HomeMy WebLinkAbout10/06/2026 05. Public Comment - Distributed at MeetingRCW 10.130.080 - Audits.
(1) Each agency operating or accessing an automated license plate reader system shall maintain audit
trail data documenting all access to the system. Audit trail data must be retained for two years and must
include, at a minimum:
(a) A record of each action in which automated license plate reader data is accessed or searched,
including:
(i) The identity or username of the person who accessed or queried the system, and as applicable, the
organization or entity with whom the person is affiliated;
(ii) The date and time the automated license plate reader data or the automated license plate reader
system was accessed or searched;
(iii) Data elements used to query the automated license plate reader system;
(iv) Specific purpose for accessing or querying the automated license plate reader system, including the
offense type for any criminal investigation;
(v) The associated call for service or case number; and
(vi) The location of the cameras that are part of the automated license plate reader system accessed.
(b) All records of actions in which automated license plate reader data is exported, downloaded, or
shared; and
(c) Any audit trail data generated by or made available through a third -party vendor providing automated
license plate reader system services. Each agency shall ensure that all such vendor audit trail data is
downloaded or otherwise obtained and retained by the agency in accordance with this section.
(2) Data elements used to query the automated license plate reader system and retained as audit trail
data pursuant to subsection (1)(a) of this section may be used solely for auditing purposes and may not
be searched, analyzed, compiled, or indexed for investigative purposes. Data elements that contain
unique identifiers must be partially redacted in any public disclosure.
(3) Each agency shall conduct an internal audit at least once each year to review:
(a) All access to and use of the automated license plate reader system, as reflected in the audit trail data;
and
(b) The agency's compliance with the data retention, purging, and sharing requirements established
under this chapter and agency policy.
[10303;,]
Notes:
Effective date -2026 c 239: See note following RCW 10.130M30.
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TO: Hillsboro Chief of Police Jim Coleman
FROM: Washington County Community Members
DATE: December 18, 2025
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Hillsboro is currently facing a public safety crisis. This crisis is not driven by local crime, but by
the unregulated presence of unidentified federal agents operating in plainclothes, driving
unmarked vehicles, and engaging in aggressive tactics that endanger our residents.
These actions undermine the Community Trust your office has worked hard to build. When
families are torn apart in parking lots and unidentified drivers block roadways, the public loses
faith in the safety of our streets.
We are not asking you to violate federal law. We are asking you to enforce Oregon Law and
uphold the Constitutional rights of the public. Based on recent guidance from the Oregon
Attorney General and findings from Senator Ron Wyden, we submit the following policy
requests for immediate adoption.
PUBLIC SAFETY & TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT
Context: As noted in the Oregon Attorney General's letter dated November 24, 2025, federal
agents are not immune from state law when acting outside the "reasonable scope" of their
duties. The AG cited a specific incident of excessive force at a Dutch Bros in Hillsboro as a
violation of public safety.
1. Adopt an Agency -Wide Policy Prohibiting ICE Activity on or Near Agency
Property, with clear consequences for violations.
2. Enforce Traffic Safety Impartially: Treat reports of unmarked vehicles driving
recklessly, blocking roadways without emergency markers, or aggressively boxing in
drivers as priority public safety hazards. Deputies should initiate traffic stops to verify
the safety of the situation and the driver's credentials, regardless of federal status.
3. Investigate Excessive Force: Adopt the Attorney General's standard that the
Supremacy Clause does not protect federal agents who commit assault or endanger the
public. If deputies witness or receive reports of agents smashing windows or using mace
on non-violent individuals, these incidents must be investigated as potential violations of
the Oregon Criminal Code.
4. Refer to District Attorney: Commit to documenting these incidents comprehensively
and referring them to the Washington County District Attorney for review, consistent with
the AG's intent to "evaluate for prosecution."
II. DATA PRIVACY & SURVEILLANCE SAFETY
Senator Ron Wyden's October 16, 2025, letter regarding Flock findings proves that Flock's
architecture overrides local sanctuary policy. The Senator confirmed that federal agencies
accessed the "National Lookup Tool" to bypass local restrictions.
Included is a draft policy for your consideration.
1. Purpose and Scope: The purpose of this policy is to establish clear guidelines for
the acquisition, deployment, and use of surveillance technology by this
Department. This policy ensures that all technological tools —including
Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR)—are used in a manner that
protects the constitutional rights, privacy, and local sovereignty of all community
members.
2. Policy Statement: This Department recognizes that public trust is the foundation
of effective policing. We commit to transparency in our use of technology and
pledge that Hillsboro Police Department resources will comply with state law and
not be used to facilitate federal immigration enforcement or mass data collection
of non -criminal activity.
3. Acquisition and Approval: Prior to the acquisition of any new surveillance
technology, the Department shall:
• Submit a Surveillance Impact Report: This report must detail the specific
public safety need, the range of the technology, and the potential impact on civil
liberties.
• Establish a Use Policy: A clear, written policy must be approved by the City
Council before the technology is deployed.
• Conduct Public Vetting: The Department shall hold at least one public meeting
to allow for community feedback regarding the proposed technology.
4. Data Sovereignty and Restrictions: To ensure that local data serves local needs,
the following restrictions apply to all surveillance databases:
• Prohibition on Federal Sharing: The Department is strictly prohibited from
sharing surveillance data (including ALPR "hits" or historical location data) with
federal agencies, including ICE or CBP, for the purpose of civil immigration
enforcement. HPD will not engage with surveillance systems that allow federal
agencies to use locally collected data for federal immigration enforcement
purposes.
• Third -Party Vendor Compliance: Any contract with a private surveillance
vendor must include a legal clause forbidding the vendor from selling, sharing, or
providing a "backdoor" to our local data to any third -party or federal agency
without a specific, locally -authorized judicial warrant.
• Query Limitations: Access to surveillance data is restricted to authorized
personnel for specific, ongoing criminal investigations. "Fishing expeditions" or
mass queries of residents' movements without reasonable suspicion are
prohibited. All data searches will require an attached case number.
5. Retention and Auditing
• Data Purge: All data not tied to an active criminal investigation shall be purged in
accordance with City, County, and State rules.
• Annual Audit: The Department shall conduct an annual audit of its surveillance
systems. This audit will include a log of all data queries, the justification for those
queries, and a list of any outside agencies that requested access to the data.
This audit shall be made available to the public.
6. Training: All officers authorized to use surveillance technology must undergo
annual training on this policy, with a specific focus on the Fourth Amendment and
local data protection laws.
Ill. HUMANITARIAN "FAMILY FIRST" PROTOCOLS
Context: When drivers are detained, leaving vehicles behind often results in predatory towing
fees that devastate families. This aligns with your priority of "Holistic Wellness" for the
community.
WE REQUEST A POLICY TO:
1. Prevent Predatory Towing: Implement a "Family First" Release Protocol. If a driver
is taken into custody (by any agency) and a vehicle is left behind, HPD officers on scene
must make a reasonable attempt to contact a registered family member or friend to
retrieve the vehicle before calling a tow truck.
2. Support Left -Behind Minors: Establish a clear protocol for when parents are detained
in the presence of children. Deputies must ensure children are placed with a safe,
designated caregiver rather than defaulting to state custody, minimizing trauma.
3. Partner with legal aid, immigrant advocacy groups, and other appropriate
Community -Based Organizations to provide on -site support for affected families.
IV. TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY
Context: The community cannot trust what it cannot see. We need data to understand the scope
of this federal operation.
WE REQUEST:
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narcotics K-9 officer. Alaniz's patrol vehicle is equipped with exterior cameras
feed into larger fixed -position camera networks that automatically capture
and log license plate numbers along with accompanying information like the
date, time, and location a license plate is seen by one of the cameras in that
("ALPR") technology. Alaniz has access to at least two ALPR systems, Flock
and VehicleManager. These two systems have different capabilities, but they
serve the same essential function: gathering and organizing historical data
about a vehicle's whereabouts on public roadways for use by law enforcement
across the country. It is not clear from the record how long such information
is kept, nor is it clear who keeps the information. But at least at the time of
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Flock system for the California license plate number on the Mazda SUV.
Both Flock and VehicleManager provide users an option for the reason the
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his patrol car so she could search for the rental information on her phone.
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people that are uh transporting large amounts of drugs, U.S. currency, guns,
uh human trafficking, identity theft stuff." He then told Kyle "your short trip
to California I feel like uh—I don't feel —I know from my training ... and my
experience that people who do very short trips to California and come right
back are usually transporting large amounts of drugs." Alaniz asked Kyle for
consent to search her vehicle, and she denied the request. Immediately after
Kyle refused, Alaniz asked for backup and told Kyle that she was detained so
he could have his dog sniff her car.
While Alaniz explained the next steps, Kyle disclosed that she had some
marijuana in the car. She asked Alaniz if she could give it to him because she
knew that Alaniz's dog would alert to the marijuana. Alaniz stated, "I am not
worried at all for a little bit of marijuana, that's not what I'm looking for," but
he proceeded with detaining Kyle to deploy his dog for a drug sniff. Alaniz
also responded to a radio communication by stating "it's non -pressing, I've
just got a refusal on k9 deployment."
After Alaniz's backup officer arrived on the scene, he told him "I asked for
consent to search her car, she ... denied, so I'm gonna run my dog." Alaniz
also told another officer: "Man, she's nervous as all get out. Super nervous.
She went to California for two days. ... Kinda making some stuff up as I'm
asking her where she stayed at. ... Has a shit ton of luggage back there for
just two days to California. I asked her for consent. She's like no I don't think
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that "any restraint on the person amounting to a seizure for the purposes of
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totality of the circumstances." Id. (quoting Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1379). "This
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The government is correct that, in general, "[i] mplausible travel plans can
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opposite sides of the Colorado River, which serves as the border between
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There is nothing suspicious about Kyle visiting family she had not seen in
years, and swimming is a normal activity to do with people during a visit.
Indeed, visiting family that someone has not seen for years is a good reason
to travel a long way over a short time.
Perhaps Kyle was not the best storyteller when she recounted her travel
statements were at most odd. They add little to the reasonable suspicion
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that Kyle had in the car. In some circumstances, "the presence of a bag in a
vehicle adds nothing to the reasonable suspicion calculus." United States v.
Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Santos,
403 F.3d 1120, 1124, 1133 (10th Cir. 2005) to note that the Tenth Circuit had
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generic term to reference the type of bag (i.e. a plastic grocery -style bag one
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4) The Rental Vehicle
The government argues that Alaniz knew from "his training and
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Alaniz also made it even more clear that this was the Rodriguez moment
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• She made a short trip to California that required a long drive to and
from her departure in Missouri over a short period;
• She audibly recounted what day she left for her trip;
• She went swimming on her trip, bought items for her kids and other
things, she visited her cousin, and she had not seen the people she
visited in years;
• She stayed in a town on one side of the Arizona/California border,
and visited someone in a town on the other side of the border;
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• She smoked a cigarette in her car;
• She was driving a rental vehicle; and
• She was nervous, but not extremely or persistently nervous.
In the Court's view, Alaniz did not have enough information to reasonably
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we cannot say the factors operate together to eliminate a
sufficient portion of innocent travel. "Reliance on the mantra `the
totality of the circumstances' cannot metamorphose these facts
into reasonable suspicion."
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Such evidence would not have been acquired without Alaniz unlawfully
extending the stop. Because the government does not identify any applicable
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Oklahoma law regarding PR use is not relevant to the Fourth Amendment ao
analysis. [Id. at 23-24].
Neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Supreme Court have decided whether
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law enforcement's use of ALPR technology is a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes. The issue is still working its way through trial and appellate courts
across the country. Based on the Court's research, it appears that nearly
every court examining the issue to date has determined that ALP
Case 4:26cr00189-SEH Document 62 Filed in U ND/OK on 10/01/26 Page 30 of 38
this way. United States v. Schoggins, No. CR-25-189-JFH, 2026 WL 713083
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The Court must keep in mind the basic underlying principle that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967). That is why "[w]hen an individual seeks to preserve
something as private and his expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable,' then governmental `intrusion into that
private sphere generally qualifies as a search." Chatrie v. United States, 609
U.S. , 146 S.Ct. 2193, 2204 (2026) (citation omitted).
The Court acknowledges that people, in at least a broad sense, do not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements on a public roadway.
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983). But the rapid
development of technology requires courts to take a more nuanced approach
than following Knotts in a vacuum. The Supreme Court has paid particularly
close attention to cell phones, which collect immense amounts of information
about people's whereabouts in fine detail. In Carpenter v. United States, the
Court held that the government's acquisition of cell -cite location records was
a search under the Fourth Amendment. 585 U.S. 296, 320 (2018). Certainly,
the Carpenter majority distinguished cell phones from automobiles: "While
individuals regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell phones
with them all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public
thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor's offices, political
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales." Id. at 311. But the
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privacy in the whole of their physical movements." Id. at 2206 (quoting
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access to an entire month's worth of location data tied to the license plate on
Kyle's car, including more than fifty sightings across multiple states. [ECF
No. 50-3] . This is not the same fine-tuned level of detail that something like a
cell phone reveals about the whole of someone's physical movements. But by
virtue of how ALPR technology works, Alaniz and other officers using these
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take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
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information it collects. It could track and log a couple struggling to start a
family at the fertility clinic. It could show how often someone visits a liquor
store or casino. It could show which doctor someone goes to or what lawyer's
office someone visits. It also collects mundane information about people's
commutes, but it collects a tremendous amount of such information all the
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he conducted the ALPR search, which led to the rest of the evidence obtained
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Sara E. Hill
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE