, the City Council has received the recommendation of the Planning Commission and has conducted a public hearing on July 21, 2015 pursuant to notice duly published to consider such recommendation; and WHEREAS, the recommendation of the Planning Commission supports the amendment of YMC 15.02.020 to add a definition of "mission" use, and to amend Table 4-1 of YMC 15.04.030 to allow such use as a Class (2) use only within the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts of the City of Yakima, but requiring that new mission uses within such zoning districts shall 1 be subject to a Type (3) review with a development agreement incorporating applicable development standards and mitigations imposed by the hearing examiner; and further that any modification of an existing mission use shall be subject to the modification procedures and provisions of Chapter 15.17 YMC; provided, that any proposed modification that does not meet the criteria in YMC 15.17.040 for administrative review and approval shall be subject to a Type (3) review with a development agreement incorporating applicable development standards and mitigations imposed by the hearing examiner; and WHEREAS, the City Council finds and determines that such recommendation is supported by previous interpretations of record by the hearing examiner as set forth in In re: Union Gospel Mission, City No. UAZO-Interp. No. 1-92, Examiner No. 192-5-2 (Lamb, Feb. 27, 1992); and In re: Modification of Interpretation, Union Gospel Mission, Interpretation No. 2-95, Examiner No. 195-5-27 (Lamb, June 9, 1995); and WHEREAS, the City Council finds and determines that YMC 15.02.020 should be amended to add a definition of "mission" use consistent with the definition previously formulated by the hearing examiner, and that Table 4-1 of YMC 15.04.030 should be amended to allow such use as a Class (2) use with a Type (3) review as described above, and with an approved development agreement within the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts of the City of Yakima; and WHEREAS, the City Council finds and determines that the amendments described above are in the best interest of residents of the City of Yakima and will promote the general health, safety and welfare; now, therefore BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF YAKIMA: Section 1. The recommendation of the City of Yakima Planning Commission as described above is received, together with the Planning Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support thereof, which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are hereby adopted by the City Council. Section 2. YMC 15.04.020 is hereby amended to add a definition of land use for "mission" use to read as follows: "Mission" means a facility typically owned or operated by a public agency or non- profit corporation, providing a variety of services for the disadvantaged, typically including but not limited to temporary housing for the homeless, dining facilities, health and counseling activities, whether or not of a spiritual nature, with such services being generally provided to the public at large. Mission uses shall be Class (2) uses within the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts as set forth in Table 4-1, YMC 15.04.030, and subject to a Type (3) review as set forth in Chapter 15.15 YMC with a development agreement incorporating applicable development standards 2 and mitigations imposed by the hearing examiner. Effective as and from August 24, 2015, any modification of an existing mission use shall be subject to the modification procedures and provisions of Chapter 15.17 YMC; provided, that any proposed modification that does not meet the criteria in YMC 15.17.040 for administrative review and approval shall be subject to a Type (3) review with a development agreement incorporating applicable development standards and mitigations imposed by the hearing examiner. Section 3. Table 4-1 of YMC 15.04.030 ("Health and Social Service Facility" component) is hereby amended to provide that mission uses are Class (2) uses only within the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts within the City of Yakima, and not allowed within any other zoning districts, and subject to Type (3) review with a development agreement, all as set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference, and with such changes shown in legislative format as set forth in Exhibit "B" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. Section 4. This ordinance shall be in full force and effect 30 days after its passage, approval, and publication as provided by law and by the City Charter. PASSED BY THE CITY COUNCIL, signed and approved this 21s1 day of July, 2015. ATTEST: Micah Cawley, Mayor City Clerk Publication Date: Effective Date: 3 EXHIBIT "A" (Table 4-1, YMC 15.04.030) Table 4-1 Permitted Land Uses ("Health and Social Service Facility" Component) HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICE FACILITY Group Homes (six or fewer), Adult Family Home (*) R- R- R- B- B- 1 1 1 M- M- SR 1 2 3 1 2 HB SCC LCC AS GC CBD RD 1 2 HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICE FACILITY Group Homes (six or fewer), Adult Family Home (*) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Treatment Centers For Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Boarding House (*) 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 Halfway House (*) 2 3 3 Group Homes (more than six), Convalescent and Nursing Homes (*) 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 Mission (*) (with Type (3) review, and development agreement — see definition) 2 2 NOTES: * Refers to definition in YMC Chapter 15.02 1 = Type (1) Permitted Home Occupation 2 = Type (2) Review and Approval by the Administrative Official Required 3 = Type (3) Review Public Hearing and Approval by the Hearing Examiner Required [ ] = Not Permitted 4 EXHIBIT "B" (Table 4-1, YMC 15.04.030 — Changes shown in legislative format) Table 4-1 Permitted Land Uses ("Health and Social Service Facility" Component) HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICE FACILITY Group Homes (six or fewer), Adult Family Home (*) R- R- R- B- B- 1 1 1 M- M- SR 1 2 3 1 2 HB SCC LCC AS GC CBD RD 1 2 HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICE FACILITY Group Homes (six or fewer), Adult Family Home (*) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Treatment Centers For Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Boarding House (*) 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 Halfway House (*) 2 3 3 Group Homes (more than six), Convalescent and Nursing Homes (*) 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 Mission (*) (with Type (3) review, and development agreement — see definition) 2 2 NOTES: * Refers to definition in YMC Chapter 15.02 1 = Type (1) Permitted Home Occupation 2 = Type (2) Review and Approval by the Administrative Official Required 3 = Type (3) Review Public Hearing and Approval by the Hearing Examiner Required [ ] = Not Permitted 5 iwa ZONING TEXT AMENDMENT — "MISSION" & "RESOURCE SERVICE CENTER" USES TXT#001-15, SEPA#007-15 Yakima City Council REMAND Public Hearing July 21, 2015 EXHIBIT LIST Applicant: City of Yakima Planning Division / File Numbers: TXT#001-15, SEPA#007-15 Site Address: Citywide Staff Contact: Jeff Peters, Supervising Planner Table of Contents CHAPTER A Mission Remand Staff Report to Yakima Planning Commission (YPC) CHAPTER B YPC Findings of Fact & Recommendation to City Council on Mission Remand CHAPTER C Proposed Ordinance for Mission Remand CHAPTER D Public Notices CHAPTER E Public Comments ZONING TEXT AMENDMENT — "MISSION" USES TXT#001-15, SEPA#007-15 EXHI.�IT LIST CHAPTER A Mission Remand Staff Report to Yakima Planning Commission (YPC) Remand Hearing Staff Report to YPC City of Yakima Planning Division "Mission" Use Remand Staff Report TO: City of Yakima Planning Commission FROM: Jeff Peters, Supervising Planner SUBJECT: Update Regarding Staff Recommendation for "Mission" Use FOR MEETING OF: June 10, 2015 ISSUE: Yakima City Council remand of the City Planning Commission's recommendation regarding incorporation of the Hearing Examiner's 1992 and 95 Use Interpretations defining the use and level of Review of a "Mission" into the text and tables of the City of Yakima's Zoning Ordinance. BACKGROUND: The City of Yakima Planning Commission conducted a study sessions regarding the incorporation of the "Mission" use, definition, and level of review on December, 10, 2014, January 14, 2015, February 11, 2015, and February 25, 2015. On March 25, 2015, the Commission held its required public hearing on the matter and found that the "Mission" use as defined by the City Hearing Examiner's 1992 and 95 decisions appropriately defined a "Mission", the proposal meet the zoning district intent statements for the General Commercial, Central Business District, and Light Industrial zoning districts, and that a Class (2) Review was an appropriate level of review for the proposed use. On May 19, 2015, the Yakima City Council held its required public hearing to consider the Planning Commission's recommendation to incorporate the "Mission" definition and use into the City's Municipal Code. At the public hearing, numerous members of the public testified about the problems that have been created by the allowance of the Union Gospel Mission at its present location on N. 1st Street, and requested that the Council consider increasing the level of review for the "Mission" to a Type (3) Review. As a result, the Yakima City Council unanimously voted to remand the proposed recommendation and accompanying ordinance back to the Yakima Planning Commission for the expressed purpose of soliciting increased public involvement from property owners along N. 1St Street, and further consideration of increasing the level of review to a Type (3) Review. STAFF SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS: In light of the Council remand, City Planning and Legal staff have reviewed the two proposed issues requested to be addressed by the Council and are recommending the following amendments: 1. The class of use should remain a Class (2) Use as defined below to ensure that issues related to the Federal Fair Housing Act are addressed by not deeming the proposed use an incompatible land use; 2. The level of review should be elevated to that of a Type (3) Review which requires a public hearing by the City of Yakima Hearing Examiner in accordance with YMC § 15.15 without changing the underlying statement of compatibility; DOC. IND" 3. The definition and process should also be revised to indicate that any expansion of an approved Class (2) "Mission" shall be processed in accordance with the Modification provisions of YMC § 15.17. 4. The addition of a "Good Neighbor /Development Agreement" as part of the use definition and process is an appropriate means to ensure that all required mitigation imposed by the Hearing Examiner is enforceable post construction and operation. Definitions: a. A Class (2) Use is defined as: "those uses set forth and defined in the text and tables of YMC Chapter lb 4 and are generally permitted throughout the district. However, site plan review by the administrative official is required in order to ensure compatibility with the intent and character of the district and the objectives of the Yakima urban area comprehensive plan." b. A Class (3) Use is defined as: "those uses set forth and defined in the text and tables of YMC Chapter 1 04 and are generally incompatible with adjacent and abutting property because of their size, emissions, traffic generation, and neighborhood character or for other reasons. However, they may be compatible with other uses in the district if they are properly sited and designed. Class (3) may be permitted by the hearing examiner when he determines, after holding a public hearing, that the use complies with provisions and standards; and that difficulties related to the compatibility, the provisions of public services, and the Yakima urban area comprehensive plan policies have been adequately resolved." Proposed Draft Definition: "Mission" means a facility typically owned or operated by a public agency or non- profit corporation, providing a variety of services for the disadvantaged, typically including but not limited to temporary housing for the homeless, dining facilities, health and counseling activities, whether or not of a spiritual nature, with such services being generally provided to the public at large. Mission uses shall be considered Class (2) uses which are generally permitted throughout the underlying district, but require Type (3) Review to provide for increased public notice, comment and review in order to ensure compatibility with the intent and character of the district and the objectives of the Yakima Urban Area Comprehensive Plan. Mission uses within the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts as set forth in Table 4-1, YMC 15.04.030, shall be subject to a Type (3) review as set forth in Chapter 15.15 YMC effective as and from July 1, 2015. Any expansion of any existing mission use within such zoning districts shall follow the modification provisions of YMC 15.17 provided that any use which does not meet the requirements of YMC 15.17.040 shall be processed as a Class (2) use requiring a Type (3) Review. Additionally, prior to occupation and/or operation of all new and/or expanded mission uses, the applicant shall enter into a "Good Neighbor/Development Agreement codifying all required development standards, and mitigation required by the City of Yakima Hearing Examiner. ZONING TEXT AMENDMENT — "MISSION" USES TXT#001-15, SEPA#007-15 EXHIBIT LIST CHAPTER B YPC Findings of Fact & Recommendation to City Council on Mission Remand YPC Findings of Fact & Recommendation to City Council 06/24/2015 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT Planning Division 129 North Second and Vree1, 2n fl" floor Yakrw waa9 Phone (5119) ,5/;5-61"°3 Fax (5019) ,575"-.6105" ( skplanning( )yohi fl(fw goo l lv//mlovrovmy�Mk u.gov/sery YAKIMA PLANNING COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION TO THE YAKIMA CITY COUNCIL FOR TEXT AMENDMENTS TO YMC 15.02 DEFINITIONS, AND TABLE 4-1 PERMITTED LAND USES ADDING THE USE OF "MISSION" TO THE CITY'S URBAN AREA ZONING ORDINANCE June 24, 2015 WHEREAS The City of Yakima Hearing Examiner established a use and definition for a "Mission" in two Use Interpretations in 1992 and 1995 (City of Yakima Interpretations INT#1-92, and INT#2-95). Defining a "mission" as "...a facility typically owned or operated by a public agency or non-profit corporation, providing a variety of services for the disadvantaged, typically including but not limited to temporary housing for the homeless, dining facilities, health and counseling activities, whether or not of a spiritual nature, with such services being generally provided to the community at large."; and WHEREAS The City of Yakima Hearing Examiner also provided via the previous interpretations, that a "mission" should be allowed in the General Commercial (GC), Central Business District CBD), and Light Industrial Zoning Districts (M-1) as Class (2) Uses requiring Type (2) Review; and WHEREAS The City of Yakima recognized that it did not have adequate zoning controls in place to appropriately site a mission or other homeless service, thereby adopting a six month moratorium on October 21, 2014, (ORD No. 2014-027) regarding operation of mission, community center, boarding house, comprehensive community health center, and multi-purpose community center uses in the Small Convenience Center (SCC) zoning district; and WHEREAS The City of Yakima City Council directed that the Yakima Planning Commission draft development regulations which appropriately regulate uses such as missions, community centers and mixed use building, boarding houses, comprehensive community health centers, and multi-purpose community centers; and WHEREAS On October 22, 2014, prior to the moratorium becoming effective Yakima Neighborhood Health Services requested an interpretation for a proposal to operate a community center providing public assistance services in the form of a food bank, health and social services, Laundromat facility, and temporary homeless warming shelter in the SCC zoning district; and WHEREAS The Yakima Planning Commission held study sessions to review and discuss the City Council moratorium, and issue of mission, community center, boarding house, comprehensive community health center, and multi-purpose community center uses in the SCC and other 9) 5" ( � f • f ice � �"NNighhmha• r %:: Depe '�o a ort e ia°r ( Cod �i�f�a"�����u°����o� S�� wYS".m5X2�b • Mon � ��.^ i7aS..(a�"�'.f � �(�' Ydikd�,� zoning districts of the City on: December 10, 2014, January 14, 2015, February 11, 2015, and February 25, 2015; and WHEREAS The Yakima Planning Commission gave direction at its February 25, 2015, meeting that it had sufficient opportunity to review the Hearing Examiner's interpretations, mission definition, permitted zoning designations, and district intent statements, and requested that City Planning staff schedule the public hearing for consideration of the Hearing Examiner's use interpretations; and WHEREAS The City of Yakima last amended the Yakima Urban Area Zoning Ordinance in January 2015; and WHEREAS Proposals to amend the City of Yakima's Urban Area Zoning Ordinance (YUAZO) follow the City's established process in YMC § 15.23.020(B) and YMC Title 16. WHEREAS Pursuant to RCW 36.70A.130(1) the City is required to regularly take legislative action to review and revise its development regulations in accordance with the Growth Management Act; and WHEREAS Under the provisions of YMC 1.42 the Yakima Planning Commission is responsible for the review of amendments to the Yakima Urban Area Zoning Ordinance and for recommending to the City Council the approval, modification or denial of each amendment; and WHEREAS The City of Yakima Planning Commission is charged with periodically reviewing all zoning and use interpretations issued by the City of Yakima Hearing Examiner under YMC 1.42.030 to consider their inclusion or exclusion from the Yakima Municipal Code; and WHEREAS Public notice of these amendments was provided in accordance with the provisions of YMC § 15.11.090, and YMC § 16.05.010 — 050. All property owners within three hundred feet of an SCC zoning district were mailed a Notice of Public Hearing on March 6, 2015, a legal ad in the Yakima Herald was also published on March 6, 2015; and WHEREAS The City of Yakima Planning Division initiated Environmental Review for this proposal on March 5, 2015, both preparing a State Environmental Policy Act Checklist (SEPA), and issuing the Notice of Application and Environmental Review on March 9, 2015; and WHEREAS Environmental Review of this proposal was concluded on April 13, 2015, with the issuance of a Determination of Non -Significance Notice of Retention of which the SEPA appeal period ended on April 27, 2015; and 2015 Yakima Planning Commission Findings and Recommendations 2 DOC. INDEX WHEREAS The recommendation for these amendments are based upon the criteria specified in YMC §§ 16.10.040 and 15.22.050; and WHEREAS The Yakima Planning Commission reviewed the district intent statements and development standards of the CBD, GC, M-1, SCC, and LCC zoning districts (listed below) to determine if the use of a "Mission" and "Community Resource Service Center" are appropriate; and WHEREAS The Yakima Planning Commission held its required open record public hearing on March 25, 2015, providing opportunity for the public to comment on the draft amendments; and WHEREAS The Yakima Planning Commission heard from twelve members of the public regarding the proposed amendments; and WHEREAS After hearing from the public, the Yakima Planning Commission deliberated on the amendments proposed for incorporation into YMC § 15.02 Definitions, and YMC § 15.04 Table 4-1 Permitted Land Uses as identified below: "Mission": 1. The Planning Commission found that the "Mission" use as defined by the City's Hearing Examiner's 1992 and 1995 decisions appropriately defined a "Mission"; 2. The definition of a "Mission" meets the zoning district intent statements of the General Commercial (GC), Central Business District CBD), and Light Industrial Zoning Districts (M-1); and 3. The Class (2) Review process is the appropriate level of review in the above mentioned zoning districts; and WHEREAS The Planning Commission by unanimous vote recommend: 1. Approval of the "Mission" Text Amendment request as set forth in the Hearing Examiner's 1992 and 1995 decisions; and 2. That the proposed "Community Resource Service Center" Text Amendment should be separated from consideration of the "Mission" use, and scheduled for a study session on April 8, 2015, as the proposal did not contain sufficient information to be appropriately reviewed; and WHEREAS The Yakima Planning Commission concluded its consideration of the "Mission" Text Amendment on March 25, 2015, forwarding its recommendation with findings of fact, and conclusions to the Yakima City Council (attached); and WHEREAS After appropriate public notice was provided in accordance with the procedures of the City of Yakima, by the Yakima City Clerk, the City of Yakima City Council in an open record hearing on 3 I 205 Yakima Planning Commission Fincdin�v Ri�ri# Reconyniendalions May 19, 2015, took public testimony regarding the proposed "Mission" ordinance, and considered the City of Yakima Planning Commission's recommendation to approve the proposed ordinance; and WHEREAS After considerable deliberation on the proposed ordinance, the Yakima City Council found that more public input and involvement was desired from property owners along N. 1st Street, and that the Planning Commission should consider increasing the level of review of a "Mission" use from a Type (2) review to that of a Type (3) review, and by a vote of 5 to 0 remanded the proposed ordinance back to the Planning Commission; and WHEREAS The Yakima City Planning Commission was notified of the council's action and direction on the proposed ordinance on May 27, 2015, to which the Planning Commission held an initial study session to discussions their initial options to address the councils request; and WHEREAS At the conclusion of the May 27, 2015, study session, and following discussion with city staff, the City Planning Commission found that it may be possible to increase the level of review of a land use without increasing the uses burden of compatibility or class of use, and directed City staff to bring back a revised ordinance at their next meeting accomplishing this objective; and WHEREAS On June 10, 2015, the Yakima City Planning Commission held a second study session regarding the remand of the "Mission" use ordinance at which the City Planning and Legal divisions submitted a two page staff report outlining the issues requested to be addressed, background on the history of the proposed use, staff suggested amendments, and a revised draft definition of the "Mission" use. The Yakima Planning Commission took significant public testimony from members of the public including: the Union Gospel Mission, Gateway Organization, and business and property owners along N. 1st Street. At the conclusion of the study secession, the Planning Commission directed city staff to proof the draft definition, revise the proposed ordinance, and schedule the public hearing for June 24, 2015; and WHEREAS On June 11, 2015, the City of Yakima Planning Division in accordance with YMC Title 16 provided public notice for the proposed Planning Commission remand hearing which included: 1) written notice to parties of record, 2) email to city divisions and media, and 3) Legal add in the Yakima Herald; and WHEREAS On June 24, 2015, the City of Yakima Planning Commission opened the required remand hearing, received additional public input on the proposed ordinance changes, further deliberated 2015 Yakina Planning Commission Findings and Recommendations 4 on the City Council's request to increase the level of review for a "Mission" use to that of a Type (3) Review, and made the following findings; and Now therefore, the Yakima City Planning Commission presents the following findings and recommendations to the Yakima City Council: Based upon a review of the information contained in the City of Yakima Hearing Examiner's 1992 and 1995 Unclassified Use Interpretations, (City of Yakima Interpretations INT#1-92, and INT#2-95), City of Yakima Comprehensive Plan 2025, Yakima Neighborhood Health's supplemental information, exhibits, testimony and other evidence presented at an open record public hearing held on March 25, 2015, and remand hearing of June 24, 2015; and a review of the Yakima Urban Area Zoning Ordinance; the Planning Commission makes the following: FINDINGS The amendment proposal to establish, further regulate or permit the use of "Mission" as defined by the City of Yakima Interpretations INT#1-92, and INT#2-95, and considered by the City of Yakima Planning Commission at its March 25, 2015, public hearing within the Yakima Municipal Code, Title 15 Urban Area Zoning Ordinance. The requested changes are consistent with the Yakima Urban Area Comprehensive Plan by meeting the goals, objectives and policies of the Plan set forth in the General Development, Public Services, Land Use, Transportation, and Utilities Elements of the Comprehensive Plan. The City of Yakima Planning Commission has studied the proposed issues and finds that the proposed ordinance amendment will not have an adverse consequence for adjacent jurisdictions or service providers. There are no regionally significant issues known related to the request; consequently, this request will not significantly contribute to the cumulative impacts of other Comprehensive Plan amendments, and/or zoning amendments. This proposal meets the County -wide Planning Policies and intent of the Growth Management Act because it will provide appropriate land use controls which direct service providers of the homeless populations of Yakima to appropriate zoning districts within the City of Yakima that have the least impact on surrounding business, and residential neighborhoods. YAKIMA PLANNING COMMISSION'S CONCLUSIONS a) The text amendment impacts the Central Business District, General Commercial, and Light Industrial zoning districts of the City. b) No significant adverse environmental impacts have been identified by the approval of the amendment request. c) The requested text amendment to the City of Yakima's Urban Area Zoning Ordinance is supported by the City of Yakima's Urban Area Comprehensive Plan 2025. d) The amendment to the Yakima Municipal Code, Title 15 Urban Area Zoning Ordinance, which includes, but is not limited to, a new definition in YMC § 15.02, and addition of a new land use category to YMC § 15.04 Table 4-1 Permitted Uses. e) The City of Yakima Planning Commission considered the issues raised by the Yakima City Council on remand at its June 24, 2015, meeting by: 1) considering additional testimony from business and property owners along N. 1st St. at two public study sessions, and one open record hearing, and 2) elevated the level of review of a • „`Mission" to that of a Type (3) Review. 20 ikIntnPlanning Commission 5 Findings and Recommendations f) g) The City of Yakima Planning Commission concludes that increasing the level of review of a "Mission" use from a Type (2) to Type (3) Review process does not hinder a mission from locating within the CBD, GC, and M-1 zoning districts, but rather enhances the public's involvement in commenting on such applications. The City of Yakima Planning Commission further concludes that due to the impacts of a "Mission" on surrounding businesses, and residential neighborhoods that "Mission" uses should be required to enter into a development agreement between the City of Yakima and applicant/property owner. MOTION Based upon the analysis, findings and conclusions outlined above, it was moved and seconded that the Yakima Planning Commission recommend APPROVAL of the modified text amendment to the Yakima Municipal Code (YMC) Title 15, Urban Area Zoning Ordinance. The motion carried by unanimous vote. Having made the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions, the Planning Commission hereby renders its: RECOMMENDATION TO CITY COUNCIL The Planning Commission of the City of Yakima, having received and considered all evidence and testimony presented at public hearings, and having received and reviewed the record herein, hereby recommends that the City Council of the City of Yakima APPROVE the zoning Text Amendment application (TXT #001-15 & SEPA #007-15), and accompanying ordinance. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of June, 2015. 2015 Yakimna Planning Commission Findings -anti Recommendations By: Dave Fonfara, Chairman Yakima Planning Commission 6 ZONING TEXT AMENDMENT — "MISSION" USES TXT#001-15, SEPA#007-15 EXHIBIT LIST CHAPTER C Proposed Ordinance for Mission Remand C-1 Proposed Ordinance for Mission Remand 07/21/2015 AN ORDINANCE ORDINANCE NO. 2015 - relating to land use; amending Section 15.02.020 of the Yakima Municipal Code to add definition of mission use, and amending Table 4-1 of Section 15.04.030 of the Yakima Municipal Code designating such use as a Class (2) use only within the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts of the City of Yakima. WHEREAS, the City Council has previously adopted ordinances establishing zoning districts within the City of Yakima, defining certain land uses, and designating such uses within the zoning districts, all as codified in Title 15 of the Yakima Municipal Code (YMC); and WHEREAS, the City Council previously adopted Ordinance No. 2014-027 implementing a moratorium on the acceptance of applications for, processing and issuance of, land use approvals and permits for "mission uses" within the SCC Small Convenience Center zoning district pending adoption of a comprehensive regulation governing such uses; and WHEREAS, the Planning Commission of the City of Yakima has conducted meetings and a public hearing on March 25, 2015 pursuant to notice, and after consideration of all comments, evidence and testimony presented has presented a recommendation, supported by appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted April 8, 2015, to the City Council; and WHEREAS, the City Council held a public hearing on May 19, 2015 to receive and consider the recommendation of the Planning Commission, and after receiving public comment and testimony. remanded the recommendation to the Planning Commission to consider whether new mission uses should be considered Class (3) uses in the GC General Commercial. CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts of the City of Yakima; and WHEREAS, the Planning Commission has held a study session and conducted a public hearing on June 24, 2015 concerning such issues, and having considered all evidence and testimony presented, has adopted Findings of Fact. Conclusions and Recommendation; and WHEREAS, the City Council has received the recommendation of the Planning Commission and has conducted a public hearing on July 21, 2015 pursuant to notice duly published to consider such recommendation: and WHEREAS, the recommendation of the Planning Commission supports the amendment of YMC 15.02.020 to add a definition of "mission" use, and to amend Table 4-1 of YMC 15.04.030 to allow such use as a Class (2) use only within the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts of the City of Yakima, but requiring that new mission uses within such zoning districts shall 1 DOC. INDEX be subject to a Type (3) review with a development agreement incorporating applicable development standards and mitigations imposed by the hearing examiner; and further that any modification of an existing mission use shall be subject to the modification procedures and provisions of Chapter 15.17 YMC: provided, that any proposed modification that does not meet the criteria in YMC 15.17.040 for administrative review and approval shall be subject to a Type (3) review with a development agreement incorporating applicable development standards and mitigations imposed by the hearing examiner; and WHEREAS, the City Council finds and determines that such recommendation is supported by previous interpretations of record by the hearing examiner as set forth in In re: Union Gospel Mission, City No. UAZO-Interp. No. 1-92, Examiner No. 192-5-2 (Lamb, Feb. 27, 1992); and In re: Modification of Interpretation, Union Gospel Mission, Interpretation No. 2-95, Examiner No. 195-5-27 (Lamb, June 9, 1995); and WHEREAS, the City Council finds and determines that YMC 15.02.020 should be amended to add a definition of "mission" use consistent with the definition previously formulated by the hearing examiner, and that Table 4-1 of YMC 15.04.030 should be amended to allow such use as a Class (2) use with a Type (3) review as described above, and with an approved development agreement within the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts of the City of Yakima; and WHEREAS, the City Council finds and determines that the amendments described above are in the best interest of residents of the City of Yakima and will promote the general health, safety and welfare; now, therefore BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY OF YAKIMA: Section 1. The recommendation of the City of Yakima Planning Commission as described above is received, together with the Planning Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support thereof, which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are hereby adopted by the City Council. Section 2. YMC 15.04.020 is hereby amended to add a definition of land use for "mission" use to read as follows: "Mission" means a facility typically owned or operated by a public agency or non- profit corporation, providing a variety of services for the disadvantaged, typically including but not limited to temporary housing for the homeless, dining facilities, health and counseling activities, whether or not of a spiritual nature, with such services being generally provided to the public at Targe. Mission uses shall be Class (2) uses within the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts as set forth in Table 4-1, YMC 15.04.030, and subject to a Type (3) review as set forth in Chapter 15.15 YMC with a development agreement incorporating applicable development standards 2 DOC. INDEX and mitigations imposed by the hearing examiner. Effective as and from August 24, 2015, any modification of an existing mission use shall be subject to the modification procedures and provisions of Chapter 15.17 YMC: provided. that any proposed modification that does not meet the criteria in YMC 15.17.040 for administrative review and approval shall be subject to a Type (3) review with a development agreement incorporating applicable development standards and mitigations imposed by the hearing examiner. Section 3. Table 4-1 of YMC 15.04.030 ("Health and Social Service Facility" component) is hereby amended to provide that mission uses are Class (2) uses only within the GC General Commercial, CBD Central Business District, and M-1 Light Industrial zoning districts within the City of Yakima, and not allowed within any other zoning districts, and subject to Type (3) review with a development agreement, all as set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference, and with such changes shown in legislative format as set forth in Exhibit "B" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. Section 4. This ordinance shall be in full force and effect 30 days after its passage, approval, and publication as provided by law and by the City Charter. PASSED BY THE CITY COUNCIL, signed and approved this 21st day of July, 2015. ATTEST: Micah Cawley, Mayor City Clerk Publication Date: Effective Date: 3 DOC. INDEX # C -I EXHIBIT "A" (Table 4-1, YMC 15.04.030) Table 4-1 Permitted Land Uses ("Health and Social Service Facility" Component) SR R- 1 R- 2 R- 3 B- 1 B- 2 HB SCC LCC AS GC CBD RD M- 1 M- 2 HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICE FACILITY Group Homes (six or fewer), Adult Family Home (*) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Treatment Centers For Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Boarding House (*) 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 Halfway House (*) 2 3 3 Group Homes (more than six), Convalescent and Nursing Homes (*) 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 Mission (*) (with Type (3) review, and development agreement — see definition) 2 2 NOTES: * Refers to definition in YMC Chapter 15.02 1 = Type (1) Permitted Home Occupation 2 = Type (2) Review and Approval by the Administrative Official Required 3 = Type (3) Review Public Hearing and Approval by the Hearing Examiner Required [ ] = Not Permitted 4 DOC. INDEX EXHIBIT "B" (Table 4-1, YMC 15.04.030 — Changes shown in legislative format) Table 4-1 Permitted Land Uses ("Health and Social Service Facility" Component) SR R- 1 R- R- B- B - 2 HB SCC LCC AS GC CBD RD M- 1 M- 2 HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICE FACILITY Group Homes (six or fewer), Adult Family Home (*) 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 Treatment Centers For Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Boarding House (*) 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 Halfway House (*) 2 3 3 Group Homes (more than six), Convalescent and Nursing Homes (*) 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 — 2 — Mission (*) (with Tvpe (3) 2 — review, and development agreement — see definition) NOTES: * Refers to definition in YMC Chapter 15.02 1 = Type (1) Permitted Home Occupation 2 = Type (2) Review and Approval by the Administrative Official Required 3 = Type (3) Review Public Hearing and Approval by the Hearing Examiner Required [ ] = Not Permitted 5 DOC. INDEX # G-1 ZONING TEXT AMENDMENT — "MISSION" USES TXT#001-15, SEPA#007-15 EXHIIIT LIST CHAPTER D Public Notices Notice of Remand Hearing D -la: Legal Notice and Press Release E-mail D -lb: Parties and Agencies Notified D -lc: Affidavit of Mailing Agenda Statement: Set Date to for City Council Remand Public Hearing Letter of Transmittal to City Clerk for Remand Public Hearing Notice of City Council Public Hearing 07/07/2015 07/09/2015 Ili i IIICllfiii! r lI "'lli"III°INII CIIITY CIII_IlfiiiflIFf.IIIK III�mr�urtlh SecStreet 'r< II iiurn shin ton 9 1 Ph hie (5it«) 575 3'7 , Fax 5rt!,1) 57r „r(w (f 114 CITY OF YAKIMA NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING Proposed Amendment of Municipal Code Regarding "Mission" Uses NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Yakima City Council will conduct a public hearing on the Yakima Planning Commission's revised recommendation and proposed ordinance regarding the remand decision related to the use and definition for "Mission" in the GC, CBD and M-1 zoning districts. Said public hearing will be held on Tuesday, July 21, 2015 at 6:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in the Council Chambers at the Yakima City Hall, 129 North 2nd Street, for the City Council to receive public testimony and evidence regarding this issue. All interested persons are invited to attend this hearing. Written comments may be submitted to the Council in two ways: 1) Send a letter via regular mail to "Yakima City Council, 129 N. 2'd Street, Yakima, WA. 98901 or, 2) E-mail your comments to citycouncil@yakimawa.gov. Include in the e-mail subject line, "Mission Uses in SCC Zone." Please also include your name and mailing address.. Dated this 8th day of July, 2015. Sonya Claar Tee City Clerk CITY OF YAKIMA, PLANNING DIVISION LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL I, Rosalinda Ibarra, as an employee of the City of Yakima, Planning Division, have transmitted to: Sonya Clam• -Tee, Yakima City Clerk, by hand delivery, the following documents: 1. Mailing labels for CITY OF YAKIMA PLANNING DIVISION - MISSION USES (TXT#001-15, SEPA#007-15) REMAND PUBLIC HEARING NOTICE; including all labels for parties of record. Signed this 9th day of July, 2015. Rbµaiinda Ibarra Administrative Assistant Received By: Date: 7/W/.5 DOC. INDEX # ,. Maria Rosario Montes de Oca 104 S 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 ,n II 1, Meeting Joe Chin 316 South 9th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YPC Meetingl, Josafath Cruz 711 East Spruce Street Yakima, WA 98901 01 14/115 1111111,11111 11Me digiing; Jose Perez 211 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 111(I113CI"v,eetinlg Juana Amezcua 115 North 9th Street Yakima, WA 98901 agentamezcua07@gmail.com 01/14/15 YIN1..° Meeting Leonel Valencia 809 East Spruce Street Yakima, WA 98901 leonelvalencia809@yahoo.com 011/14/15 'RC Meeting Jerry Winters 301 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 1/1"°U Meeting01/1 1 Mauricio Aramburo 113 South 6th Street #3 Yakima, WA 98901 01/I4/1 1 "Mk:1 Mec11nn1g Lori Zamudio 413 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 1/15 "111)1; Meeting Maria Elena Garcia 204 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 1/.1 5 " PC MeetingMeeting01114/111501114/1115 01/1 Ondina Garcia 107 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/151 YPC Meeting Miguel Alvarez 108 S 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 "PII C Meeting Salvador Nava 211 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YPC Meeting Lidia & Daniel Mendoza 320 South 9th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/111 0 C Meeting Berenice Cortes 308 '/2 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 1/ 111, 1 1'1 ' MEM: Meeting Severiano Barajas 217 Union Street Yakima, WA 98901 11 15 11Meeting Delia Solis 109 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 1PC'Meeting, Bertha Ramirez Ruby's Daycare 113 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 valleibertha@aol.com 01/1 1f1 MP .11 1n ellnngl Albert Lantrip 808 Pioneer Lane Union Gap, WA 98903 �f d' .b Q Meeting Benito & Francelia Suarez 303 South 6th Street #A Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 1r IPC 111[eeting Bertin Martinez 1414 South 16th Street Yakima, WA 98901 k 1,11 1 1d1 � 'CPC ,' 101n,nnlung Carl Howell 603 South 12th Street Yakima, WA 98901 111/1. 1/15 Y"R"1, Meeting Maribel Martinez 206 '/2 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 111"11:; Meeting Ismael Gonzalez 219 Union Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/151 YPC Meeting Balbina Gomez 106 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 " PC1 Meeting Edward Torres 20 South 10th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01114 15 YON: Meeting Filemon Acevedo 305 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/15/15 YPC Meeting Francisco Lopez 211 'h South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 1D'1/115/111 YPC Meeting Gloria Sanchez 108 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 "1'111. Meeting Fred Fernandez 211 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 011/14/15 YP(; Meeting. ,g Gloria A. Rangel 517 Clark Street Moxee, WA 98936 Angelicarange122@gmail.com 01/1X11/15 1"II"CMeeting; Hilda Doble 206 South 6th Street #1 Yakima, WA 98901 01/114/15 YF( Mceling„ IND Daniel Fonseca 712 East Spruce Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15' IPC Meednngg David T. Reich 3005 W Chestnut Ave Yakima, WA 98902 d.reich@charter.net 0"1/09/15 L noty ttd Coo aauuacoots Frances Davies Thomas Davies Family Partnership L.P. 1024 Egan Avenue Pacific Grove, CA 93950 frances@guitarist.com tl;Pi1,'1 '/1 I nornnlow;ml t.'a'uuumuumo. �rrut:� Robert G. Koury Koury Family Limited Partnership 7327 Southwest Barnes Rd PMB 600 Portland, OR 97225 011/110/15 Comment 11,t, John Van Epps 3413 Clinton Way Yakima, WA 98902 03'23/ 113 t, rmiurnuneat 1 0 Item Stephen Stokesberry solfloris@msn.com 0 3, 25 15 Ile`, m ail comments Marshall Clark The Atlantic Building LLC 2320 N Atlantic Street, Ste# 100 Spokane, WA 99205 03/12115 Comment I..,ivner Valerie Fisher ASAP Metal Fabricators 315 S. 3rd Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 valerief@asapmetalfab.com 03/17/15 Vi;..�rirnao°ommuoo,nts Terry Schweyen ASAP Metal Fabricators 315 South 3rd Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 C'I'xmuuuuo muN 1 erdf��,o Isaac Baruch 1416 3rd Avenue Yakima, WA 98101 03/23/15 t1nirmamen1 Letter Gwen Seward 701 S 38th Ave #7 Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 YP(::11eaarin Wayne Ullman McEwen Lakeside, LLC 2024 218th PL NE Sammamish, WA 98074 ullmanw@icloud.com 01,16j 5 , uaa; ilt d coni ry kaig3µ-3, Lloyd & Leah Higgens 3607 NE 119th Avenue Vancouver, WA 98682 013/20/15 Comment Letter Jay Sentz Westpark Properties, LLC 118 Gilbert Drive Yakima, WA 98902 O3/23/15 Comment II u,tte Kathy Mantey KDF Investments 3703 W Nob Hill Blvd Yakima, WA 98902 03/23/1.5 Com5ument'. Letter Bob McLaughlin drbob@gmail.com 03/25/15 11'I1)G.1111eamling Bryon Underwood bhunderwood@msn.com 03/25/1.5 WC Hearin James Parks 1119 Garfield Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 03/251115 a P"t' M te;aarintvt Janice Gonzalez Janiceg@yvfwc.org 03/2511.5 ail.uu " Hewing Judy Salverda 701 S 38th Ave #16 Yakima, WA 98902 03125/ 5 .Y11.1 Mai Nathan Poel 214 S 17th Ave Yakima, WA 98902 03/2:5/1:5 'ill°t, Ila aau-Mgn, Terri Chacon 2005 W Chestnut Ave Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 WC 111amarinig; Deanna Roy laideerose@yahoo.com 03/25/15 IYIPC 11eadrig, Wanda Fuller fullerwanda@hotmail.com 01 `2.5/15 1"Ilyt, 1 Ne^ammimml Jim Hall 1413 S 8th Ave Yakima, WA 98902 0:3/25/15 YAIIIC Marin airiauii, Larry Fuller maaxwell@hotmail.com 03/25/15 YII C Hearing Patty Orona 701 S 38th Ave #5 Yakima, WA 98902 03 X5/15 ItIPCIIIIIevar n5; Fred Kerley 407 W Mead Ave Yakima, WA 98902 03/2515 Y11(..V 11e°arung Don Breitenfeldt 3807 Meadow Lane Yakima, WA 98902 03/25115 3T(11 Hearing Janice Bullek 701 S 38th Ave #8 Yakima, WA 98902 03125/115 .Il leant y. Joanne Orme 701 S 38th Ave #13 Yakima, WA 98902 03/2„5/15 Y.PC Hearing Lynn Walters 701 South 38th Ave #18 Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 Y11"(; Hearing Steve Hill Sshill538@gmail.com 03/25/15 "VIP(, Antriii1( IND Jack & Nancy Westford 1837 Northshore Rd Bellingham, WA 98226 nwestford@gmail.com 05/26/1.5 13 mill („;;ommmiv;rrutm Robert F. Lockbeam PO Box 10056 Yakima, WA 98909 03/22/15 Comment. 1 Kim Kovalik kim.kovalik@charter.net 04/01/15 160-rnaIihid Communis Barbara Cline 1460 North 16th Avenue, Ste. A Yakima, WA 98902 barbara@traho.com i4air 04/02./1 5 4 06uu-umiM 1 a;hler Elizabeth Angland 806 South 24th Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 04/02./15 („OHnuumew Leri¢ r Connie G. Simmons 206 1/2 S 7th St #2 Yakima, WA 98901 04/08/15'Vl°4, IVeetIiing Reed Ball 5808 Summitview Ave PMB#125 Yakima, WA 98908 04/08/15 5511C Meeting Dennis Macias 1010 North 20th Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 05/27/15 Y1"4, Meeting Maud Scott 309 Union Street Yakima, WA 98901 06/10/15 YPC Meeting Phyllis Musgrove 424 N 30th Ave Yakima, WA 98902 0(x/74/15 Y PC 1 dealing Emma R. Micelli 27 South 4th Street #326 Yakima, WA 98901 06/24/1.5 )61104; 111e,aHu•HHHg Bev Luby Bartz 114 North 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 06/24/1.5 ”` PC0 Hearing Anita Monoian Yakima Neighborhood Health Services PO Box 2605 Yakima, WA 98907 Anita.monoian@ynhs.org Rachel Saimons, Attorney Meyer, Fluegge & Tenney, P.S. PO Box 22680 Yakima, WA 98907 saimons@mfflaw.com Luis Sandobal 1001 East Race Street Yakima, WA 98901 04/02/i 5 4;uaunnuaua;n V.tiittei. Mark Johnson 614 South 24th Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 094/08/15 5115111 M rliun,g NVRSTUK nvrstuk@elltel.net 0,4508/15 ll_yen a Va,ul 4 `anawaou en.t. Miguel Alvarez 104 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 04/08/15 X2PC 1V,lu ethig Rev. Willie Pride 2607 Logan Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 05/19/15 Council iteariung1 Davin Shergill 1504N1st St Yakima, WA 98901 06/00/15 Y1''<,.;` Mura�'a.iuug',r Amarjit Nijjar 1219 North 1st Street Yakima, WA 98901 05/09/05 (;ouunci0 110uniunH4 Jaswant Singh 912N1st St Yakima, WA 98901 1„ro YIPC Meeting Rajiv Sauson 1223 North 1st Street Yakima, WA 98901 06/10/15 .°YI''(,: .Meeting Matt Burton 9301 Torrey Pines Lane Yakima, WA 98908 06/24/15 YI0 1 HcaHiruaoi Dave PO Box 8328 Yakima, WA 98908 06/24/15 YIPC Heating ulu,Hg Ester Huey 1311 South 75th Ave #2 Yakima, WA 98908 06/24/15 '°(P(; ti Rhonda Hauff Yakima Neighborhood Health Services PO Box 2605 Yakima, WA 98907 Rhonda.hauff@ynhs.org Applua;auni At -47 DOC. INDEX Nathan Poel Yakima Neighborhood Health Services PO Box 2605 Yakima, WA 98907 nathanpoel@gmail.com Pastor Donald Davis 515 S 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 06/24/15 "a PC leafing Gary Rufener 1408 North 1st Street Yakima, WA 98901 garyerufener@aol.com 06/24/05 t° 1°(; 11e aruua1' Bill Brado 201 Oak Street #6 Yakima, WA 98901 Wbrado@Aol.com iD4a/24/15 Yip(.; 1110air01 an; Rick Phillips 822 North 48th Avenue Yakima, WA 98908 06/'24/15 Y0(' 0leaginng Rhonda Hauff Yakima Neighborhood Health Services 12 South 8th Street Yakima, WA 98901 F'aappIicaamt Jamie Carmody Meyer, Fluegge & Tenney, P.S. PO Box 22680 Yakima, WA 98907 carmody@mftlaw.com Anita Monoian Yakima Neighborhood Health Services 12 South 8th Street Yakima, WA 98901 Applcaut Al Bradley 109 S 8th Street Yakima, WA 98901 Albradleyl@msn.com Phone int11.11. mquest Nathan Poel Yakima Neighborhood Health Services 12 South 8th Street Yakima, WA 98907 nathanp@orth.org A Sung Lee 702 N. 48th Avenue Yakima, WA 98908 Julianalboss@yahoo.com '1,11•)crty vv A II r City Council REMAND Public Hearing 07/21/15 Rick Phillips Union Gospel Mission PO Box 565 Yakima, WA 98907 rick.phillips@yugm.org iii. Eta oc. IIEX # ITEM TITLE: SUBMITTED BY: SUMMARY EXPLANATION: BUSINESS OF THE CITY COUNCIL YAKIMA, WASHINGTON AGENDA STATEMENT Item No. 5.D. For Meeting of: July 7, 2015 Set July 21, 2015 as the date of a public hearing for Council consideration of the Yakima Planning Commission's revised recommendation and ordinance regarding the remand decision related to the use and definition for "Mission" in the GC, CBD, and M-1 zoning districts. Joan Davenport, AICP, Community Development Director (509) 576-6417 Jeff Peters, Supervising Planner (509) 575-6163 On June 24, 2015, the City of Yakima Planning Commission conducted and concluded the City Council required remand hearing regarding the establishment of a new use and definition for "Mission" within the GC, CBD, and M-1 zoning districts. Therefore, the Planning Commission and Division are now requesting that the Yakima City Council set July 21, 2015, as the date of a public hearing to consider the Commission's revised recommendation and proposed ordinance on the matter. Resolution: Ordinance: Other (Specify): Set Date Contract: Contract Term: Start Date: End Date: Item Budgeted: Amount: Funding Source/Fiscal Impact: Strategic Priority: Improve the Built Environment Insurance Required? No Mail to: Phone: APPROVED FOR SUBMITTAL: City Manager DOC. INDEX RECOMMENDATION: Set July 21, 2015 as the date for the public hearing to consider the Yakima Planning Commission's revised recommendation and ordinance regarding the remand hearing for mission uses. ATTACHMENTS: Description Upload Date Type No Attachments Available AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING STATE OF WASHINGTON CITY OF YAKIMA RE: TXT#001-15 City Planning - Mission Uses N/A I, Lisa Maxey, as an employee of the Yakima City Planning Division, have dispatched through the United States Mails, a Notice of Remand Hearing. A true and correct copy of which is enclosed herewith; that said notice was addressed to the applicants, Yakima Planning Commission members, and parties of record; that said applicants and parties of record are individually listed on the mailing list retained by the Planning Division, and that said notices were mailed by me on the nth day of June, 2015. That I mailed said notices in the manner herein set forth and that all of the statements made herein are just and true. Lisa Maxey Department Assistant II 01/14/15 YPC Meeting Maria Rosario Montes de Oca 104 5 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YPC Meeting Miguel Alvarez 108 S 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/:14/15 YPC Meeting Mauricio Aramburo 113 South 6th Street #3 Yakima, WA 98901 01/1.4/15 YPC Needing Bertin Martinez 1414 South 16th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YPC Meeting Maribel Martinez 206 14 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YPC Meet'in Jose Perez 211 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YPC Meeting Severiano Barajas 217 Union Street Yakima, WA 98901 01./1.4/1.5 YPC Meeting Benito & Francelia Suarez 303 South 6th Street #A Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/1..5 YIPC Meeting Joe Chin ASAP Metal Fabricators 316 South 9th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YIPC Meeting Gloria A. Rangel 517 Clark Street Moxee, WA 98936 Angelucaran e 2 y,rn. 01/14/15 YPC Meeting Balbina Gomez 106 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YPC Meeting Gloria Sanchez 108 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 011./14/11.5 YIPC Meeting Ondina Garcia 107 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/1.5 YPC Meeting Delia Solis 109 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YIPC Meeting Bertha Ramirez Ruby's Daycare 113 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 valleberthataol.com 01/14/15 YPC Meeting Edward Torres 20 South 10th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YPC Meeting Hilda Doble 206 South 6th Street #1 Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YPC Meeting Fred Fernandez 211 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/1.5 YPC Meeting Juana Amezcua 115 North 9th Street Yakima, WA 98901 agentamezcuaO7@gmail com 01/14/15 YIPC Meeting Maria Elena Garcia 204 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/1.5 YPC 1Meeting Francisco Lopez 2111/z South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YPC Meeting Salvador Nava 211 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/1.5 YPC Meeting Ismael Gonzalez 219 Union Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YPC (Meeting Filemon Acevedo 305 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YIPC (Meeting Daniel Fonseca 712 East Spruce Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/1.5 YPC Meeting Lidia & Daniel Mendoza 320 South 9th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01./1.4./1..5 YPC Meet:'ing Jerry Winters 301 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01./1.4/15 YPC Meeting Berenice Cortes 308 % South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01/14/15 YPC (Meeting Lori Zamudio 413 South 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 01./14/1.5 YIPC Meeting Carl Howell 603 South 12th Street Yakima, WA 98901 DOC, 01/14/1.5 YIPC Meeting Josafath Cruz 711 East Spruce Street Yakima, WA 98901 INDEX 01./1.4/1.5 YPC Meeting, Albert Lantrip 808 Pioneer Lane Union Gap, WA 98903 01/1.4/1.5 YIPC IWeetiirng Leonel Valencia 809 East Spruce Street Yakima, WA 98901 g nelvaI;eencis809,@Yaho21Aoan 03/09/1.5 II:::--mailied Comments David T. Reich 3005 W Chestnut Ave Yakima, WA 98902 d.reih@charter.net 03/17/1515 maiied Colmrnenis Frances Davies Thomas Davies Family Partnership L.P. 1024 Egan Avenue Pacific Grove, CA 93950 Frances{ guitarlst.com 03/.70/1.5 Comment Letter Lloyd & Leah Higgens 3607 NE 119th Avenue Vancouver, WA 98682 03/2.3/1.5 Colnrnlnrnelnt Letter John Van Epps 3413 Clinton Way Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 YPC ng James Parks 1119 Garfield Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 0:9/25/15 YPC Hearing Nathan Poel 214 S 17th Ave Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 YPC (Hearing Pastor Donald Davis 515 S 6th Street Yakima, WA 98901 03/1.2/15 Corndie nt: ILLiege'r Marshall Clark 2320 N Atlantic Street, Ste# 100 Spokane, WA 99205 03/1.'7/1.5 l maiiied Comments Valerie Fisher 315 S. 3rd Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 valerief@asapmetalfab.com 03/20/15 Cernrmelrnt. (Letter. Robert G. Koury 7327 Southwest Barnes Rd PMB 600 Portland, OR 97225 03/23/15 Comment Letter Kathy Mantey 3703 W Nob Hill Blvd Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 YPC Hearing Jim Hall 1413 S 8th Ave Yakima, WA 98902 03/16/15 i:::.lrnaiied Coli nments Wayne Ullman 2024 218th PL NE Sammamish, WA 98074 uilmanw lcioud.com 03/20/15 Comment Il..eettemlr Terry Schweyen ASAP Metal Fabricators 315 South 3rd Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 03/23/15 Cernment Il..r ttelr Isaac Baruch 1416 3rd Avenue Yakima, WA 98101 03/25/15 corm flents Stephen Stokesberry Union Gospel Mission solfloris@rnsn.cor 03/25/15 YPC Hearing Terri Chacon 2005 W Chestnut Ave Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/1.5 YIPC Hearing Don Breitenfeldt KDF Investments 3807 Meadow Lane Yakima, WA 98902 03/75/15 YPC Hearing Reed & Wendy Ball 5808 Summitview Ave PMB#125 Yakima, WA 98908 03/25/1.5 YPC. Hearing Fred Kerley 407 W Mead Ave Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 YIPC Hearing Joanne Orme 701 S 38th Ave #13 Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 YPC Hearing Judy Salverda 701 S 38th Ave #16 Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 YPC Hearing Janice Bullek 701 5 38th Ave #8 Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 YPC. Hearing Deanna Roy laideerose@yahoo.com 03/25/1.5 YPC Hearing Bob McLaughlin drbob W tntail.coova 03/25/1.5 YIPC Hearing Patty Orona 701 S 38th Ave #5 Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 YPC Hearing Gwen Seward 701 S 38th Ave #7 Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 YPC Hearing Lynn Walters 701 South 38th Ave #18 Yakima, WA 98902 03/25/15 YPC Hearing Larry Fuller rnaa xwe l l @hotm a i 1. corn 03/25/15 YPC Hearing Janice Gonzalez Janicegevvfwc.org 03/25/1.!5 YIPC IHeariing Steve Hill Sshlil538(gmaii:com 03/25/15 YPC Hearing Wanda Fuller fullerwandat hotnnail,com 03/25/15 YIP(: Hearing Bryon Underwood bhunderwood@msn cont 03/26/1.5 Eianaii Comments Jack & Nancy Westford 1837 Northshore Rd Bellingham, WA 98226 nwestford @gmail.conl 04/02/15 Comment Il...etter Luis Sandobal 1001 East Race Street Yakima, WA 98901 04/08/15 IF-Irrnaiilled Corrrnmernt NVRSTUK nvrstuk@.elIt&l.net 03/27/1!5 CarnMeIrnt: I..eVae`Ir Robert F. Lockbeam PO Box 10056 Yakima, WA 98909 04/02/15 Comment Letter Barbara Cline 1460 North 16th Avenue, Ste. A Yakima, WA 98902 barbara@traho.com 04/08/15 YPC Meeting Miguel Alvarez 104 South 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 04/01/15 E.-Ima'tllled Comments Kim Kovalik kim.kovallk@charter.net, 04/02/15 Comment Il..atter Elizabeth Angland Koury Family Limited Partnership 806 South 24th Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 04/08/15 YPC Meeting Jay Sentz 118 Gilbert Drive Yakima, WA 98902 04/08/15 YPC Meeting Connie G. Simmons 2061/2 S 7th St #2 Yakima, WA 98901 05/19/15 Council II -tearing Gary Rufener 1408 North 1st Street Yakima, WA 98901 05/27/1..5 YPC Meetliling, Dennis Macias 1010 North 20th Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 06/.10/1..5 YPC Meetliing Davin Shergill 1504 N 1st St Yakima, WA 98901 06/10/15 YPC Me Resident 4702 Sum "'vlew Ave #100 Yakima, r A 98908 04/08/15 YPC Meeting Mark Johnson 614 South 24th Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 05/19/1.5 Council0 Hearing Bill Brado McEwen Lakeside, LLC 203 Oak Street Yakima, WA 98901 Wbrado • Aol.com 05/19/15 Counlcill V-Ileariirtig Amarjit Nijjar 1219 North 1st Street Yakima, WA 98901 05/1.9/11.5 C¢:o rn¢.I'ili I leari ng Rev. Willie Pride The Atlantic Building LLC 2607 Logan Avenue Yakima, WA 98902 05/27/15 YPC Meeting Bev Luby Bartz 114 North 7th Street Yakima, WA 98901 06/10/15 YPC IMeetang Maud Scott 309 Union Street Yakima, WA 98901 06/1.0/1!5 YPC: Tom Dul 513�font St Ste CI Yaki�,,� ma, WA 98901 06/1.0/15 YPC Meeting Gary Rufener garyerufe ner@aol.cort Appkant Anita Monoian Yakima Neighborhood Health Services 12 South 8th Street Yakima, WA 98901 1 ppi11 calrnt Nathan Poel Yakima Neighborhood Health Services 12 South 8th Street Yakima, WA 98907 nathan orfltor.. Applicant Anita Monoian Meyer, Fluegge & Tenney, P,5, PO Box 2605 Yakima, WA 98907 �,i'014 1'n.99,.9' tn:: Y'9.blAtt Applicant Rachel Saimons, Attorney PO Box 22680 Yakima, WA 98907 sa6u-nonsC rnftlaw,c soy Abn1:,lic ar o. Rhonda Hauff Yakima Neighborhood Health Services PO Box 2605 Yakima, WA 98907 RE'9111111310ifeillblaRTS DOC_ INDEX 06/10/1!5 YPC Meetiing Rajiv Sauson 1223 N 1st St Yakima, WA 98901 06/10/15 YIfDC Meetlilnlg Phyllis Musgrove 424 N 30th Ave Yakima, WA 98902 06/10/15 YIfDC Meeting Jaswant Singh 912 N 1st St Yakima, WA 98901 Alplplliic:ant Rhonda Hauff Yakima Neighborhood Health Services 12 South 8th Street Yakima, WA 98901 Applicant Jamie Carmody Meyer, Fluegge & Tenney, P.S. PO Box 22680 Yakima, WA 98907 ca r m ody@ nn ft la w. coni Applicant t Nathan Poel Yakima Neighborhood Health Services PO Box 2605 Yakima, WA 98907 raxti 101?9.9. 101 dtlSeffl Phone crallp request Al Bradley 109 S 8th Street Yakima, WA 98901 AAbradf 1Pmsncom Piropperty Owner ' Sung Lee 702 N. 48th Avenue Yakima, WA 98908 Jullianallboss@vahoo.cam Nuc of CVUYIallGk kai i rte `TXiftOO-)S Sen+- (/)� /l5 06/10/1.5 YIN: Meeting Rick Phillips Yakima Neighborhood Health Services PO Box 565 Yakima, WA 98907 rick h'iIAipsfpy� np� arg DOC. INDEX Name Debbie Cook In -House Distribution Division Engineering E-mail List E-mail Address )ejb b i e . co o k(ii) aki ma wagpv, Dana Kallevig Wastewater Engineering akall..i gayakimaw a. HL.av da n . ri dd 1 e @ yaki mawa. go v Dan Riddle Mg,rik. k rt 01 er@ia k i mawagov Mark Kunkler Jeff Cutter Legal Dept Legal Dept jfe fi. e u titer& qk nu awa.goy Archie Matthews ONDS a Mile m atthewsgyak i M awa.gov Mark Soptich Fire Dept Police Department mark: pti chLya k i ma w a go v Doi n inie.ri zz i (0, yak i m a wa gov Chief Rizzi Joe Caruso Code Administration [ Code Administration .1 op,eara gl(lig,iak imawa,gpv Carolyn Belles cam IMILINIkg.fkOsiglawa.g.Q v. Jerry Robertson Glenn Denman Suzanne DeBusschere Code Administration kn-ry.robertsn(:4 yak i m a wa.go v Code Administration Code Administration Hdci,_:Dgi . d en mgygyAkirp4wa .gp v Su za n ne . d e bu s schereAy a k i 111 awa. go v (lave. brown gyaktmayva. goy Dave Brown Mike Shane Water/Irrigation Engineering m ike.shane@yald fila W a. go v me loyfel aid alma mv Randy Meloy Wastewaterrandy. Scott Schafer Public Works Dept s'.g o tlsedt a fin4ygkinialvaaioy. James Dean Utilities iltme s d eangya k i n1 a wa gp y James Scott Kevin Futrell Refuse Division J4nic.s..§.cP it.@nkjina19..,g kevim futrel I @yak imawa.goy Transit Division Planning joandaven ort d) al< i rn awa . goy Joan Davenport TFor: the Record/File Revised 12/2014 Binder Copy Type of Notice: f6161 J File Number(s): C61-15 Date of Mailing: _LI ) DOC. INDEX Maxey, Lisa From: Maxey, Lisa Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2015 9:30 AM To: Belles, Carolyn; Brown, David; Caruso, Joe; Cook, Debbie; Cutter, Jeff; Davenport, Joan; Dean, James; DeBusschere, Suzanne; Denman, Glenn; Futrell, Kevin; Ibarra, Rosalinda; Kallevig, Dana; Kunkler, Mark; Matthews, Archie; Maxey, Lisa; Meloy, Randy; Riddle, Dan; Rizzi, Dominic; Robertson, Jerry; Schafer, Scott; Scott, James; Shane, Mike; Soptich, Mark; Al Rose; Alfred A. Rose (silvrfx40@bmi.net); 'Carmen Mendez'; Carmen Mendez (mdcmm303 @gmail.com); Dave Fonfara; Ensey, Rick; Patricia Byers; Ron Anderson; Scott Clark; William Cook (cook.w@charter.net); Aaron, Robbie; Allyn, Kaarre; Beehler, Randy; Bill & Linda Beerman; Brown, Michael; Business Times Randy Luvaas (E-mail); City of Union Gap; City of Union Gap; Clear Tee, Sonya; CWHBA Joe Walsh (E-mail); Danielle Surkatty; David Gaudette; David Kearby - Associated General Contractors of WA; Davido, Sean; Dianna Woods; Doug Carey; Evodio Reyes; Farmworker Housing Marty Miller (E-mail); Gary Forrest; Jamie Carmody; Ken Camarata - AIA; Crockett, Ken; Lozano, Bonnie; Luz Bazan Gutierrez - RCDR; Mike & Cindy Noble; Mike Dooley - Wilbert Precast; Mike Shinn; Peters, Jeff; Phil Hoge; Price, Cally; Ralph Call; Robert Lockhart; Ron Pelson(ron@traditionaldesignsinc.com); Sandy Lloyd; Smith, Valerie; Steve Erickson; Steve S; Terrence Danysh; Terry Keenhan; Thomas Carroll; Walt Ranta; Crockett, Ken; Daily Sun News - Bob Story; KAPP TV News; KBBO-KRSE Radio - manager; KCJT TV News; KDNA Radio; KEPR TV News; KIMA TV News; KIMA TV News - Crystal Bui; KIT/KATS/DMVW/KFFM - Lance Tormey; KNDO TV News; KUNS-TV Univision; KVEW TV News; NWCN News; NWPR - Anna King; Randy Luvaas - Yakima Business Times; Reed C. Pell; Tu Decides - Albert Torres; Yakima Herald Republic - Craig Troianello; Yakima Herald Republic - Erin Snelgrove; Yakima Herald Republic - Mai Hoang; Yakima Herald Republic - Mark Morey; Yakima Herald Republic Newspaper; Yakima Valley Business Times - George Finch; Beehler, Randy Cc: Peters, Jeff Subject: NOTICE OF REMAND HEARING - Mission Uses - TXT#001-15 Attachments: NOTICE OF REMAND HEARING - City Planning - Mission Uses-TXT_001-15.pdf Attached is a Notice of Remand Hearing regarding the above -entitled project. If you have any questions about this proposal please contact assigned planner Jeff Peters at (509) 575-6163 or by e-mail at "e eters akimawaLari. Thank you! Ly Department A.ssista nt i.i (509) :i°76-6669 Llsa.;Maxey(d)yakimawa , ov City of Yakima Planning Division 129 N. 2nd St. Yakima, WA 98901 1 00 A daily part of your life yakima-herald.com -Ad Proof - This is the proof of your ad scheduled to run on the dates indicated below. Please confirm placement prior to deadline, by contacting your account rep at (509) 577-7740. Date: 06/08/15 Account #: 110358 Company Name: CITY OF YAKIMA PLANNING Contact: ROSALINDA IBARRA Address: DEPT OF COMMERCIAL ECONOMICAL DEVELOPEME 129 N 2ND STREET YAKIMA, WA 98901-2720 Telephone: (509) 575-6164 Ad ID: 552053 Start: 06/11/15 Stop: 06/11/15 Total Cost: $119.85 Agate Lines: 67 # of Inserts: 2 Ad Class: 6021 Account Rep: Simon Sizer Phone # (509) 577-7740 Email: ssizer@yakimaherald.com Run Dates: Yakima Herald -Republic 06/11/15 YakimaHerald.com 06/11/15 Ad Proof CITY OF YAKIMA NOTICE OF REMAND HEARING DATE: June 11, 2015 TO: Members of the Public and Parties of Record FROM: Joan Davenport, AICP, Com- munity Development Director SUBJECT: Notice of Remand Hearing regarding the City of Yakima Planning Commis- sion's Recommendation to the Yakima City Council incorpo- rating a new definition of "Mis- sion" into the City of Yakima's Municipal Code. CITY FILE NUMBER(S): TXT#001-15 NOTICE OF REMAND: On May 19, 2015, the Yakima City Council considered a recom- mendation and accompany- ing ordinance by the City of Yakima Planning Commission to incorporate a new definition and land use category for a "Mission" into the City's Munici- pal Code. Following testimony from the public during an open record hearing and deliberation on the matter, the City Council voted unanimously to remand the issue and ordinance back to the Planning Commission for further public input and work. The file containing the com- plete application is available for public review at the City of Yakima Planning Division, 2nd floor City Hall, 129 North 2nd Street, Yakima, Washington Additional information may be found on the City of Yakima Planning website under Quick Links beneath the "Yakima Planning Comrnusslon" head- ing: http://www.yakimawa.gov/ services/planning/ NOTICE OF REMAND HEARING: This request requires that the City of Yakima Planning Commis- sion hold an open record public hearing. The public hearing is scheduled to be held on Wednesday June 24, 2015, beginning at 3:30 p.m., in the Council Chambers, City Hall, 129 N 2nd Street, Yakima, WA. Any person desiring to express their views on this matter is invited to attend the public hearing or to submit written comments to: City of Yakima, Planning Division, 129 N 2nd St., Yakima, WA 96901. If you have any question on this pro- posal, please call Jeff Peters, Supervising Planner at (509) 575-6163. (552053) June 11, 2015 DOC. I" D' #me �. NOtic CITY OF YAKIMA NOTICE OF REMAND HEARING DATE: June 11, 2015 TO: Members of the Public and Parties of Record FROM: Joan Davenport, AICP, Com- munity Development Director SUBJECT: Notice of Remand Hearing regarding the City of Yakima Planning Commis- sion's Recommendation to the Yakima City Council incorpo- rating a new definition of "Mis- sion" into the City of Yakima's Municipal Code, CITY FILE NUMBER(S): T ;Ttfool-15 NOTICE OF REMAND: On May 19, 2015, the Yakima City Council considered a recom- mendation and accompany- ing ordinance by the City of Yakima Planning Commission to incorporate a new definition and land use category for a "Mission" into the City's Munici- pal Code. Following testimony from` the public during an open record hearing and deliberation on the matter, the City Council voted unanimously to remand the issue and ordinance back to the Planning Commission for further public nput and work. The file containing the corn. flets appilcatlon is available or public review at the City of Yakima Planning Division, 2nd floor City Hall, 129 North 2nd Street, Yakima, Washington Additional Information may be found on the City of Yakima; Planning website under Quick Links beneath the "Yakima Planning Commission" head- ing: http://wwwroyaklumawa.ggov/ servicss/plannln / NOTICE OF REMAND HEARING: This_ request requires that the City of Yakima PlanningCommis- sion hold an open record public hearing, the ptiblic hearing is scheduled to be held on Wednesday Jun 24, 2015, beginning at 3:50 p.m., in the Council Chambers, City Hall, 129 N 2nd Street, Yakima, WA Any person desiring to express their views on this manor Is invited to attend the public hearing or to submit written comments to: City of Yakima, PlanningDivision, 129 N 2nd St., Yakma, WA 95901. IN you have any question on this pro- posal, please call' Jett Peters, Supervising Planner at (509) 575-5153. (552053) June 11, 2015 COMM. I EVE.LOPMENT I 1 ".P Is`TMENT Joan Davenport, AICP, .Director lianning 1 w9"ioiiort Secolui si' t'e f .:„ .2nd Floor lnd (509) 575 261).1!')3 m' .1'202 (51...P9.) 525-6.1.05 NOTICE OF REMAND HEARING DATE: June 11, 2015 TO: Members of the Public and Parties of Record FROM: Joan Davenport, AICP, Community Development Director SUBJECT: Notice of Remand Hearing regarding the City of Yakima Planning Commission's Recommendation to the Yakima City Council incorporating a new definition of "Mission" into the City of Yakima's Municipal Code. CITY FILE NUMBER(S): TXT#001-15 NOTICE OF REMAND On May 19, 2015, the Yakima City Council considered a recommendation and accompanying ordinance by the City of Yakima Planning Commission to incorporate a new definition and land use category for a "Mission" into the City's Municipal Code. Following testimony from the public during an open record hearing and deliberation on the matter, the City Council voted unanimously to remand the issue and ordinance back to the Planning Commission for further public input and work. The file containing the complete application is available for public review at the City of Yakima Planning Division, 2nd floor City Hall, 129 North 2nd Street, Yakima, Washington. Additional information may be found on the City of Yakima Planning website under Quick Links beneath the "Yakima Planning Commission" heading: http://www.vakinnawa4oviservices/clannino/ NOTICE OF REMAND HEARING This request requires that the City of Yakima Planning Commission hold an open record public hearing. The public hearing is scheduled to be held on Wednesday June 24, 2015, beginning at 3:30 p.m., in the Council Chambers, City Hall, 129 N 2nd Street, Yakima, WA. Any person desiring to express their views on this matter is invited to attend the public hearing or to submit written comments to: City of Yakima, Planning Division, 129 N 2nd St., Yakima, WA 98901. If you have any question on this proposal, please call Jeff Peters, Supervising Planner at (509) 575-6163. ZONING TEXT AMENDMENT — "MISSION" USES TXT#001-15, SEPA#007-15 EXHIBIT LIST CHAPTER E Public Comments E-1 Comment Letter received from Reed C. Pell Law Offices 06/10/2015 June 10, 2015 To: REED C. P'ELL LAW OFFICES 7 SOUTH THIRD AVENUE YAK.A, WA 98902 1-509-952-3669 c City of Yakima Planning Commission From: Reed C. Pell Re: CITY PLANNING D ViSK N / Y Si IF V1 q_ (:.. NTER" USES — Proposed fleet ti nien TXT110 1 5 and 'Fr10 2.w' (1i] O fix; It is my understanding that you are having a Study Session this afternoon at 3:30 pm regarding the above matter. Mr. Jeff Peters, Supervising Planner, has advised me that if I forward this letter to him by 3:00 pm today he will provide copies to you. This matter has been remanded to you by the City Council for further review and consideration. I have reviewed the City Council Meeting at which this issue was considered and it appears that both the citizens that testified and the Council Members were concerned that the proposal being made included a recommendation of just a Class 2 review. The purpose of this letter is to urge you to adopt a Class 3 review on Mission and Resource Service Center Uses. The Yakima Urban Area Zoning Ordinance includes several uses that are permitted only with a Class 3 review, to -wit: Social Card Rooms (See YMC A" 9 d 9O, Horse Racing Tracks, Speedways CemeterylCrematorium with Funeral Home Hospital (*) Outside Institutional Overlay Correctional Facilities Senior High School Wastewater Sprayfield (*) Zoo (*) Treatment Centers For Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation of,;: ���� Rendering Plants, Slaughter Houses Mining Including Sand and Gravel Pits (*) Off -Site Hazardous Waste Treatment and Storage Facilities (*) Golf Courses, Clubhouses, Golf Driving Ranges Concentrated Feeding Operation The City has determined that the above uses can be so detrimental to surrounding property owners that the only way they should be permitted, if at all, is with a Class 3 Review. Note that one of the uses that requires a Class 3 Review is Treatment Centers for Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation; a problem that is epidemic to people who find their way to a Mission. In summary, it is my recommendation that a Mission and/or Resource Service Center Use be permitted only with a Class 3 Review. Do we really want anat orth First Street disaster in some other area of the City? Si Reed C. Pell DOC. l ,i DIU # E'