HomeMy WebLinkAboutR-2025-115 Resolution authorizing the acceptance of an FAA Airport Terminal Program (ATP) grant for construction of terminal baggage claim and restroom upgradesRESOLUTION NO. R-2025-115
A RESOLUTION authorizing grant acceptance from the Federal Aviation Administration for
the Yakima Air Terminal Building Modernization Baggage Claim and
Restroom project for Capital Improvements at the Yakima Air Terminal -
McAllister Field,
WHEREAS, the City owns and operates the Yakima Air Terminal -McAllister Field in
accordance with applicable Federal, State, and Local regulations; and
WHEREAS, the Yakima Air Terminal -McAllister Field has been notified that grant funds
are available to maintain and/or improve the airport upon submission of completed Airport
Terminal Program (ATP) grant application and satisfaction of certain conditions; and
WHEREAS, the Yakima Air Terminal -McAllister Field has a current and complete Airport
Master Plan, which details a variety of required capital improvement projects, including
construction and modernization of the airport's Terminal Facility infrastructure; and
WHEREAS, the grant offer is a total of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000) dollars in ATP
funding administered by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); and
WHEREAS, the City Council deems it to be in the best interest of the City and its residents
to authorize acceptance of the grant funds needed to accomplish the baggage claim and restroom
capital improvements, now, therefore,
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF YAKIMA:
The City Manager is hereby authorized and directed to sign to accept ATP grant funds from the
FAA for the Yakima Air Terminal Building Modernization project for the Yakima Air Terminal-
McAllister Field
ADOPTED BY THE CITY COUNCIL this 4th day of August, 2025,
ATTEST: K�r Patricia Byers, yor
osalinda Ibarra, City Clerk
el
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U.S. Department Airports Division Seattle Airports District Office:
of Transportation Northwest Mountain 2200 S 216th St
Federal Aviation Region Des Moines, WA 98198
Administration Oregon, Washington
August 15, 2025
Ms. Victoria Baker
City Manager
Yakima Air Terminal -McAllister Field
129 N Second St
Yakima, WA 98901
Dear Ms. Baker:
The Grant Offer for the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) - Airport Terminal Program Grant
(ATP) Project No. 3-53-0089-060-2025 at Yakima Air Terminal -McAllister Field Airport is attached for
execution. This letter outlines the steps you must take to properly enter into this agreement and
provides other useful information. Please read the conditions, special conditions, and assurances that
comprise the grant offer carefully.
You may not make any modification to the text, terms or conditions of the grant offer.
Steps You Must Take to Enter into Agreement.
To properly enter into this agreement, you must do the following:
1. The governing body must give authority to execute the grant to the individual(s) signing the
grant, i.e., the person signing the document must be the sponsor's authorized representative(s)
(hereinafter "authorized representative").
2. The authorized representative must execute the grant by adding their electronic signature to
the appropriate certificate at the end of the agreement.
3. Once the authorized representative has electronically signed the grant, the sponsor's attorney(s)
will automatically receive an email notification.
4. On the same day or after the authorized representative has signed the grant, the sponsor's
attorney(s) will add their electronic signature to the appropriate certificate at the end of the
agreement.
5. If there are co-sponsors, the authorized representative(s) and sponsor's attorney(s) must follow
the above procedures to fully execute the grant and finalize the process. Signatures must be
obtained and finalized no later than September 3, 2025.
6. The fully executed grant will then be automatically sent to all parties as an email attachment.
Payment. Subject to the requirements in 2 CFR § 200.305 (Federal Payment), each payment request for
reimbursement under this grant must be made electronically via the Delphi elnvoicing System. Please
see the attached Grant Agreement for more information regarding the use of this System.
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Project Timing. The terms and conditions of this agreement require you to complete the project
without undue delay and no later than the Period of Performance end date (1,460 days from the grant
execution date). We will be monitoring your progress to ensure proper stewardship of these Federal
funds. We expect you to submit payment requests for reimbursement of allowable incurred project
expenses consistent with project progress. Your grant may be placed in "inactive" status if you do not
make draws on a regular basis, which will affect your ability to receive future grant offers. Costs
incurred after the Period of Performance ends are generally not allowable and will be rejected unless
authorized by the FAA in advance,
Reporting. Until the grant is completed and closed, you are responsible for submitting formal reports as
follows:
For all grants, you must submit by December 31' of each year this grant is open:
1. A signed/dated SF-270 (Request for Advance or Reimbursement for non -construction
projects) or SF-271 or equivalent (Outlay Report and Request for Reimbursement for
Construction Programs), and
2. An SF-425 (Federal Financial Report).
For non -construction projects, you must submit FAA Form 5100-140, Performance Report within
30 days of the end of the Federal fiscal year.
For construction projects, you must submit FAA Form 5370-1, Construction Progress and
Inspection Report, within 30 days of the end of each Federal fiscal quarter.
Audit Requirements. As a condition of receiving Federal assistance under this award, you must comply
with audit requirements as established under2 CFR Part 200. Subpart F requires non -Federal entities
that expend $1,000,000 or more in Federal awards to conduct a single or program specific audit for that
year. Note that this includes Federal expenditures made under other Federal -assistance programs.
Please take appropriate and necessary action to ensure your organization will comply with applicable
audit requirements and standards.
Closeout. Once the project(s) is completed and all costs are determined, we ask that you work with your
FAA contact indicated below to close the project without delay and submit the necessary final closeout
documentation as required by your Region/Airports District Office.
FAA Contact Information. Chelsea Branchcomb, (206) 231-4231, chelsea.I,branchcomb@faa.gov is the
assigned program manager for this grant and is readily available to assist you and your designated
representative with the requirements stated herein.
We sincerely value your cooperation in these efforts and look forward to working with you to complete
this important project.
Sincerely,
Ryan C. Zulauf
Acting Manager, Seattle Airports District Office
2
Coe
U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration
FY 2025 AIRPORT TERMINAL PROGRAM GRANT
GRANT AGREEMENT
Part I - Offer
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Federal Award Offer Date August 15, 2025
Airport/Planning Area Yakima Air Terminal -McAllister Field Airport
Airport Terminal Program
Grant Number
3-53-0089-060-2025 (Contract Number: DOT-FA25NM-086)
Unique Entity Identifier FJNNX1XFJ9K3
TO: City of Yakima, Washington
(herein called the "Sponsor")
FROM: The United States of America (acting through the Federal Aviation Administration, herein
called the "FAA")
WHEREAS, the Sponsor has submitted to the FAA a Project Application dated August 01, 2025, for a
grant of Federal funds for a project at or associated with the Yakima Air Trml/McAllister Field Airport,
which is included as part of this Grant Agreement; and
WHEREAS, the FAA has approved a project for the Yakima Air Trml/McAllister Field Airport (herein
called the "Project") consisting of the following:
Improve Terminal Building (46% of phase 2-construction), including baggage claim area;
which is more fully described in the Project Application submitted in response to the Notice of Funding
Opportunity (NOFO) published on July 5, 2024.
NOW THEREFORE, Pursuant to and for the purpose of carrying out the Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act (IIJA) (Public Law (P.L.) 117-58) of 2021; FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-63); and the
representations contained in the Project Application; and in consideration of: (a) the Sponsor's adoption
and ratification of the attached Grant Assurances dated April 2025, interpreted and applied consistent
with the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024; (b) the Sponsor's acceptance of this Offer; and (c) the
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benefits to accrue to the United States and the public from the accomplishment of the Project and
compliance with the Grant Assurance and conditions as herein provided;
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES, HEREBY
OFFERS AND AGREES to pay (95) % of the allowable costs incurred accomplishing the Project as the
United States share of the Project.
Assistance Listings Number (Formerly CFDA Number): 20.106
This Offer is made on and SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS:
CONDITIONS
1. Maximum Obligation. The maximum obligation of the United States payable under this Offer is
$1,000,000.
The following amounts represent a breakdown of the maximum obligation for the purpose of
establishing allowable amounts for any future grant amendment, which may increase the foregoing
maximum obligation of the United States under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 47108(b):
$0 for planning
$1,000,000 for airport development; and,
$0 for land acquisition.
2. Grant Performance. This Grant Agreement is subject to the following Federal award requirements:
a. Period of Performance:
1. Shall start on the date the Sponsor formally accepts this Agreement and is the date signed
by the last Sponsor signatory to the Agreement. The end date of the Period of Performance
is 4 years (1,460 calendar days) from the date of acceptance. The Period of Performance end
date shall not affect, relieve, or reduce Sponsor obligations and assurances that extend
beyond the closeout of this Grant Agreement.
2. Means the total estimated time interval between the start of an initial Federal award and
the planned end date, which may include one or more funded portions or budget periods. (2
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 200.1) except as noted in 49 U.S.0 § 47142(b).
b. Budget Period:
1. For this Grant is 4 years (1,460 calendar days) and follows the same start and end date as
the Period of Performance provided in paragraph (2)(a)(1). Pursuant to 2 CFR § 200.403(h),
the Sponsor may charge to the Grant only allowable costs incurred during the Budget Period
and as stated in 49 U.S.0 § 47142(b). All project costs must be incurred after the grant
execution date unless specifically permitted under 49 U.S.C. § 47110(c). Certain airport
development costs incurred before execution of the grant agreement, but after November
15, 2021, are allowable only if certain conditions under 49 U.S.C. § 47110(c) are met.
2. Means the time interval from the start date of a funded portion of an award to the end date
of that funded portion during which the Sponsor is authorized to expend the funds awarded,
including any funds carried forward or other revisions pursuant to 2 CFR § 200.308.
c. Close Out and Termination:
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Unless the FAA authorizes a written extension, the Sponsor must submit all Grant closeout
documentation and liquidate (pay-off) all obligations incurred under this award no later
than 120 calendar days after the end date of the Period of Performance. If the Sponsor does
not submit all required closeout documentation within this time period, the FAA will
proceed to close out the grant within one year of the Period of Performance end date with
the information available at the end of 120 days (2 CFR § 200.344). The FAA may terminate
this agreement and all of its obligations under this agreement if any of the following occurs:
(a) (1) The Sponsor fails to obtain or provide any Sponsor grant contribution as required by
the agreement;
(2) A completion date for the Project or a component of the Project is listed in the
agreement and the Recipient fails to meet that milestone by six months after the date
listed in the agreement;
(3) The Sponsor fails to comply with the terms and conditions of this agreement,
including a material failure to comply with the Project Schedule even if it is beyond the
reasonable control of the Sponsor;
(4) Circumstances cause changes to the Project that the FAA determines are
inconsistent with the FAA's basis for selecting the Project to receive a grant; or
(5) The FAA determines that termination of this agreement is in the public interest.
(b) In terminating this agreement under this section, the FAA may elect to consider only the
interests of the FAA.
(c) The Sponsor may request that the FAA terminate the agreement under this section.
3. Ineligible or Unallowable Costs. In accordance with P.L. 117-58, Division J, Title VIII 49 U.S.C. § 49
U.S.C. § 47110, the Sponsor is prohibited from including any costs in the grant funded portions of
the project that the FAA has determined to be ineligible or unallowable, including costs incurred to
carry out airport development implementing policies and initiatives repealed by Executive Order
14148, provided such costs are not otherwise permitted by statute.
4. Indirect Costs - Sponsor. The Sponsor may charge indirect costs under this award by applying the
indirect cost rate identified in the project application as accepted by the FAA, to allowable costs for
Sponsor direct salaries and wages.
5. Determining the Final Federal Share of Costs. The United States' share of allowable project costs
will be made in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 47109, the regulations, policies, and procedures of the
Secretary of Transportation ("Secretary"), and any superseding legislation. Final determination of
the United States' share will be based upon the final audit of the total amount of allowable project
costs and settlement will be made for any upward or downward adjustments to the Federal share of
costs.
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6. Completing the Project Without Delay and in Conformance with Requirements. The Sponsor must
carry out and complete the project without undue delays and in accordance with this Agreement,
IIJA (P.L. 117-58), and the regulations, policies, and procedures of the Secretary. Per 2 CFR
§ 200.308, the Sponsor agrees to report and request prior FAA approval for any disengagement from
performing the project that exceeds three months or a 25 percent reduction in time devoted to the
project. The report must include a reason for the project stoppage. The Sponsor also agrees to
comply with the grant assurances, which are part of this Agreement.
7. Amendments or Withdrawals before Grant Acceptance. The FAA reserves the right to amend or
withdraw this offer at any time prior to its acceptance by the Sponsor.
8. Offer Expiration Date. This offer will expire and the United States will not be obligated to pay any
part of the costs of the project unless this offer has been accepted by the Sponsor on or before
September 3, 2025, or such subsequent date as may be prescribed in writing by the FAA.
9. Improper Use of Federal Funds and Mandatory Disclosure.
a. The Sponsor must take all steps, including litigation if necessary, to recover Federal funds spent
fraudulently, wastefully, or in violation of Federal antitrust statutes, or misused in any other
manner for any project upon which Federal funds have been expended. For the purposes of this
Grant Agreement, the term "Federal funds" means funds however used or dispersed by the
Sponsor, that were originally paid pursuant to this or any other Federal grant agreement. The
Sponsor must obtain the approval of the Secretary as to any determination of the amount of the
Federal share of such funds. The Sponsor must return the recovered Federal share, including
funds recovered by settlement, order, or judgment, to the Secretary. The Sponsor must furnish
to the Secretary, upon request, all documents and records pertaining to the determination of
the amount of the Federal share or to any settlement, litigation, negotiation, or other efforts
taken to recover such funds. All settlements or other final positions of the Sponsor, in court or
otherwise, involving the recovery of such Federal share require advance approval by the
Secretary.
b. The Sponsor, a recipient, and a subrecipient under this Federal grant must promptly comply
with the mandatory disclosure requirements as established under 2 CFR § 200.113, including
reporting requirements related to recipient integrity and performance in accordance with
Appendix XII to 2 CFR Part 200.
10, United States Not Liable for Damage or Injury. The United States is not responsible or liable for
damage to property or injury to persons which may arise from, or be incident to, compliance with
this Grant Agreement.
11. System for Award Management (SAM) Registration and Unique Entity Identifier (UEI).
a. Requirement for System for Award Management (SAM): Unless the Sponsor is exempted from
this requirement under 2 CFR § 25.110, the Sponsor must maintain the currency of its
information in the SAM until the Sponsor submits the final financial report required under this
Grant, or receives the final payment, whichever is later. This requires that the Sponsor review
and update the information at least annually after the initial registration and more frequently if
required by changes in information or another award term. Additional information about
registration procedures may be found at the SAM website (currently at http://www.sam.gov).
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b. Unique entity identifier (UEI) means a 12-character alpha -numeric value used to identify a
specific commercial, nonprofit or governmental entity. A UEI may be obtained from SAM.gov at
https://sam.gov/content/entity-registration.
12, Electronic Grant Payment(s). Unless otherwise directed by the FAA, the Sponsor must make each
payment request under this Agreement electronically via the Delphi elnvoicing System for
Department of Transportation (DOT) Financial Assistance Awardees.
13. Informal Letter Amendment of ILIA Projects. If, during the life of the project, the FAA determines
that the maximum grant obligation of the United States exceeds the expected needs of the Sponsor
by $25,000 or five percent (5%), whichever is greater, the FAA can issue a letter amendment to the
Sponsor unilaterally reducing the maximum obligation.
The FAA can, subject to the availability of Federal funds, also issue a letter to the Sponsor increasing
the maximum obligation if there is an overrun in the total actual eligible and allowable project costs
to cover the amount of the overrun provided it will not exceed the statutory limitations for grant
amendments. The FAA's authority to increase the maximum obligation does not apply to the
"planning" component of Condition No. 1, Maximum Obligation.
The FAA can also issue an informal letter amendment that modifies the grant description to correct
administrative errors or to delete work items if the FAA finds it advantageous and in the best
interests of the United States.
An informal letter amendment has the same force and effect as a formal grant amendment.
14. Environmental Standards. The Sponsor is required to comply with all applicable environmental
standards, as further defined in the Grant Assurances, for all projects in this grant. If the Sponsor
fails to comply with this requirement, the FAA may suspend, cancel, or terminate this Grant
Agreement.
15. Financial Reporting and Payment Requirements. The Sponsor will comply with all Federal financial
reporting requirements and payment requirements, including submittal of timely and accurate
reports.
16. Buy American. Unless otherwise approved in advance by the FAA, in accordance with 49 U.S.C.
§ 50101, the Sponsor will not acquire or permit any contractor or subcontractor to acquire any steel
or manufactured goods produced outside the United States to be used for any project for which
funds are provided under this Grant. The Sponsor will include a provision implementing Buy
American in every contract and subcontract awarded under this Grant.
17. Build America, Buy American. The Sponsor must comply with the requirements under the Build
America, Buy America Act (P.L. 117-58).
18. Maximum Obligation Increase. In accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 47108(b)(3), as amended, the
maximum obligation of the United States, as stated in Condition No. 1, Maximum Obligation, of this
Grant:
a. May not be increased for a planning project;
b. May be increased by not more than 15 percent for development projects, if funds are available;
c. May be increased by not more than the greater of the following for a land project, if funds are
available:
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1. 15 percent; or
2. 25 percent of the total increase in allowable project costs attributable to acquiring an
interest in the land.
If the Sponsor requests an increase, any eligible increase in funding will be subject to the United
States Government share as provided in IIJA (P,L. 117-58), or other superseding legislation if
applicable, for the fiscal year appropriation with which the increase is funded. The FAA is not
responsible for the same Federal share provided herein for any amount increased over the initial
grant amount. The FAA may adjust the Federal share as applicable through an informal letter of
amendment.
19. Audits for Sponsors.
PUBLIC SPONSORS. The Sponsor must provide for a Single Audit or program -specific audit in
accordance with 2 CFR Part 200, The Sponsor must submit the audit reporting package to the
Federal Audit Clearinghouse on the Federal Audit Clearinghouse's Internet Data Entry System at
http://harvester.census.gov/facweb/, Upon request of the FAA, the Sponsor shall provide one copy
of the completed audit to the FAA. Sponsors that expend less than $1,000,000 in Federal awards
and are exempt from Federal audit requirements must make records available for review or audit
by the appropriate Federal agency officials, State, and Government Accountability Office. The FAA
and other appropriate Federal agencies may request additional information to meet all Federal
audit requirements.
20. Suspension or Debarment. When entering into a "covered transaction" as defined by 2 CFR
§ 180.200, the Sponsor must:
a. Verify the non -Federal entity is eligible to participate in this Federal program by:
1. Checking the Responsibility/Qualification records in the Federal Awardee Performance and
Integrity Information System (FAPIIS) as maintained within the System for Award
Management (SAM) to determine if the non -Federal entity is excluded or disqualified; or
2. Collecting a certification statement from the non -Federal entity attesting they are not
excluded or disqualified from participating; or
3. Adding a clause or condition to covered transactions attesting the individual or firm are not
excluded or disqualified from participating.
b. Require prime contractors to comply with 2 CFR § 180.330 when entering into lower -tier
transactions with their contractors and sub -contractors.
c. Immediately disclose in writing to the FAA whenever (1) the Sponsor learns it has entered into a
covered transaction with an ineligible entity or (2) the Public Sponsor suspends or debars a
contractor, person, or entity.
21. Ban on Texting While Driving.
a. In accordance with Executive Order 13513, Federal Leadership on Reducing Text Messaging
While Driving, October 1, 2009, and DOT Order 3902.10, Text Messaging While Driving,
December 30, 2009, the Sponsor is encouraged to:
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1. Adopt and enforce workplace safety policies to decrease crashes caused by distracted
drivers including policies to ban text messaging while driving when performing any work for,
or on behalf of, the Federal government, including work relating to a grant or subgrant.
2. Conduct workplace safety initiatives in a manner commensurate with the size of the
business, such as:
i. Establishment of new rules and programs or re-evaluation of existing programs to
prohibit text messaging while driving; and
ii. Education, awareness, and other outreach to employees about the safety risks
associated with texting while driving.
b. The Sponsor must insert the substance of this clause on banning texting while driving in all
subgrants, contracts, and subcontracts funded with this Grant.
22. Trafficking in Persons.
1. Posting of contact information.
a. The Sponsor must post the contact information of the national human trafficking hotline
(including options to reach out to the hotline such as through phone, text, or TTY) in all
public airport restrooms.
2. Provisions applicable to a recipient that is a private entity.
a. Under this Grant, the recipient, its employees, subrecipients under this Grant, and
subrecipients employees must not engage in:
i. Severe forms of trafficking in persons;
ii. The procurement of commercial sex act during the period of time that the grant or
cooperative agreement is in effect;
iii. The use of forced labor in the performance of this grant; or any subaward; or
iv. Acts that directly support or advance trafficking in person, including the following acts;
a) Destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, or otherwise denying an employee
access to that employee's identity or immigration documents;
b) Failing to provide return transportation of pay for return transportation costs to an
employee from a country outside the United States to the country from which the
employee was recruited upon the end of employment if requested by the
employee, unless:
1. Exempted from the requirement to provide or pay for such return
transportation by the federal department or agency providing or entering
into the grant; or
2. The employee is a victim of human trafficking seeking victim services or
legal redress in the country of employment or witness in a human trafficking
enforcement action;
c) Soliciting a person for the purpose of employment, or offering employment, by
means of materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises
regarding that employment;
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d) Charging recruited employeesaplacement mrrecruitment fee; or
e) Providing orarranging housing that fails tmmeet the host country's housing and
safety standards.
b. The FAA, may unilaterally terminate this Grant, or take any remedial actions authorized by
22U.S.C871O4b(c),m/ithoutpeno|ty,ifanypdvateentltyunderthisGrant
i Is determined to have violated a prohibition in paragraph (2)(a) of this Grant;
ii. Has an employee that is determined to have violated a prohibition in paragraph (2)(a) of
this Grant through conduct that iseither:
m) Associated with performance under this Grant; or
b) Imputed tmthe recipient orsubredpientusing the standards and due process for
imputing the conduct of an individual to an organization that are provided in 2 CFN
Part 18O,"OMB Guidelines toAgencies mnGovernment-wide Debarment and
Suspension (Nonproourement)'"asimplemented bythe FAA at2 CFRPart 12OO'
3. Provision applicable toorecipient other than mprivate entity.
a. The FAA may unilaterally terminate this award or take any remedial actions authorized by
22 U.S.0 7104b(c), without penalty, if subrecipient than is a private entity under this award;
i. Is determined to have violated a prohibition in paragraph (2)(a) of this Grant or
O. Has an employee that is determined to have violated a prohibition in paragraph (2)(a) of
this Grant through conduct that iseither:
a) Associated with performance under this Grant; or
b\ Imputed 1mthe subredpientusing the standards and due process for imputing the
conduct of an individual to an organization that are provided in 2 CFR Part 180,
"OMB Guidelines tpAgencies mnGo*ernnnentvvideDebarment and Suspension
(Nonpnocuremnent),"animplemented bvour agency at2CFRPart 1IOO.
4. Provisions applicable boany recipient.
a. The recipient must inform the FAA and the DOT Inspector General, immediately of any
information you receive from any source alleging a violation of a prohibition in paragraph
(2)(a) of this Grant.
b. The FAA's right to unilaterally terminate this Grant as described in paragraph (2)(b) or (3)(a)
ofthisGrani|mp|ementstherequinmmemtspf22U.S.[.6chapter78andisadditiuntma||
other remedies for noncompliance that are available to the FAA underthis Grant;
c. The recipient must include the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) of this Grant award term in
enysuhaward it makes to a private entity.
d. If applicable, the recipient must also comply with the compliance plan and certification
requirements in2[FR17S.105(b).
5. Definitions. For purposes mfthis Grant award, term:
a. "Employee" means either:
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3-53-0089-060-2025
i. An individual employed by the recipient or a subrecipient who is engaged in the
performance of the project or program under this Grant; or
ii. Another person engaged in the performance of the project or program under this Grant
and not compensated by the recipient including, but not limited to, a volunteer or
individual whose services are contributed by a third party as an in -kind contribution
toward cost sharing or requirements.
b. "Private entity" means:
i. Any entity, including for profit organizations, nonprofit organizations, institutions of
higher education, and hospitals. The term does not include foreign public entities,
Indian Tribes, local governments, or states as defined in 2 CFR 200.1.
ii. The terms "severe forms of trafficking in persons," "commercial sex act," "sex
trafficking," "Abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process," "coercion," "debt
bondage," and "involuntary servitude" have the meaning given at section 103 of the
TVPA, as amended (22 U.S.C. §7102).
23. IIJA Funded Work Included in a PFC Application. Within 120 days of acceptance of this Grant
Agreement, the Sponsor must submit to the FAA an amendment to any approved Passenger Facility
Charge (PFC) application that contains an approved PFC project also covered under this Grant
Agreement as described in the project application. The airport sponsor may not make any
expenditure under this Grant Agreement until project work addressed under this Grant Agreement
is removed from an approved PFC application by amendment.
24. Exhibit "A" Property Map. The Exhibit "A" Property Map dated May 2021, is incorporated herein by
reference or is submitted with the project application and made part of this Grant Agreement.
25. Employee Protection from Reprisal. In accordance with 2 CFR § 200.217 and 41 U.S.C. § 4712, an
employee of a grantee, subgrantee contractor, recipient or subrecipient must not be discharged,
demoted, or otherwise discriminated against as a reprisal for disclosing to a person or body
described in paragraph (a)(2) of 41 U.S.C. 4712 information that the employee reasonably believes is
evidence of gross mismanagement of a Federal contract or grant, a gross waste of Federal funds, an
abuse of authority relating to a Federal contract or grant, a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety, or a violation of law, rule, or regulation related to a Federal contract (including the
competition for or negotiation of a contract) or grant. The grantee, subgrantee, contractor,
recipient, or subrecipient must inform their employees in writing of employee whistleblower rights
and protections under 41 U.S.C. § 4712. See statutory requirements for whistleblower protections at
10 U.S.C. § 4701, 41 U.S.C. § 4712, 41 U.S.C. § 4304, and 10 U.S.C. § 4310.
26. Prohibited Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services and Equipment. The Sponsor
agrees to comply with mandatory standards and policies relating to use and procurement of certain
telecommunications and video surveillance services or equipment in compliance with the National
Defense Authorization Act [Public Law 115-232 § 889(f)(1)] and 2 CFR § 200.216.
27. Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. The Sponsor acknowledges that it has considered
and addressed physical and cybersecurity and resilience in their project planning, design, and
oversight, as determined by the DOT and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). For airports
that do not have specific DOT or DHS cybersecurity requirements, the FAA encourages the voluntary
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adoption of the cybersecurity requirements from the Transportation Security Administration and
Federal Security Director identified for security risk Category X airports.
28. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. As a condition of a grant award, the Sponsor shall demonstrate that
it complies with the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq)
and implementing regulations (49 CFR part 21), the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (49
U.S.C. § 47123), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42
U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.), U.S. Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Assurances, and other relevant civil rights statutes, regulations, or authorities, including any
amendments or updates thereto. This may include, as applicable, providing a current Title VI
Program Plan to the FAA for approval, in the format and according to the timeline required by the
FAA, and other information about the communities that will be benefited and impacted by the
project. A completed FAA Title VI Pre -Grant Award Checklist is required for every grant application,
unless excused by the FAA. The Sponsor shall affirmatively ensure that when carrying out any
project supported by this grant that it complies with all federal nondiscrimination and civil rights
laws based on race, color, national origin, sex, creed, age, disability, genetic information, in
consideration for federal financial assistance. The Department's and FAA's Office of Civil Rights may
provide resources and technical assistance to recipients to ensure full and sustainable compliance
with Federal civil rights requirements. Failure to comply with civil rights requirements will be
considered a violation of the agreement or contract and be subject to any enforcement action as
authorized by law,
29. FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. This grant agreement is subject to the terms and conditions
contained herein including the terms known as the Grant Assurances as they were published in the
Federal Register April 2025. On May 16, 2024, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 made certain
amendments to 49 U.S.C. chapter 471. The Reauthorization Act will require the FAA to make certain
amendments to the assurances in order to best achieve consistency with the statute. Federal law
requires that the FAA publish any amendments to the assurances in the Federal Register along with
an opportunity to comment. In order not to delay the offer of this grant, the existing assurances are
attached herein; however, the FAA shall interpret and apply these assurances consistent with the
Reauthorization Act. To the extent there is a conflict between the assurances and Federal statutes,
the statutes shall apply. The full text of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 is at:
https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/3935/text
30. Applicable Federal Anti -Discrimination Laws. Pursuant to Section (3)(b)(iv), Executive Order 14173,
Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit -Based Opportunity, the sponsor:
a, Agrees that its compliance in all respects with all applicable Federal anti -discrimination laws is
material to the government's payment decisions for purposes of 31 U.S.C. 3729(b)(4); and
b. certifies that it does not operate any programs promoting diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI)
initiatives that violate any applicable Federal anti -discrimination laws.
31. Federal Law and Public Policy Requirements. The Sponsor shall ensure that Federal funding is
expended in full accordance with the United States Constitution, Federal law, and statutory and
public policy requirements: including but not limited to, those protecting free speech, religious
liberty, public welfare, the environment, and prohibiting discrimination; and the Sponsor will
cooperate with Federal officials in the enforcement of Federal law, including cooperating with and
10
3-53-0089-060-2025
not impeding U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other Federal offices and
components of the Department of Homeland Security in and the enforcement of Federal
immigration law.
32. National Airspace System Requirements
a. The Sponsor shall cooperate with FAA activities installing, maintaining, replacing, improving, or
operating equipment and facilities in or supporting the National Airspace System, including
waiving permitting requirements and other restrictions affecting those activities to the
maximum extent possible, and assisting the FAA in securing waivers of permitting or other
restrictions from other authorities. The Sponsor shall not take actions that frustrate or prevent
the FAA from installing, maintaining, replacing, improving, or operating equipment and facilities
in or supporting the National Airspace System.
b. If the FAA determines that the Sponsor has violated subsection (a), the FAA may impose a
remedy, including:
i additional conditions on the award;
ii. consistent with 49 U.S.0 chapter 471, any remedy permitted under 2 C.F.R. 200.339-
200.340, including withholding of payments; disallowance of previously reimbursed
costs, requiring refunds from the Recipient to the USDOT; suspension or termination of
the award; or suspension and debarment under 2 CFR part 180; or
iii. any other remedy legally available.
c. In imposing a remedy under this condition, the FAA may elect to consider the interests of only
the FAA.
d. The Sponsor acknowledges that amounts that the FAA requires the Sponsor to refund to the
FAA due to a remedy under this condition constitute a debt to the Federal Government that the
FAA may collect under 2 CFR 200.346 and the Federal Claims Collection Standards (31 CFR parts
900-904).
33. Signage Costs for Construction Proiects. The airport grant recipient hereby agrees that it will
require the prime contractor of a Federally- assisted airport improvement project to post signs
consistent with a DOT/FAA-prescribed format, as may be requested by the DOT/FAA, and further
agrees to remove any signs posted in response to requests received prior to February 1, 2025.
34. Title 8 - U.S.C., Chapter 12. Subchapter II - Immigration. The sponsor will follow applicable federal
laws pertaining to Subchapter 12, and be subject to the penalties set forth in U.S.C. § 1324, Bringing
in and harboring certain aliens, and 8 U.S.C. § 1327, Aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter.
11
3-53-0089-060-2025
SPECIAL CONDITIONS
35. Duffy Plaintiff Special Term. Pursuant to the court's preliminary injunction order in State of
California v. Duffy, 1:25-cv-00208-JJM-PAS (D.R.I.) (June 19, 2025), DOT will not impose or enforce
the challenged immigration enforcement condition* or any materially similar terms and conditions,
to any grant funds awarded, directly or indirectly, to Plaintiff States or local government entities
within those States (collectively referred to as "Plaintiff State Entities"), or otherwise rescind,
withhold, terminate, or take other adverse action, absent specific statutory authority, based on the
challenged immigration enforcement condition while DOT is subject to an injunction. DOT will not
require Plaintiff State Entities to make any certification or other representation related to
compliance the challenged immigration enforcement condition nor will DOT construe acceptance of
funding from DOT as certification as to the challenged immigration enforcement condition.
*The challenged immigration enforcement condition:
"[T]he Recipient will cooperate with Federal officials in the enforcement of Federal law, including
cooperating with and not impeding U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other
Federal offices and components of the Department of Homeland Security in the enforcement of
Federal immigration law."
36. Usable Unit of Development. The FAA and the Sponsor agree this Grant only funds a portion of the
overall project. The FAA makes no commitment of funding beyond what is provided herein. In
accepting this award, the Sponsor understands and agrees that the work described in this Grant
Agreement must be incorporated into a safe, useful, and usable unit of development completed
within a reasonable timeframe [49 USC § 47106(a)(4)]. This safe, useful, usable unit of development
must be completed regardless of whether the Sponsor receives any additional federal funding.
37. Buy American Executive Orders. The Sponsor agrees to abide by applicable Executive Orders in
effect at the time this Grant Agreement is executed, including Executive Order 14005, Ensuring the
Future Is Made in All of America by All of America's Workers.
12
3-53-0089-060-2025
The Sponsor's acceptance of this Offer and ratification and adoption of the Project Application
incorporated herein shall be evidenced by execution of this instrument by the Sponsor, as hereinafter
provided, and this Offer and Acceptance shall comprise a Grant Agreement, constituting the contractual
obligations and rights of the United States and the Sponsor with respect to the accomplishment of the
Project and compliance with the Grant Assurances, terms, and conditions as provided herein. Such Grant
Agreement shall become effective upon the Sponsor's acceptance of this Offer.
Please read the following information: By signing this document, you are agreeing that you have
reviewed the following consumer disclosure information and consent to transact business using
electronic communications, to receive notices and disclosures electronically, and to utilize electronic
signatures in lieu of using paper documents. You are not required to receive notices and disclosures or
sign documents electronically. If you prefer not to do so, you may request to receive paper copies and
withdraw your consent at any time.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct'
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
(Sgnature)
Ryan C. Zulauf
Ryon C, Zulauf
Acting Manager
Acting Manager, Seattle Airports District Office
1 Knowingly and willfully providing false information to the Federal government is a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (False Statements) and could subject you to fines, imprisonment, or both.
13
3-53-0089-060-2025
Part II - Acceptance
The Sponsor does hereby ratify and adopt all assurances, statements, representations, warranties,
covenants, and agreements contained in the Project Application and incorporated materials referred to
in the foregoing Offer and does hereby accept this Offer and by such acceptance agrees to comply with
all of the Grant Assurances, terms, and conditions in this Offer and in the Project Application.
Please read the following information: By signing this document, you are agreeing that you have
reviewed the following consumer disclosure information and consent to transact business using
electronic communications, to receive notices and disclosures electronically, and to utilize electronic
signatures in lieu of using paper documents. You are not required to receive notices and disclosures or
sign documents electronically. If you prefer not to do so, you may request to receive paper copies and
withdraw your consent at any time.
declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.'
Dated September 8, 2025
City of Yakima
(Name of Sponsor)
ViQtoria BaKer
(Signature of SponsorsAuthorized Official)
By: Victoria Baker
(Typed Name of Sponsor's Authorized Official)
Title: City Manager
(Title of Sponsor's Authorized Official)
CITY CONTRACT
RESOLUTION NO: (2,-7-C S
- Knowingly and willfully providing false information to the Federal government is a violation of 18 U.5.C.
1001 (False Statements) and could subject you to fines, imprisonment, or both,
14
3-53-0089-060-2025
CERTIFICATE OF SPONSOR'S ATTORNEY
I, Sara Watkins , acting as Attorney for the Sponsor do hereby certify:
That in my opinion the Sponsor is empowered to enter into the foregoing Grant Agreement under the
laws of the State of Washington. Further, I have examined the foregoing Grant Agreement and the
actions taken by said Sponsor and Sponsor's official representative, who has been duly authorized to
execute this Grant Agreement, which is in all respects due and proper and in accordance with the laws
of the said State; the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (111A) (P,L, 117-58) of 2021; and the
representations contained in the Project Application. In addition, for grants involving projects to be
carried out on property not owned by the Sponsor, there are no legal impediments that will prevent full
performance by the Sponsor. Further, it is my opinion that the said Grant Agreement constitutes a legal
and binding obligation of the Sponsor in accordance with the terms thereof.
Please read the following information: By signing this document, you are agreeing that you have
reviewed the following consumer disclosure information and consent to transact business using
electronic communications, to receive notices and disclosures electronically, and to utilize electronic
signatures in lieu of using paper documents. You are not required to receive notices and disclosures or
sign documents electronically. If you prefer not to do so, you may request to receive paper copies and
withdraw your consent at any time.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.'
Dated at September 8, 2025
By:
(Signature of Sponsor's Attorney)
3 Knowingly and willfully providing false information to the Federal government is a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (False Statements) and could subject you to fines, imprisonment, or both.
15
ASSURANCES
AIRPORT SPONSORS
A. General.
1. These assurances shall be complied with in the performance of grant agreements for airport
development, airport planning, and noise compatibility program grants for airport sponsors.
2. These assurances are required to be submitted as part of the project application by sponsors
requesting funds under the provisions of Title 49, U.S.C., subtitle VII, as amended. As used
herein, the term "public agency sponsor" means a public agency with control of a public -use
airport; the term "private sponsor" means a private owner of a public -use airport; and the term
"sponsor" includes both public agency sponsors and private sponsors.
3. Upon acceptance of this grant offer by the sponsor, these assurances are incorporated in and
become part of this Grant Agreement.
B. Duration and Applicability.
1. Airport Development or Noise Compatibility Program Projects Undertaken by a Public Agency
Sponsor.
The terms, conditions, and assurances of this Grant Agreement shall remain in full force and
effect throughout the useful life of the facilities developed or equipment acquired for an
airport development or noise compatibility program project, or throughout the useful life of
the project items installed within a facility under a noise compatibility program project, but in
any event not to exceed twenty (20) years from the date of acceptance of a grant offer of
Federal funds for the project. However, there shall be no limit on the duration of the
assurances regarding Exclusive Rights and Airport Revenue so long as the airport is used as an
airport. There shall be no limit on the duration of the terms, conditions, and assurances with
respect to real property acquired with federal funds. Furthermore, the duration of the Civil
Rights assurance shall be specified in the assurances.
2. Airport Development or Noise Compatibility Projects Undertaken by a Private Sponsor.
The preceding paragraph (1) also applies to a private sponsor except that the useful life of
project items installed within a facility or the useful life of the facilities developed or equipment
acquired under an airport development or noise compatibility program project shall be no less
than ten (10) years from the date of acceptance of Federal aid for the project.
3. Airport Planning Undertaken by a Sponsor.
Unless otherwise specified in this Grant Agreement, only Assurances 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 13,18, 23, 25,
30, 32, 33, 34, 37, and 40 in Section C apply to planning projects. The terms, conditions, and
assurances of this Grant Agreement shall remain in full force and effect during the life of the
project; there shall be no limit on the duration of the assurances regarding Exclusive Rights and
Airport Revenue so long as the airport is used as an airport.
Airport Sponsors Assurances Page 1 of 19
C. Sponsor Certification.
The sponsor hereby assures and certifies, with respect to this grant that:
1. General Federal Requirements
The Sponsor will comply with all applicable Federal laws, regulations, executive orders, policies,
guidelines, and requirements as they relate to the application, acceptance, and use of Federal funds
for this Grant. Performance under this agreement shall be governed by and in compliance with the
following requirements, as applicable, to the type of organization of the Sponsor and any applicable
sub -recipients. The applicable provisions to this agreement include, but are not limited to, the
following:
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
a. 49 U.S.C. subtitle VII, as amended.
b. Davis -Bacon Act, as amended — 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3144, 3146, and 3147, et seq.'
c. Federal Fair Labor Standards Act — 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.
d. Hatch Act — 5 U.S.C. § 1501, et seq.2
e. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42
U.S.C. 4601, et seq.', 2
f. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 —Section 106 —54 U.S.C. § 306108.2
g. Archeological and Historic Preservation Act of 1974 — 54 U.S.C. § 312501, et seq.'
h. Native Americans Grave Repatriation Act — 25 U.S.C. § 3001, et seq.
i. Clean Air Act, P.L. 90-148, as amended —42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq.
j. Coastal Zone Management Act, P.L. 92-583, as amended —16 U.S.C. § 1451, et seq.
k. Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 — Section 102(a) - 42 U.S.C. § 4012a.'
I. 49 U.S.C. § 303, (formerly known as Section 4(f)).
m. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 — 29 U.S.C. § 794.
n. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.) (prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, national origin).
o. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) (prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability).
p. Age Discrimination Act of 1975 —42 U.S.C. § 6101, et seq.
q. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, P.L. 95-341, as amended.
r. Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, as amended —42 U.S.C. § 4151, et seq.'
s. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 — Section 403 — 42 U.S.C. § 8373.'
t. Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act —40 U.S.C. § 3701, et seq.'
u. Copeland Anti -kickback Act —18 U.S.C. § 874.'
v. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 —42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq.'
Airport Sponsors Assurances Page 2 of 19
w. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, P.L90-542, asamended —16U��§ 1271, et seq.
x. Single Audit Act of19Q4-31U.SiC. §7SO1~c1smq.z
y. Drug -Free Workplace Act of19QA-41U.S.C. §§Q1Dlthrough 8105.
z' The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act pf200G asamended (9.L.1O9-2@2,as
amended bvsection S2D2qfP'L11Q'252).
aa' Civil Rights Restoration Act of1987, P.L. 100-259.
bb. Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, P.L117-S8,Title V|||.
cc. Build America, Buy America Act, P.L.117'SQ,Title IX.
dd. Endangered Species Act —16U.S.C.1S31,etseq.
ee.Title |Xmfthe Education Amendments mf1972,asamended —30U.S.C.1G81—l683 and168S-
1687.
ff. Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of1972,asamended —21U.S.C.11O1,etseq.
gg. Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of197[l9.L.91-
G1G,asamended —42U.S'[§4S41,etseq.
hh. Appropriated Funds to influence Certain Federal Contracting and Financial Transactions — 31
U.S.[. § 1352.
EXECUTIVE ORDERS
a. Executive Order 11990 —Protection of Wetlands
b. Executive Order 1198@—FloodolainManagement
c. Executive Order 1237J—Intergovernmental Review ofFederal Programs
d' Executive Order 12699 — Seismic Safety of Federal and Federally Assisted New Building
Construction'
e. Executive Order 14005 — Ensuring the Future is Made in all of America by All of America's
Workers
t Executive Order 14149 — Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship
g. Executive Order 14151 — Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and
Prefemendng
h. Executive Order 14154—Unleashing American Energy
I. Executive Order 14168 — Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring
Biological Truth tothe Federal Government
Executive Order 14173 — Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit -Based Opportunity
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
a' 2 CFR Part 180— OMB Guidelines to Agencies on Governmentwide Debarment and Suspension
(Nmnprpcunemmnt)'
b. 2CFRPart 2ODand 1JO1—Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit
Nequ|nomne�sfor Federal Awards. 1,4,1
c. 2CFRPart 12OD—NonpnmcuncmnentSuspension and Debarment.
Airport Sponsors Assurarmes Page 3 of 19
d. 14 CFR Part 13—Investigative and Enforcement Procedures.
e. 14 CFRPart 1G—Rules of Practice for Federally -Assisted Airport Enforcement Proceedings.
f. 14 CFR Part 150 — Airport Noise Compatibility Planning.
9.
28 CFR Part 35 — Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government
h. 28[FR§ 50.3 — U.S. Department of Justice Guidelines for the Enforcement of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of19G4.
i 2SCFRPart l—Procedures for Predetermination ofWage Rmtes.,
i' 39CFRPart 3 — Contractors and Subcontractors on Public Building or Public Work Financed in
Whole orinPart bVLoans orGrants from the United States''
k. 29[FRPart S—Labor Standards Provisions Applicable toContracts Covering Federally Financed
and Assisted Construction (Also Labor Standards Provisions Applicable to Nonconstruction
Contracts Subject tothe Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act).'
|. 41 CFR Part 60 — Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Equal Employment
Opportunity, Department of Labor (Federal and Federally -assisted contracting requirements).'
m. 49CFRPart 2U—New Restrictions mnLobbying.
n. 48CFRPart 21—Nondiscrimination |nFederally-Assisted Programs ofthe Department Pf
Transportation - Effectuation ofTitle V|ofthe Civil Rights Act of1964'
o' 49 CFR Part 23 — Participation by Disadvantage Business Enterprise in Airport Concessions.
p. 49 CFR Part 24 — Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and
Federally -Assisted Programs.', 1
49 CFR Part 26 — Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of
Transportation Financial Assistance Programs.
r 49CFRPart 27—Nondiscrimination onthe Basis ofDisability inPrograms orActivitiesReceiving
Federal Financial Assistance.'
q.
s 49 CFR Part 28 — Enforcement of Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs or
Activities Conducted bythe Department of Transportation.
t. 49 CFR Part 30 — Denial of Public Works Contracts to Suppliers of Goods and Services of
Countries That Deny Procurement Market Access tnU'S.Contractors.
u' 49 CFR Part 32 — Governmentwide Requirements for Drug -Free Workplace (Financial
Assistance).
v. 49 CFR Part 37 —Transportation Services for individuals with Disabilities (ADA).
vv' 49 CFR Part 38 — Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Specifications for
Transportation Vehicles.
x. 4g[FRPart 41—Seismic Safety.
FooTNoTEoTo ASSURANCE (C)(1)
� These laws donot apply taairport planning sponsors.
z These laws donot apply toprivate sponsors.
Airport Sponsors Assurances Page 4 of 19
' 2 CFR Part 200 contains requirements for State and Local Governments receiving Federal
assistance. Any requirement levied upon State and Local Governments by this regulation shall
apply where applicable to private sponsors receiving Federal assistance under Title 49, United
States Code.
4 Cost principles established in 2 CFR Part 200 subpart E must be used as guidelines for
determining the eligibility ofspecific types ofexpenses.
5 Audit requirements established |n2 CFRPart 3OUsubpart Fare the guidelines for audits.
SPECIgAssUmANCES
Specific assurances required to be included in grant agreements by any ofthe above laws, regulations or
circulars are incorporated by reference inthis Grant Agreement.
1. Responsibility and Authority of the Sponsor.
a. Public Agency Sponsor:
It has legal authority to apply for this Grant, and to finance and carry out the proposed project;
that a resolution, motion or similar action has been duly adopted or passed as an official act of
the applicant's governing body authorizing the filing of the application, including all
understandings and assurances contained therein, and directing and authorizing the person
identified as the official representative of the applicant to act in connection with the
application and toprovide such additional information asmay berequired.
b. Private Sponsor:
|thas legal authority toapply for this Grant and tofinance and carry out the proposed project
and comply with all terms, conditions, and assurances of this Grant Agreement. It shall
designate an official representative and shall in writing direct and authorize that person to file
this application, including all understandings and assurances contained therein; to act in
connection with this application; and to provide such additional information as may be
required.
2. Sponsor Fund Availability.
It has sufficient funds available for that portion of the project costs which are not to be paid by the
United States. It has sufficient funds available to assure operation and maintenance of items funded
under this Grant Agreement which itwill own orcontrol.
3. Good Title.
a. It, opublic agency orthe Federal government, holds good title, satisfactory t#the Secretary, to
the landing area of the airport or site thereof, or will give assurance satisfactory to the
Secretary that good title will beacquired.
b. For noise compatibility program projects to be carried out on the property of the sponsor, it
holds good title satisfactory to the Secretary to that portion of the property upon which Federal
funds will be expended or will give assurance to the Secretary that good title will be obtained.
4. Preserving Rights and Powers.
a. it will not take or permit any action which would operate to deprive it of any of the rights and
powers necessary to perform any or all of the terms, conditions, and assurances in this Grant
Agreement without the written approval of the Secretary, and will act promptly to acquire,
extinguish or modify any outstanding rights or claims of right of others which would interfere
Airport Spormors Assurances Page 5 of 19
with such performance by the sponsor. This shall be done in a manner acceptable to the
Secretary.
b. Subject to 49 U.S.C. 47107(a)(16) and (x), it will not sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise transfer
or dispose of any part of its title or other interests in the property shown on Exhibit A to this
application or, for a noise compatibility program project, that portion of the property upon
which Federal funds have been expended, for the duration of the terms, conditions, and
assurances in this Grant Agreement without approval by the Secretary. If the transferee is
found by the Secretary to be eligible under Title 49, United States Code, to assume the
obligations of this Grant Agreement and to have the power, authority, and financial resources
to carry out all such obligations, the sponsor shall insert in the contract or document
transferring or disposing of the sponsor's interest, and make binding upon the transferee all of
the terms, conditions, and assurances contained in this Grant Agreement.
c. For all noise compatibility program projects which are to be carried out by another unit of local
government or are on property owned by a unit of local government other than the sponsor, it
will enter into an agreement with that government. Except as otherwise specified by the
Secretary, that agreement shall obligate that government to the same terms, conditions, and
assurances that would be applicable to it if it applied directly to the FAA for a grant to
undertake the noise compatibility program project. That agreement and changes thereto must
be satisfactory to the Secretary. It will take steps to enforce this agreement against the local
government if there is substantial non-compliance with the terms of the agreement.
d. For noise compatibility program projects to be carried out on privately owned property, it will
enter into an agreement with the owner of that property which includes provisions specified by
the Secretary. It will take steps to enforce this agreement against the property owner
whenever there is substantial non-compliance with the terms of the agreement.
e. If the sponsor is a private sponsor, it will take steps satisfactory to the Secretary to ensure that
the airport will continue to function as a public -use airport in accordance with these assurances
for the duration of these assurances.
f. If an arrangement is made for management and operation of the airport by any agency or
person other than the sponsor or an employee of the sponsor, the sponsor will reserve
sufficient rights and authority to ensure that the airport will be operated and maintained in
accordance with Title 49, United States Code, the regulations and the terms, conditions and
assurances in this Grant Agreement and shall ensure that such arrangement also requires
compliance therewith.
g. Sponsors of commercial service airports will not permit or enter into any arrangement that
results in permission for the owner or tenant of a property used as a residence, or zoned for
residential use, to taxi an aircraft between that property and any location on airport. Sponsors
of general aviation airports entering into any arrangement that results in permission for the
owner of residential real property adjacent to or near the airport must comply with the
requirements of Sec. 136 of Public Law 112-95 and the sponsor assurances.
5. Consistency with Local Plans.
The project is reasonably consistent with plans (existing at the time of submission of this
application) of public agencies that are authorized by the State in which the project is located to
plan for the development of the area surrounding the airport.
Airport Sponsors Assurances Page 6 of 19
6. Consideration of Local Interest.
It has given fair consideration to the interest of communities in or near where the project may be
located.
7. Consultation with Users.
In making a decision to undertake any airport development project under Title 49, United States
Code, it has undertaken reasonable consultations with affected parties using the airport at which
project is proposed.
8. Public Hearings.
In projects involving the location of an airport, an airport runway, or a major runway extension, it
has afforded the opportunity for public hearings for the purpose of considering the economic,
social, and environmental effects of the airport or runway location and its consistency with goals
and objectives of such planning as has been carried out by the community and it shall, when
requested by the Secretary, submit a copy of the transcript of such hearings to the Secretary.
Further, for such projects, it has on its management board either voting representation from the
communities where the project is located or has advised the communities that they have the right
to petition the Secretary concerning a proposed project.
9. Metropolitan Planning Organization.
In projects involving the location of an airport, an airport runway, or a major runway extension at a
medium or large hub airport, the sponsor has made available to and has provided upon request to
the metropolitan planning organization in the area in which the airport is located, if any, a copy of
the proposed amendment to the airport layout plan to depict the project and a copy of any airport
master plan in which the project is described or depicted.
10. Pavement Preventive Maintenance -Management.
With respect to a project approved after January 1, 1995, for the replacement or reconstruction of
pavement at the airport, it assures or certifies that it has implemented an effective airport
pavement maintenance -management program, and it assures that it will use such program for the
useful life of any pavement constructed, reconstructed, or repaired with Federal financial assistance
at the airport. It will provide such reports on pavement condition and pavement management
programs as the Secretary determines may be useful.
11. Terminal Development Prerequisites.
For projects which include terminal development at a public use airport, as defined in Title 49, it
has, on the date of submittal of the project grant application, all the safety equipment required for
certification of such airport under 49 U.S.C. 44706, and all the security equipment required by rule
or regulation, and has provided for access to the passenger enplaning and deplaning area of such
airport to passengers enplaning and deplaning from aircraft other than air carrier aircraft.
12. Accounting System, Audit, and Record Keeping Requirements.
a. It shall keep all project accounts and records which fully disclose the amount and disposition by
the recipient of the proceeds of this Grant, the total cost of the project in connection with
which this Grant is given or used, and the amount or nature of that portion of the cost of the
project supplied by other sources, and such other financial records pertinent to the project. The
accounts and records shall be kept in accordance with an accounting system that will facilitate
an effective audit in accordance with the Single Audit Act of 1984.
Airport Sponson Assurances Page 7 of 19
b. It shall make available to the Secretary and the Comptroller General of the United States, or
any of their duly authorized representatives, for the purpose of audit and examination, any
books, documents, papers, and records of the recipient that are pertinent to this Grant. The
Secretary may require that an appropriate audit be conducted by a recipient. In any case in
which an independent audit is made of the accounts of a sponsor relating to the disposition of
the proceeds of a grant or relating to the project in connection with which this Grant was given
or used, it shall file a certified copy of such audit with the Comptroller General of the United
States not later than six (6) months following the close of the fiscal year for which the audit was
made.
13. Minimum Wage Rates.
It shall include, in all contracts in excess of $2,000 for work on any projects funded under this Grant
Agreement which involve labor, provisions establishing minimum rates of wages, to be
predetermined by the Secretary of Labor under 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3144, 3146, and 3147, Public
Building, Property, and Works), which contractors shall pay to skilled and unskilled labor, and such
minimum rates shall be stated in the invitation for bids and shall be included in proposals or bids for
the work.
14. Veteran's Preference.
It shall include in all contracts for work on any project funded under this Grant Agreement which
involve labor, such provisions as are necessary to insure that, in the employment of labor (except in
executive, administrative, and supervisory positions), preference shall be given to Vietnam era
veterans, Persian Gulf veterans, Afghanistan -Iraq war veterans, disabled veterans, and small
business concerns owned and controlled by disabled veterans as defined in 49 U.S.C. 47112.
However, this preference shall apply only where the individuals are available and qualified to
perform the work to which the employment relates.
15. Conformity to Plans and Specifications.
It will execute the project subject to plans, specifications, and schedules approved by the Secretary.
Such plans, specifications, and schedules shall be submitted to the Secretary prior to
commencement of site preparation, construction, or other performance under this Grant
Agreement, and, upon approval of the Secretary, shall be incorporated into this Grant Agreement.
Any modification to the approved plans, specifications, and schedules shall also be subject to
approval of the Secretary and incorporated into this Grant Agreement.
16. Construction Inspection and Approval.
It will provide and maintain competent technical supervision at the construction site throughout the
project to assure that the work conforms to the plans, specifications, and schedules approved by
the Secretary for the project. It shall subject the construction work on any project contained in an
approved project application to inspection and approval by the Secretary and such work shall be in
accordance with regulations and procedures prescribed by the Secretary. Such regulations and
procedures shall require such cost and progress reporting by the sponsor or sponsors of such
project as the Secretary shall deem necessary.
17. Planning Projects.
In carrying out planning projects:
a. It will execute the project in accordance with the approved program narrative contained in the
project application or with the modifications similarly approved.
Airport Sponsors Assurances Page 8 of 19
b. It will furnish the Secretary with such periodic reports as required pertaining to the planning
project and planning work activities.
c. It will include in all published material prepared in connection with the planning project a
notice that the material was prepared under a grant provided by the United States.
d. It will make such material available for examination by the public and agrees that no material
prepared with funds under this project shall be subject to copyright in the United States or any
other country.
e. It will give the Secretary unrestricted authority to publish, disclose, distribute, and otherwise
use any of the material prepared in connection with this grant.
f. It will grant the Secretary the right to disapprove the sponsor's employment of specific
consultants and their subcontractors to do all or any part of this project as well as the right to
disapprove the proposed scope and cost of professional services.
g. It will grant the Secretary the right to disapprove the use of the sponsor's employees to do all
or any part of the project.
h. It understands and agrees that the Secretary's approval of this project grant or the Secretary's
approval of any planning material developed as part of this grant does not constitute or imply
any assurance or commitment on the part of the Secretary to approve any pending or future
application for a Federal airport grant.
18. Operation and Maintenance.
a. The airport and all facilities which are necessary to serve the aeronautical users of the airport,
other than facilities owned or controlled by the United States, shall be operated at all times in a
safe and serviceable condition and in accordance with the minimum standards as may be
required or prescribed by applicable Federal, state, and local agencies for maintenance and
operation. It will not cause or permit any activity or action thereon which would interfere with
its use for airport purposes. It will suitably operate and maintain the airport and all facilities
thereon or connected therewith, with due regard to climatic and flood conditions. Any proposal
to temporarily close the airport for non -aeronautical purposes must first be approved by the
Secretary. In furtherance of this assurance, the sponsor will have in effect arrangements for:
1. Operating the airport's aeronautical facilities whenever required;
2. Promptly marking and lighting hazards resulting from airport conditions, including
temporary conditions; and
3. Promptly notifying pilots of any condition affecting aeronautical use of the airport. Nothing
contained herein shall be construed to require that the airport be operated for
aeronautical use during temporary periods when snow, flood, or other climatic conditions
interfere with such operation and maintenance. Further, nothing herein shall be construed
as requiring the maintenance, repair, restoration, or replacement of any structure or
facility which is substantially damaged or destroyed due to an act of God or other
condition or circumstance beyond the control of the sponsor.
b. It will suitably operate and maintain noise compatibility program items that it owns or controls
upon which Federal funds have been expended.
Airport Sponsors Assurances Page 9 of 19
19. Hazard Removal and Mitigation.
It will take appropriate action to assure that such terminal airspace as is required to protect
instrument and visual operations to the airport (including established minimum flight altitudes) will
be adequately cleared and protected by removing, lowering, relocating, marking, or lighting or
otherwise mitigating existing airport hazards and by preventing the establishment or creation of
future airport hazards.
20. Compatible Land Use.
It will take appropriate action, to the extent reasonable, including the adoption of zoning laws, to
restrict the use of land adjacent to or in the immediate vicinity of the airport to activities and
purposes compatible with normal airport operations, including landing and takeoff of aircraft. In
addition, if the project is for noise compatibility program implementation, it will not cause or permit
any change in land use, within its jurisdiction, that will reduce its compatibility, with respect to the
airport, of the noise compatibility program measures upon which Federal funds have been
expended.
21. Economic Nondiscrimination.
a. It will make the airport available as an airport for public use on reasonable terms and without
unjust discrimination to all types, kinds and classes of aeronautical activities, including
commercial aeronautical activities offering services to the public at the airport.
b. In any agreement, contract, lease, or other arrangement under which a right or privilege at the
airport is granted to any person, firm, or corporation to conduct or to engage in any
aeronautical activity for furnishing services to the public at the airport, the sponsor will insert
and enforce provisions requiring the contractor to:
1. Furnish said services on a reasonable, and not unjustly discriminatory, basis to all users
thereof, and
2. Charge reasonable, and not unjustly discriminatory, prices for each unit or service,
provided that the contractor may be allowed to make reasonable and nondiscriminatory
discounts, rebates, or other similar types of price reductions to volume purchasers.
c. Each fixed -based operator at the airport shall be subject to the same rates, fees, rentals, and
other charges as are uniformly applicable to all other fixed -based operators making the same or
similar uses of such airport and utilizing the same or similar facilities.
d. Each air carrier using such airport shall have the right to service itself or to use any fixed -based
operator that is authorized or permitted by the airport to serve any air carrier at such airport.
e. Each air carrier using such airport (whether as a tenant, non -tenant, or subtenant of another air
carrier tenant) shall be subject to such nondiscriminatory and substantially comparable rules,
regulations, conditions, rates, fees, rentals, and other charges with respect to facilities directly
and substantially related to providing air transportation as are applicable to all such air carriers
which make similar use of such airport and utilize similar facilities, subject to reasonable
classifications such as tenants or non -tenants and signatory carriers and non -signatory carriers.
Classification or status as tenant or signatory shall not be unreasonably withheld by any airport
provided an air carrier assumes obligations substantially similar to those already imposed on air
carriers in such classification or status.
Airport Sponsors Assurances Pap 10 of 19
f. It will not exercise or grant any right or privilege which operates to prevent any person, firm, or
corporation operating aircraft on the airport from performing any services on its own aircraft
with its own employees (including, but not limited to maintenance, repair, and fueling) that it
may choose to perform.
g In the event the sponsor itself exercises any of the rights and privileges referred to in this
assurance, the services involved will be provided on the same conditions as would apply to the
furnishing of such services by commercial aeronautical service providers authorized by the
sponsor under these provisions.
h. The sponsor may establish such reasonable, and not unjustly discriminatory, conditions to be
met by all users of the airport as may be necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the
airport.
i The sponsor may prohibit or limit any given type, kind or class of aeronautical use of the airport
if such action is necessary for the safe operation of the airport or necessary to serve the civil
aviation needs of the public.
22. Exclusive Rights.
It will permit no exclusive right for the use of the airport by any person providing, or intending to
provide, aeronautical services to the public. For purposes of this paragraph, the providing of the
services at an airport by a single fixed -based operator shall not be construed as an exclusive right if
both of the following apply:
a. It would be unreasonably costly, burdensome, or impractical for more than one fixed -based
operator to provide such services, and
b. If allowing more than one fixed -based operator to provide such services would require the
reduction of space leased pursuant to an existing agreement between such single fixed -based
operator and such airport. It further agrees that it will not, either directly or indirectly, grant or
permit any person, firm, or corporation, the exclusive right at the airport to conduct any
aeronautical activities, including, but not limited to charter flights, pilot training, aircraft rental
and sightseeing, aerial photography, crop dusting, aerial advertising and surveying, air carrier
operations, aircraft sales and services, sale of aviation petroleum products whether or not
conducted in conjunction with other aeronautical activity, repair and maintenance of aircraft,
sale of aircraft parts, and any other activities which because of their direct relationship to the
operation of aircraft can be regarded as an aeronautical activity, and that it will terminate any
exclusive right to conduct an aeronautical activity now existing at such an airport before the
grant of any assistance under Title 49, United States Code.
23. Fee and Rental Structure.
It will maintain a fee and rental structure for the facilities and services at the airport which will
make the airport as self-sustaining as possible under the circumstances existing at the particular
airport, taking into account such factors as the volume of traffic and economy of collection. No part
of the Federal share of an airport development, airport planning or noise compatibility project for
which a Grant is made under Title 49, United States Code, the Airport and Airway Improvement Act
of 1982, the Federal Airport Act or the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 shall be
included in the rate basis in establishing fees, rates, and charges for users of that airport.
Airport Sponsors Assurances Page 11 of 19
24. Airport Revenues.
a. All revenues generated by the airport and any local taxes on aviation fuel established after
December 30, 1987, will be expended by it for the capital or operating costs of the airport; the
local airport system; or other local facilities which are owned or operated by the owner or
operator of the airport and which are directly and substantially related to the actual air
transportation of passengers or property; or for noise mitigation purposes on or off the airport.
The following exceptions apply to this paragraph:
1. If covenants or assurances in debt obligations issued before September 3, 1982, by the
owner or operator of the airport, or provisions enacted before September 3, 1982, in
governing statutes controlling the owner or operator's financing, provide for the use of the
revenues from any of the airport owner or operator's facilities, including the airport, to
support not only the airport but also the airport owner or operator's general debt
obligations or other facilities, then this limitation on the use of all revenues generated by
the airport (and, in the case of a public airport, local taxes on aviation fuel) shall not apply.
2. If the Secretary approves the sale of a privately owned airport to a public sponsor and
provides funding for any portion of the public sponsor's acquisition of land, this limitation
on the use of all revenues generated by the sale shall not apply to certain proceeds from
the sale. This is conditioned on repayment to the Secretary by the private owner of an
amount equal to the remaining unamortized portion (amortized over a 20-year period) of
any airport improvement grant made to the private owner for any purpose other than land
acquisition on or after October 1,1996, plus an amount equal to the federal share of the
current fair market value of any land acquired with an airport improvement grant made to
that airport on or after October 1,1996.
3. Certain revenue derived from or generated by mineral extraction, production, lease, or
other means at a general aviation airport (as defined at 49 U.S.C. 47102), if the FAA
determines the airport sponsor meets the requirements set forth in Section 813 of Public
Law 112-95.
b. As part of the annual audit required under the Single Audit Act of 1984, the sponsor will direct
that the audit will review, and the resulting audit report will provide an opinion concerning, the
use of airport revenue and taxes in paragraph (a), and indicating whether funds paid or
transferred to the owner or operator are paid or transferred in a manner consistent with Title
49, United States Code and any other applicable provision of law, including any regulation
promulgated by the Secretary or Administrator.
c. Any civil penalties or other sanctions will be imposed for violation of this assurance in
accordance with the provisions of 49 U.S.C. 47107.
25. Reports and Inspections.
It will:
a. submit to the Secretary such annual or special financial and operations reports as the Secretary
may reasonably request and make such reports available to the public; make available to the
public at reasonable times and places a report of the airport budget in a format prescribed by
the Secretary;
b. for airport development projects, make the airport and all airport records and documents
affecting the airport, including deeds, leases, operation and use agreements, regulations and
Airport Sponsors Assurances Page 12 of 19
other instruments, available for inspection by any duly authorized agent of the Secretary upon
reasonable request;
c. for noise compatibility program projects, make records and documents relating to the project
and continued compliance with the terms, conditions, and assurances of this Grant Agreement
including deeds, leases, agreements, regulations, and other instruments, available for
inspection by any duly authorized agent of the Secretary upon reasonable request; and
d. in a format and time prescribed by the Secretary, provide to the Secretary and make available
to the public following each of its fiscal years, an annual report listing in detail:
1. all amounts paid by the airport to any other unit of government and the purposes for
which each such payment was made; and
2. all services and property provided by the airport to other units of government and the
amount of compensation received for provision of each such service and property.
26. Use by Government Aircraft.
It will make available all of the facilities of the airport developed with Federal financial assistance
and all those usable for landing and takeoff of aircraft to the United States for use by Government
aircraft in common with other aircraft at all times without charge, except, if the use by Government
aircraft is substantial, charge may be made for a reasonable share, proportional to such use, for the
cost of operating and maintaining the facilities used. Unless otherwise determined by the Secretary,
or otherwise agreed to by the sponsor and the using agency, substantial use of an airport by
Government aircraft will be considered to exist when operations of such aircraft are in excess of
those which, in the opinion of the Secretary, would unduly interfere with use of the landing areas
by other authorized aircraft, or during any calendar month that:
a. Five (5) or more Government aircraft are regularly based at the airport or on land adjacent
thereto; or
b. The total number of movements (counting each landing as a movement) of Government
aircraft is 300 or more, or the gross accumulative weight of Government aircraft using the
airport (the total movement of Government aircraft multiplied by gross weights of such
aircraft) is in excess of five million pounds.
27. Land for Federal Facilities.
It will furnish without cost to the Federal Government for use in connection with any air traffic
control or air navigation activities, or weather -reporting and communication activities related to air
traffic control, any areas of land or water, or estate therein as the Secretary considers necessary or
desirable for construction, operation, and maintenance at Federal expense of space or facilities for
such purposes. Such areas or any portion thereof will be made available as provided herein within
four months after receipt of a written request from the Secretary.
28. Airport Layout Plan.
a. The airport owner or operator will maintain a current airport layout plan of the airport
showing:
1. boundaries of the airport and all proposed additions thereto, together with the boundaries
of all offsite areas owned or controlled by the sponsor for airport purposes and proposed
additions thereto;
Airport Sponsors Assurances Page 13 of 19
2. the location and nature of all existing and proposed airport facilities and structures (such
as runways, taxiways, aprons, terminal buildings, hangars and roads), including all
proposed extensions and reductions of existing airport facilities;
3. the location of all existing and proposed non -aviation areas and of all existing
improvements thereon; and
4. all proposed and existing access points used to taxi aircraft across the airport's property
boundary.
b. Subject to subsection 49 U.S.C. 47107(x), the Secretary will review and approve or disapprove
the plan and any revision or modification of the plan before the plan, revision, or modification
takes effect.
c. The owner or operator will not make or allow any alteration in the airport or any of its facilities
unless the alteration-
1. is outside the scope of the Secretary's review and approval authority as set forth in
subsection (x); or
2. complies with the portions of the plan approved by the Secretary.
d. When the airport owner or operator makes a change or alteration in the airport or the
facilities which the Secretary determines adversely affects the safety, utility, or efficiency of
any federally owned, leased, or funded property on or off the airport and which is not in
conformity with the airport layout plan as approved by the Secretary, the owner or operator
will, if requested, by the Secretary:
1. eliminate such adverse effect in a manner approved by the Secretary; or
2. bear all costs of relocating such property or its replacement to a site acceptable to the
Secretary and of restoring the property or its replacement to the level of safety, utility,
efficiency, and cost of operation that existed before the alteration was made, except in
the case of a relocation or replacement of an existing airport facility due to a change in the
Secretary's design standards beyond the control of the airport sponsor.
29. Civil Rights.
It will promptly take any measures necessary to ensure that no person in the United States shall, on
the grounds of race, color, and national origin (including limited English proficiency) in accordance
with the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d to 2000d-4); creed and
sex per 49 U.S.C. 47123 and related requirements; age per the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 and
related requirements; or disability per the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and related
requirements, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise
subjected to discrimination in any program and activity conducted with, or benefiting from, funds
received from this Grant.
a. Using the definitions of activity, facility, and program as found and defined in 49 CFR 21.23(b)
and 21.23(e), the sponsor will facilitate all programs, operate all facilities, or conduct all
programs in compliance with all non-discrimination requirements imposed by or pursuant to
these assurances.
b. Applicability
Airport Sponsors Assurances Page 14 of 19
1. Programs and Activities. If the sponsor has received a grant (or other federal assistance)
for any of the sponsor's program or activities, these requirements extend to all of the
sponsor's programs and activities.
2. Facilities. Where it receives a grant or other federal financial assistance to construct,
expand, renovate, remodel, alter, or acquire a facility, or part of a facility, the assurance
extends to the entire facility and facilities operated in connection therewith.
3. Real Property. Where the sponsor receives a grant or other Federal financial assistance in
the form of, or for the acquisition of real property or an interest in real property, the
assurance will extend to rights to space on, over, or under such property.
c. Duration.
The sponsor agrees that it is obligated to this assurance for the period during which Federal
financial assistance is extended to the program, except where the Federal financial assistance is
to provide, or is in the form of, personal property, or real property, or interest therein, or
structures or improvements thereon, in which case the assurance obligates the sponsor, or any
transferee for the longer of the following periods:
1. So long as the airport is used as an airport, or for another purpose involving the provision
of similar services or benefits; or
2. So long as the sponsor retains ownership or possession of the property.
d. Required Solicitation Language. It will include the following notification in all solicitations for
bids, Requests For Proposals for work, or material under this Grant Agreement and in all
proposals for agreements, including airport concessions, regardless of funding source:
"The (City of Yakima), in accordance with the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d to 2000d-4) and the Regulations, hereby notifies all bidders or offerors
that it will affirmatively ensure that for any contract entered into pursuant to this
advertisement, all businesses will be afforded full and fair opportunity to submit bids in
response to this invitation and no businesses will be discriminated against on the grounds of
race, color, national origin (including limited English proficiency), creed, sex , age, or disability
in consideration for an award."
e. Required Contract Provisions.
1. It will insert the non-discrimination contract clauses requiring compliance with the acts and
regulations relative to non-discrimination in Federally -assisted programs of the
Department of Transportation (DOT), and incorporating the acts and regulations into the
contracts by reference in every contract or agreement subject to the non-discrimination in
Federally -assisted programs of the DOT acts and regulations.
2. It will include a list of the pertinent non-discrimination authorities in every contract that is
subject to the non-discrimination acts and regulations.
3. It will insert non-discrimination contract clauses as a covenant running with the land, in
any deed from the United States effecting or recording a transfer of real property,
structures, use, or improvements thereon or interest therein to a sponsor.
4. It will insert non-discrimination contract clauses prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race, color, national origin (including limited English proficiency), creed, sex, age, or
Airport Sponsor Assurances Page 15 of 19
disability as a covenant running with the land, in any future deeds, leases, license, permits,
or similar instruments entered into by the sponsor with other parties:
a. For the subsequent transfer of real property acquired or improved under the
applicable activity, project, or program; and
b. For the construction or use of, or access to, space on, over, or under real property
acquired or improved under the applicable activity, project, or program.
f. It will provide for such methods of administration for the program as are found by the
Secretary to give reasonable guarantee that it, other recipients, sub -recipients, sub -grantees,
contractors, subcontractors, consultants, transferees, successors in interest, and other
participants of Federal financial assistance under such program will comply with all
requirements imposed or pursuant to the acts, the regulations, and this assurance.
g. It agrees that the United States has a right to seek judicial enforcement with regard to any
matter arising under the acts, the regulations, and this assurance.
30. Disposal of Land.
a. For land purchased under a grant for airport noise compatibility purposes, including land
serving as a noise buffer, it will dispose of the land, when the land is no longer needed for such
purposes, at fair market value, at the earliest practicable time. That portion of the proceeds of
such disposition which is proportionate to the United States' share of acquisition of such land
will be, at the discretion of the Secretary, (1) reinvested in another project at the airport, or (2)
transferred to another eligible airport as prescribed by the Secretary. The Secretary shall give
preference to the following, in descending order:
1. Reinvestment in an approved noise compatibility project;
2. Reinvestment in an approved project that is eligible for grant funding under 49 U.S.C.
47117(e);
3. Reinvestment in an approved airport development project that is eligible for grant funding
under 49 U.S.C. 47114, 47115, or 47117;
4. Transfer to an eligible sponsor of another public airport to be reinvested in an approved
noise compatibility project at that airport; or
5. Payment to the Secretary for deposit in the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.
If land acquired under a grant for noise compatibility purposes is leased at fair market value
and consistent with noise buffering purposes, the lease will not be considered a disposal of the
land. Revenues derived from such a lease may be used for an approved airport development
project that would otherwise be eligible for grant funding or any permitted use of airport
revenue.
b. For land purchased under a grant for airport development purposes (other than noise
compatibility), it will, when the land is no longer needed for airport purposes, dispose of such
land at fair market value or make available to the Secretary an amount equal to the United
States' proportionate share of the fair market value of the land. That portion of the proceeds of
such disposition which is proportionate to the United States' share of the cost of acquisition of
such land will, upon application to the Secretary, be reinvested or transferred to another
eligible airport as prescribed by the Secretary. The Secretary shall give preference to the
following, in descending order:
Airport Sponsors Assurances Page 16 of 19
1. Reinvestment in an approved noise compatibility project;
2. Reinvestment in an approved project that is eligible for grant funding under 49 U.S.C.
47117(e);
3, Reinvestment in an approved airport development project that is eligible for grant funding
under 49 U.S.C. 47114, 47115, or 47117;
4. Transfer to an eligible sponsor of another public airport to be reinvested in an approved
noise compatibility project at that airport; or
5, Payment to the Secretary for deposit in the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.
c. Land shall be considered to be needed for airport purposes under this assurance if (1) it may be
needed for aeronautical purposes (including runway protection zones) or serve as noise buffer
land, and (2) the revenue from interim uses of such land contributes to the financial
self-sufficiency of the airport. Further, land purchased with a grant received by an airport
operator or owner before December 31, 1987, will be considered to be needed for airport
purposes if the Secretary or Federal agency making such grant before December 31, 1987, was
notified by the operator or owner of the uses of such land, did not object to such use, and the
land continues to be used for that purpose, such use having commenced no later than
December 15, 1989.
d. Disposition of such land under (a), (b), or (c) will be subject to the retention or reservation of
any interest or right therein necessary to ensure that such land will only be used for purposes
which are compatible with noise levels associated with operation of the airport.
31. Engineering and Design Services.
If any phase of such project has received Federal funds under Chapter 471 subchapter 1 of Title
49 U.S.C., it will award each contract, or sub -contract for program management, construction
management, planning studies, feasibility studies, architectural services, preliminary engineering,
design, engineering, surveying, mapping or related services in the same manner as a contract for
architectural and engineering services is negotiated under Chapter 11 of Title 40 U S.C., or an
equivalent qualifications -based requirement prescribed for or by the sponsor of the airport.
32. Foreign Market Restrictions.
It will not allow funds provided under this Grant to be used to fund any project which uses any
product or service of a foreign country during the period in which such foreign country is listed by
the United States Trade Representative as denying fair and equitable market opportunities for
products and suppliers of the United States in procurement and construction.
33. Policies, Standards, and Specifications.
It will carry out any project funded under an Airport Improvement Program Grant in accordance
with policies, standards, and specifications approved by the Secretary including, but not limited to,
current FAA Advisory Circulars (httns://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/aip-pfc-checklist 0.pdf) for
AIP projects as of August 01, 2025.
34. Relocation and Real Property Acquisition.
a. It will be guided in acquiring real property, to the greatest extent practicable under State law,
by the land acquisition policies in Subpart B of 49 CFR Part 24 and will pay or reimburse
property owners for necessary expenses as specified in Subpart B.
Airport Sponsors Assurances
page 17 or 19
b. It will provide a relocation assistance program offering the services described in Subpart C of 49
CFR Part 24 and fair and reasonable relocation payments and assistance to displaced persons as
required in Subpart D and E of 49 CFR Part 24.
c. It will make available within a reasonable period of time prior to displacement, comparable
replacement dwellings to displaced persons in accordance with Subpart E of 49 CFR Part 24.
35. Access By Intercity Buses.
The airport owner or operator will permit, to the maximum extent practicable, intercity buses or
other modes of transportation to have access to the airport; however, it has no obligation to fund
special facilities for intercity buses or for other modes of transportation.
36. Disadvantaged Business Enterprises.
The sponsor shall not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex, in the award
and performance of any DOT -assisted contract covered by 49 CFR Part 26, or in the award and
performance of any concession activity contract covered by 49 CFR Part 23. In addition, the sponsor
shall not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin or sex in the administration of its
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) and Airport Concessions Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise (ACDBE) programs or the requirements of 49 CFR Parts 23 and 26. The sponsor shall take
all necessary and reasonable steps under 49 CFR Parts 23 and 26 to ensure nondiscrimination in the
award and administration of DOT -assisted contracts, and/or concession contracts. The sponsor's
DBE and ACDBE programs, as required by 49 CFR Parts 26 and 23, and as approved by DOT, are
incorporated by reference in this agreement. Implementation of these programs is a legal obligation
and failure to carry out its terms shall be treated as a violation of this agreement. Upon notification
to the sponsor of its failure to carry out its approved program, the Department may impose
sanctions as provided for under Parts 26 and 23 and may, in appropriate cases, refer the matter for
enforcement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and/or the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986 (31
U.S.C. §§ 3801-3809, 3812).
37. Hangar Construction.
If the airport owner or operator and a person who owns an aircraft agree that a hangar is to be
constructed at the airport for the aircraft at the aircraft owner's expense, the airport owner or
operator will grant to the aircraft owner for the hangar a long term lease that is subject to such
terms and conditions on the hangar as the airport owner or operator may impose.
38. Competitive Access.
a. If the airport owner or operator of a medium or large hub airport (as defined in 49 U.S.C.
§ 47102) has been unable to accommodate one or more requests by an air carrier for access to
gates or other facilities at that airport in order to allow the air carrier to provide service to the
airport or to expand service at the airport, the airport owner or operator shall transmit a report
to the Secretary that:
1. Describes the requests;
2. Provides an explanation as to why the requests could not be accommodated; and
3. Provides a time frame within which, if any, the airport will be able to accommodate the
requests.
Airport Sponsors Assurances Page 18 of 19
b. Such report shall be due on either February 1 or August 1 of each year if the airport has been
unable to accommodate the request(s) in the six-month period prior to the applicable due
date.
39.Access to Leaded Aviation Gasoline
a. If 100-octane low lead aviation gasoline (100LL) was made available at an airport, at any time
during calendar year 2022, an airport owner or operator may not restrict or prohibit the sale of,
or self -fueling with 100-octane low lead aviation gasoline.
b. This requirement remains until the earlier of December 31, 2030, or the date on which the
airport or any retail fuel seller at the airport makes available an unleaded aviation gasoline that
has been authorized for use by the FAA as a replacement for 100-octane low lead aviation
gasoline for use in nearly all piston -engine aircraft and engine models; and meets either an
industry consensus standard or other standard that facilitates the safe use, production, and
distribution of such unleaded aviation gasoline, as determined appropriate by the FAA.
c. An airport owner or operator understands and agrees, that any violation of this grant assurance
is subject to civil penalties as provided for in 49 U.S.C. § 46301(a)(8).
Airport Sponsor Assurances Page 19 of 19
Case 2:25-cv-00814-BJR Document 169 Filed 06/03/25 Page 1 of 49
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The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESMTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. COUNTY;
PIERCE COUNTY; SNOHOMISH COUNTY;
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO;
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA; CITY OF
BOSTON; CITY OF COLUMBUS; and CITY
OF NEW YORK,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOTT TURNER in his official capacity as
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development; the U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT; SEAN DUFFY in his
official capacity as Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Transportation; the U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION;
MATTHEW WELBES in his official capacity
as acting Director of the Federal Transit
Administration; arid the FEDERAL TRANSIT
ADMINISTRATION, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
NO. 2:25-cv-814
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
FIRST AND SECOND MOTIONS FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 2:25-cv-00814-BJR Document 169 Filed 06/03/25 Page 2 of 49
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs King County, New York City, Denver, and 28 other counties, cities, and local
housing and transportation agencies bring this action to challenge the Trump administration's
imposition of what Plaintiffs claim are unlawful and politically motivated funding conditions on
an estimated $4 billion in critical federal grants. Plaintiffs contend that these funding conditions
seek to compel compliance with the administration's political agenda, including mandates to
prohibit "promotion" of "gender ideology" and "elective abortions," and to verify that "any
Federal public benefit" will not be provided to any "ineligible alien." Plaintiffs claim that these
funding conditions are unrelated to the underlying grants, which were conditionally awarded
earlier this year by Defendants U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD")
and the U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT"), including through DOT agencies, the
Federal Transit Administration ("FTA"), Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA"), Federal
Aviation Administration ("FAA"), and Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA").' These grants
'Plaintiffs are Martin Luther King, Jr. County, Washington ("King County"), Pierce County, Washington ("Pierce
County"), Snohomish County, Washington ("Snohomish County"), City and County of San Francisco, California
("San Francisco"), County of Santa Clara, California ("Santa Clara"), City of Columbus, Ohio ("Columbus"), City
of Boston, Massachusetts ("Boston"), City of New York, New York ("NYC"), City and County of Denver, Colorado
("Denver"), the Metropolitan government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee ("Nashville"), Pima
County, Arizona ("Pima County"), County of Sonoma, California ("Sonoma"), City of Bend, Oregon ("Bend"), City
of Cambridge, Massachusetts ("Cambridge"), City of Chicago, Illinois ("Chicago"), City of Culver City, California,
("Culver City"), City of Minneapolis, Minnesota ("Minneapolis"), City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania ("Pittsburgh"),
City of Portland, Oregon ("Portland"), City of San Jose, California ("San Jose"), City of Santa Monica, California
("Santa Monica"), City of Pasadena, California ("Pasadena"), City of Tucson, Arizona ("Tucson"), City of
Wilsonville, Oregon ("Wilsonville"), Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority located in King, Pierce, and
Snohomish Counties, Washington ("CPSRTA"), Intercity Transit located in Thurston County, Washington
("Intercity Transit"), Port of Seattle, Washington ("Port of Seattle"), King County Regional Homelessness Authority
located in King County, Washington ("King County RHA"), Santa Monica Housing Authority, California ("Santa
Monica HA"), San Francisco County Transportation Authority, located in the City and County of San Francisco,
California ("SFCTA"), and Treasure Island Mobility Management Agency located in Treasure Island and Yerba
Buena Island, California ("TIMMA") (collectively "Plaintiffs"). Dkt. No. 71 ("Amend. Comp.") ¶¶ 8-38.
Defendants are HUD, DOT, Scott Turner in his official capacity as Secretary of HUD, Sean Duffy in his official
capacity as Secretary of DOT, FTA, Tariq Bokhari as the acting Director of FTA, FHWA, Gloria M. Shepard as the
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Case 2:25-cv-00814-BJR Document 169 Filed 06/03/25 Page 3 of 49
support vital programs in urban centers across the country, including homelessness prevention,
housing assistance, and transportation infrastructure, that Congress has long recognized as
essential through its appropriations. Plaintiffs assert that these new funding conditions are
unconstitutional, exceed statutory authority, and violate the Administrative Procedure Act.
Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs' First and Second Motions for Preliminary
Injunction, both of which Defendants oppose. Having reviewed the briefs and exhibits filed in
support of and in opposition to the motions, the record of the case, and the relevant legal
authority, and having heard the argument of counsel, the Court will grant the motions. The
reasoning for the Court's decision follows.
H. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This lawsuit began on May 2, 2025, when eight cities and counties across the United
States sued HUD, DOT, FTA, and their respective administrators, challenging their imposition of
new funding conditions on grants the cities and counties had been conditionally awarded for fiscal
year 2024. Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl.").2 Three days later, on May 5, 2025, seven of the cities and
counties filed a motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") in which they sought to enjoin
HUD, DOT, and FTA from imposing the new funding conditions on the grants.3 Dkt. No. 5
("TRO Mot."). After briefing and a hearing on May 7, 2025, this Court granted the motion and
temporarily enjoined HUD, DOT, and FTA from: (1) imposing or enforcing the new funding
conditions on the grants, (2) rescinding or cancelling the grant agreements (or otherwise impeding
acting Director of FHWA, FAA, Chris Rocheleau as acting Administrator of FAA, FRA, and Drew Feeley as acting
Administrator of FRA (collectively "Defendants").
2 The original eight plaintiffs were: King County, Pierce County, Snohomish County, San Francisco, Santa Clara,
Boston, Columbus, and NYC. Dkt. No. 1.
' Columbus did not join the motion.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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or withholding the funds) based on the new funding conditions, and (3) requiring Plaintiffs to
make certifications or other representations related to compliance with the new funding
conditions. Dkt. No. 52 ("TRO Order").
At the conclusion of the hearing on the TRO motion, the seven cities and counties stated
their intent to move for a preliminary injunction on the same issues subject to the TRO, which
was set to expire fourteen days later. Dkt. No. 53. This Court ordered briefing and on May 21,
2025, held a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction. Id.; Dkt. No. 73. At the
conclusion of that hearing, the Court determined that good cause existed to extend the TRO by
another fourteen days, to June 4, 2025, and indicated that it would issue a written decision on the
motion for preliminary injunction by that date. Dkt. No. 73. Thereafter, also on May 21, 2025,
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding twenty-one cities, counties, and local housing and
transit agencies as plaintiffs, as well as FHWA, FAA, FRA, and their respective administrators, as
defendants. Dkt. No. 71 ("Amend. Compl."). Plaintiffs Cambridge, KCRHA, Nashville,
Pasadena, Pima County, San Jose, Santa Monica HA, and Tucson join in the original plaintiffs'
challenge to the imposition of the new funding conditions on HUD grants that they were
conditionally awarded for fiscal year 2024. Dkt. No. 72, Ex. 2, n. 1. Plaintiffs Bend, Boston,
Chicago, Columbus, Culver City, Denver, Intercity, Minneapolis, Nashville, NYC, Pierce County,
Pima County, Pittsburgh, Port of Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, San Jose, Santa Clara, Santa
Monica, Snohomish County, Sonoma County, CPSRTA, SFCTA, TIMMA, Tucson, and
Wilsonville join in the original plaintiffs' challenge to the imposition of the new funding
conditions on DOT grants that they were conditionally awarded for fiscal year 2024. Id.
The Amended Complaint was accompanied by Plaintiffs' Second Motion for a Temporary
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Dkt. No. 72 ("Pls. Sec. Mot."). In this motion,
Plaintiffs Columbus, Intercity, Minneapolis, NYC, Port of Seattle, and Tucson sought a TRO
against DOT enjoining it from imposing the new funding conditions on their conditionally
awarded grants. Pls. Sec. Mot, Ex. 1, n. 1. And Plaintiffs Cambridge and Pasadena sought a TRO
against HUD enjoining it from imposing the new funding conditions on their conditionally
awarded grants. Id Defendants acknowledged that they "oppose the New Plaintiffs' TRO and
preliminary injunction motion for the same reasons they opposed the first." Dkt. No. 151 ("Defs.
Opp. to Pls. Sec. Mot.") at 4. After reviewing the second motion for a TRO and Defendants'
opposition thereto, this Court determined that the motion raised questions of law and fact that are
materially identical to those raised in the first motion for a TRO, and granted the second TRO on
the same terms as the first TRO. See Dkt. No. 152 ("Sec. TRO Order") at 2-4.
Now before the Court are Plaintiffs' first and second motions for a preliminary injunction,
in which collectively all Plaintiffs join.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Federal Grants
As stated above, this lawsuit concerns the allocation of grants from two federal agencies:
HUD and DOT, and several DOT operating administrations: FTA, FHWA, FAA, and FRA.4
Plaintiffs allege that in January 2025, they were each awarded grants from these agencies for the
fiscal year 2024, but beginning in March and April 2025, Defendants began to impose new
funding conditions on the grants. Plaintiffs claim that these conditions exceed Congressional
4 Congress and DOT refer to DOT divisions —including FTA, FHWA, FAA, and F as "operating
administrations." 49 U.S.C. § 102; 49 C.F.R. § 1.2.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Case 2:25-cv-00814-BJR Document 169 Filed 06/03/25 Page 6 of 49
authorization and violate the United States Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act.
With this lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the new funding conditions are unlawful and
an injunction enjoining Defendants from imposing the conditions, or substantially similar
conditions, on the grants, and/or from withholding the grants based on those conditions. To that
end, it is helpful to have a basic understanding of the federal grant process.
Each year, Congress exercises its constitutional authority to appropriate taxpayer
resources to federal agencies through annual appropriation bills. These bills specify the amount of
money allocated to each agency, and for what purposes, for that fiscal year.' While the process
for awarding grant funds varies by program, generally the federal agencies issue notices of
funding opportunity ("NOFO") that announce the availability of funding, outline the requirements
for the grant programs, and reflect the specific goals and priorities of the funding programs.' State
and local governments, nonprofits, and other entities apply to receive grant funds and the agencies
review the applications to assess the eligibility both of the applicant and the proposed use of the
funds to ensure the proposed project is in compliance with the program's statutory and regulatory
requirements.' The agencies then issue notices of award to those applicants whose proposals are
approved and conditionally funded.8 Once the grant recipient successfully meets the requirements
for the grant, a grant or cooperative agreement is issued, and the funds are released. The grant or
5 The Appropriations Committee: Authority, Process, and Impact, Appropriations Chairman Tom Cole,
https://appropriations.house.gov/about/appropriations-committee-authority-process-and-impact (last visited May 9,
2025).
6 The Grani Lifecycle, Grants.gov, https://www.grants.gov/learn-grants/grants-I0l/the-grant-Iifecycle (last visited
May 9, 2025).
'Natalie Paris, Understanding Federal Agency Grant Disbursement, Payment Processes, and "Freezes",
Congressional Research Service (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/1FI2924.
8 Award Phase, Grants.gov, https://www.grants.gov/team-grants/grants-101/award-phase.html#NOA (last visited
May 9, 2025).
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
-b
Case 2:25-cv-00814-BJR Document 169 Filed 06/03/25 Page 7 of 49
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cooperative agreement sets forth the terms and conditions attached to the award, which generally
include the amount of funding approved, a description and scope of the project, an approved
budget, and financial and performance reporting requirements.9 If the grant recipient signs the
agreement or withdraws grant funds, it becomes legally obligated to carry out the terms and
conditions of the agreement.10
B. The HUD Grants
Congress enacted the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (the "Homeless
Assistance Act") to "meet the critically urgent needs of the homeless of the Nation" by providing
"funds for programs to assist the homeless, with special emphasis on elderly persons,
handicapped persons, families with children, Native Americans, and veterans." 42 U.S.C. §
11301(b)(2) -(3). Through the Act, Congress provides federal funding for a number of programs,
including the Continuum of Care Program ("CoC Program"). The CoC Program is designed "to
assist individuals (including unaccompanied youth) and families experiencing homelessness" by
providing services "to help such individuals move into transitional and permanent housing, with
the goal of long-term stability."" It does this by providing funding to states, local governments,
Indian Tribes, and nonprofit entities for a variety of programs, including shelters and supportive
housing, rental assistance, childcare, job training, healthcare, mental health services, and life
skills training. Id. §§ 11360(29), 11381, 11383.
9 Paris, supra note 7.
"'Award Phase, supra note 8.
" Continuum of Care (CoC) Program Eligibility Requirements, HUD Exchange,
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/coc/coc-program-eligibility-requirements/ (last visited May 9, 2025).
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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HUD is the federal agency responsible for administering the CoC Program. Most
recently, Congress appropriated funds for the CoC Program in the 2024 Consolidated
Appropriations Act ("the Appropriations Act") and in January 2024, HUD posted a NOFO
announcing CoC funding for fiscal years 2024 and 2025.12 Plaintiffs King County, Pierce
County, Snohomish County, San Francisco, Santa Clara, Boston, Columbus, NYC, Nashville,
Pima County, Cambridge, Pasadena, San Jose, Tucson, King County RHA, and Santa Monica
HA (collectively, "the CoC Plaintiffs") each timely submitted applications in response to the
NOFO and on January 17, 2025, HUD conditionally awarded the CoC Plaintiffs hundreds of
millions of dollars in CoC grants for fiscal year 2024. Relying on these awards, CoC Plaintiffs
have already committed, and in some cases expended, millions of dollars for homeless assistance
services.
C. The DOT Grants
Congress established DOT in 1966 "to assure the coordinated, effective administration of
the transportation programs of the Federal Government" and has established by statute a wide
variety of grant programs that provide federal funds to state and local governments for public
transit services. Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966). In
administering these grant programs, DOT often acts through its operating administrations,
including the FTA, FHWA, FAA, and FRA.
12 FY 2014 and FY 2025 Continuum of Care Competition and renewal or Replacement of Youth Homeless
Demonstration Program Grants FR-6800N-2025, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (August 29,
2025), FY 2024 and FY 2025 Continuum of Care Competition and Renewal or Replacement of Youth Homeless
Demonstration Program Grants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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1. The FTA Grant Programs
FTA provides financial and technical assistance to local public transit systems
nationwide.13 Since at least 2021, Congress has annually appropriated funding for grants
administered by FTA, including grants for: (1) the operation of public transit facilities and
equipment in urban areas, (2) public transit systems that operate on fixed rights -of -way such as
rail or passenger ferries, (3) replacement of rail rolling stock, and (4) the purchase and
maintenance of buses and bus facilities. 49 U.S.C. §§5302(8), 5307(a)(1), 5337(b), 5339(a)(2),
(b), (c). Plaintiffs King County, San Francisco, Boston, NYC, Pima County, Denver, Chicago,
Culver City, Portland, Santa Monica, Tucson, Wilsonville, Intercity Transit, and Sound Transit
operate public transit or are otherwise eligible for FTA grants and "currently rely on billions of
dollars in appropriated federal funds from FTA grant programs for transit services and
improvements provided or undertaken for the benefit of their residents." Amend. Compl. 1 91.
2. FHWA Grant Programs
FHWA supports state and local governments in the design, construction, and maintenance
of the nation's highway system through financial and technical assistance.14 To that end, FHWA
administers programs such as Safe Streets and Roads for All, the Federal Highway -Aid Program,
the Bridge Investment Program, and the National Culvert Removal, Replacement, and Restoration
Grant Program. Congress annually appropriates funds to the foregoing programs, including
through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021 ("the Infrastructure and Jobs Act").
" About FTA, Federal Transit Administration, https://www.transit.dot.gov/about-fta (last visited May 9, 2025).
14 About FHWA, U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration,
https://highways.dot.gov/aboutiabout-
fhwa#:—:text=Who%20We%20Are,technologically%20sound%20in%20the%20world (last visited May 29, 2025).
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Plaintiffs King County, Pierce County, San Francisco, Santa Clara, Snohomish County, Boston,
Columbus, NYC, Denver, Nashville, Pima County, Chicago, Minneapolis, Portland, Pittsburgh,
San Jose, Santa Monica, Sound Transit, Tucson, SFCTA, and TIMMA receive and rely on
FHWA grants worth hundreds of millions of dollars in appropriated funds.
3. FAA Grant Programs
The FAA's primary purpose is to regulate civil aviation and to maintain and operate air
traffic control and navigation systems.15 Congress has established by statute a variety of grant
programs administered by DOT, acting through the FAA, that provide federal funds to public
agencies for planning and development of airports. These programs include the Airport
Improvement Program and the Airport Infrastructure Grants Program, which are funded by
Congress through statutes such as the Infrastructure and Jobs Act, the FAA Reauthorization Acts
of 2018 and 2024, and most recently, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024. Plaintiffs
King County, Pierce County, Snohomish County, San Francisco, Denver, Pima County, Sonoma
County, Bend, Chicago, San Jose, and Port of Seattle currently have hundreds of millions of
dollars in appropriated federal funds from FAA grant programs for airport development and
infrastructure projects.
4. FRA Grant Programs
The mission of FRA is to enable the safe, reliable, and efficient movement of people and
goods via railways across the United States.' FRA provides federal funds to public agencies for
15 Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Register, https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-aviation-
administrationI :—:text=The%20mission%20of%20the%20FAA,and%20the%20National%20Airspace%20Svstem
(last visited May 29, 2025).
16 FRA 101: Getting to Know FRA, U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration (Aug.
2021), https://railroads.dot.sov/sites/fra.dot.gov/f les/2021-12/20210824-FRA 101.pdf.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
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rail infrastructure projects such as the Railroad Crossing Elimination Grant Program that provides
funds to improve the safety and mobility of people and goods at railway crossings. Funding for
the program was provided through the Infrastructure and Jobs Act. Plaintiffs allege that Bend,
Minneapolis, Portland, Sound Transit, and San Jose currently have millions of dollars in
appropriated federal funds from FRA grant programs for rail infrastructure projects.
5. The DOT SMART Grant Program
The Strengthening Mobility and Revolutionizing Transportation ("SMART") grant
program was established by Congress through the Infrastructure and Jobs Act to provide grants
"to eligible public sector agencies for projects focused on advanced smart community
technologies and systems in order to improve transportation efficiency and safety." Id. ¶ 116. It is
administered by DOT. Plaintiffs allege that Boston, Chicago, Minneapolis, Nashville, and
Intercity Transit are slated to receive millions of dollars in appropriated funds for the SMART
grant program.
D. New Funding Conditions in the HUD and DOT Grant Agreements
Plaintiffs claim that HUD and DOT are imposing unlawful funding conditions on the
CoC and DOT grants —conditions that were not included in the relevant NOFOs or authorized by
statute or regulation. Rather, Plaintiffs argue, the new funding conditions seek "to coerce grant
recipients that rely on federal funds into implementing President Trump's policy agenda, and
direct them to adopt his legal positions, contrary to settled law. Amend. Compl. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs
challenge Defendants' imposition of new funding conditions on the grants, arguing that the
conditions are unconstitutional, violate the Administrative Procedure Act, and exceed statutory
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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authority. It is understood that without acceptance of these conditions, the grants will not be
funded.
1. The New HUD Funding Conditions
Plaintiffs allege that beginning in March and April 2025, HUD presented the CoC
Plaintiffs with grant agreements (collectively, "the CoC Grant Agreements") that contained new
funding conditions that were not included in the relevant NOFO, and not authorized by the
Homeless Assistance Act, the Appropriations Act, or HUD regulations. Specifically, Plaintiffs
object to the following six conditions in the CoC Grant Agreements:
A. The recipient "shall not use grant funds to promote 'gender ideology,' as defined
in E.O. 14168 Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and
Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government";
B. The recipient "agrees that its compliance in all respects with all applicable Federal
anti -discrimination laws is material to the U.S. Government's payment decisions
for purposes of [the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4)]";
C. The recipient "certifies that it does not operate any programs that violate any
applicable Federal anti -discrimination laws, including Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964";
D. The recipient "shall not use any Grant Funds to fund or promote elective
abortions, as required by E.O. 14182, Enforcing the Hyde Amendment";
E. "No state or unit of general local government that receives funding under this
grant may use that funding in a manner that by design or effect facilitates the
subsidization or promotion of illegal immigration or abets policies that seek to
shield illegal aliens from deportation"; and
F. "Subject to the exceptions provided by [the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA")], the recipient must use
SAVE, or an equivalent verification system approved by the Federal government,
to prevent any Federal public benefit from being provided to an ineligible alien
who entered the United States illegally or is otherwise unlawfully present in the
United States."
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
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Dkt. No. 11 ("McSpadden Decl."), Ex. A at 3. In addition, the CoC Grant Agreements also state
that the Agreements, the recipients' use of funds provided under the Agreements, and the
recipients' operation of projects with grant funds are "governed by" "all current Executive
Orders." Id. at 1, ¶ 5.
2. The New DOT Funding Conditions
Plaintiffs claim that DOT and its operating administrations have also attached unlawful
funding conditions to the DOT grants by amending the grants' general terms and agreements,
master grant agreements, and/or assurance requirements. For instance, Plaintiffs allege that DOT
inserted the following funding conditions in the FTA Master Agreement that governs all FTA
grants:
A. "Pursuant to section (3)(b)(iv)(A), Executive Order 14173, Ending Illegal
Discrimination and Restoring Merit -Based Opportunity, the Recipient agrees that
its compliance in all respects with all applicable Federal anti -discrimination laws
is material to the government's payment decisions for purposes of [the False
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4)]";
B. "Pursuant to section (3)(b)(iv)(B), Executive Order 14173, Ending Illegal
Discrimination and Restoring Merit -Based Opportunity, by entering into this
Agreement, Recipient certifies that it does not operate any programs promoting
diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives that violate any applicable
Federal anti -discrimination laws"; and
C. "[T]he Recipient will cooperate with Federal officials in the enforcement of
Federal law, including cooperating with and not impeding U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other Federal offices and components of the
Department of Homeland Security in the enforcement of Federal immigration
law."
Amend. Comp1.1111164, 172. In addition, the April 25, 2025 FTA Master Agreement requires that
the recipient comply with all applicable federal laws, regulations, and requirements and defines
"federal requirements" to include "executive order." Id. In 168, 170. Plaintiffs allege that the
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foregoing new funding conditions are included in materially identical form in the FHWA, FAA,
and FRA grant requirements, as well as the DOT SMART grant program. They charge that the
new funding conditions were not included in the relevant NOFOs, were not authorized by the
relevant statutes, and are inconsistent with the relevant regulations.
E. Plaintiffs Allege Irreparable Harm
Plaintiffs allege that "[t]he grant conditions that Defendants seek to impose leave [them]
with the Hobson's choice of accepting illegal conditions that are without authority [and] contrary
to the Constitution ... or forgoing the benefit of grant funds ... that are necessary for crucial
local services." Id. ¶ 235. Plaintiffs claim that loss of the CoC Program grants would result in a
loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in funding for housing and other services meant to meet
the basic needs of the CoC Plaintiffs' homeless residents, including access to housing,
healthcare, and counseling, which would have a devasting impact on their residents and
communities. Likewise, Plaintiffs allege that the DOT grants represent billions of dollars in
funding for critical services and projects for the DOT Plaintiffs' residents, including transit
improvement and safety initiatives, critical railway and airport infrastructure, transportation
modernization, and improved air quality. Plaintiffs assert that the loss of these projects would
irreparably harm DOT Plaintiffs' residents and communities.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The APA Sovereign Immunity Waiver Applies to Plaintiffs' Claims and this
Court Has Jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
"[A plaintiff] may sue the United States only if Congress has waived sovereign immunity
for the lawsuit, and may bring its claim in federal district court only if Congress has provided for
jurisdiction there." North Star Alaska v. United States, 9 F.3d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1993) (en
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banc) (per curiam). Thus, as a threshold matter, this Court must determine whether Congress has
waived sovereign immunity for Plaintiffs' claims and whether this Court has subject -matter
jurisdiction to address them. For the reasons set forth below, this Court concludes that the answer
to both questions is yes.
1. The Sovereign Immunity Waiver under the APA
It is a bedrock principal of our legal system that the federal government —including its
federal agencies —has sovereign immunity and may not be sued absent a clear and express
waiver by statute. See United Aeronautical Corporation v. United States Air Force, 80 F.4th
1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2023); see also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) ("It is
axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that existence of such
consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction."). The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C.
§ 551 et seq., is one example of such waiver —the statute expressly waives federal sovereign
immunity so that a plaintiff "adversely affected" by a "final agency action" may obtain "judicial
review thereof." Id § 702; see also Cmty Legal Servs. in E. Palo Alto v. U.S. Dept of Heath &
Hum. Servs., No. 25-2802, 2025 WL 1393876, at *2 (9th Cir. May 14, 2025) (quoting Abbott
Lab 'ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967) (The APA "embodies [a] basic presumption of
judicial review to one 'suffering legal wrong because of agency action.'")).
However, the APA's sovereign immunity waiver is not without limits. Relevant to this
motion are two such limitations. First, the waiver does not apply if the relief sought by the
plaintiff is expressly or impliedly forbidden by another statute. Tucson Airport Auth. v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Cmty Legal Servs. in E. Palo Alto,
2025 WL 1393876, at *2 ("The APA generally waives sovereign immunity and permits a
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challenge to agency action unless 'any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or
impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.") (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). Second, the waiver
does not apply if an agency action is "committed to agency discretion by law." Jajati v. U.S.
Customs & Border Prot., 102 F.4th 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).
In addition, the APA is not a jurisdiction -conferring statute in that it does not directly
grant subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105
(1977). Instead, federal courts exercise jurisdiction over APA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331, which grants courts jurisdiction to hear cases arising under federal law. See South Delta
Water Agency v. United States, 767 F.2d 531, 539 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he Supreme Court has
interpreted section 1331 as conferring jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action
'subject only to preclusion -of -review statutes created or retained by Congress. . .'") (quoting
Califano, 430 U.S. at 105)).
2. The Parties' Jurisdictional Arguments
According to Plaintiffs, their claims fall squarely within the APA's sovereign immunity
waiver because they seek injunctive and declaratory relief against HUD and DOT actions that
have adversely affected them, and that this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Defendants counter that Plaintiffs' claims fall outside the APA's waiver and this Court's
jurisdiction for two reasons. First, they argue that the relief Plaintiffs request is impliedly
forbidden by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, which grants the Court of Federal Claims
exclusive jurisdiction over contract claims against the federal government. § 1491(a). Second,
Defendants contend that HUD's and DOT's decision to impose the new funding conditions on
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the grants is not subject to this Court's review because the action is "committed to agency
discretion by law." 5 § 701(a)(2).
3. The Tucker Act Does Not Impliedly Forbid the Relief Sought by
Plaintiffs
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims, while pled under the APA, are actually breach -
of -contract claims against the United States and, therefore, must be brought in the Court of
Federal Claims. In other words, Defendants' jurisdictional argument hinges on their successfully
recharacterizing Plaintiffs' allegations as contract claims rather than APA challenges to agency
action. See Cmty Legal Servs. in E. Palo Alto, 2025 WL 1393876, at *2 ("[T]he Tucker
Act .. . forbid[s]' an APA action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief only if that
action is a 'disguised' breach -of -contract claim.") (quoting United Aeronautical Corp., 80 F.4th
at 1026).
a. Plaintiffs' APA Claims Are Not "Disguised" Breach -of -
Contract Claims
To resolve whether Plaintiffs' APA claims are "disguised" breach -of -contract claims that
must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims, this Court must determine: (1) "the source of the
rights" upon which Plaintiffs base their claims, and (2) "the type of relief' Plaintiffs seek. United
Aeronautical Corp., 80 F.4th at 1026 (quoting Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) ("The classification of a particular action as one which is or is not 'at its essence' a
contract action depends on both the source of the rights upon which plaintiff bases its claims, and
upon the type of relief sought (or appropriate)."). "If the rights and remedies are statutorily or
constitutionally based," this Court has jurisdiction; "if the rights and remedies are contractually
based," the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction. Id. (emphasis in original).
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(i) The Source of Rights on which Plaintiffs' Base Their
Claims
In examining the source of the rights upon which a plaintiff bases its claims, courts
consider, among other things: (1) whether the "asserted rights and the government's purported
authority arise from statute," (2) whether the "rights exist . . . apart from rights created under [a]
contract," and (3) whether the plaintiff seeks to enforce a duty on the government that was
created by a contract "to which the government is a party. Crowley Gov't Servs., Inc. v. Gen.
Servs. Admin., 38 F.4th 1099, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Courts have explicitly rejected the notion
"that any case requiring some reference to . .. a contract is necessarily on the contract and
therefore directly within the Tucker Act" because to do so would "deny a court jurisdiction to
consider a claim that is validly based on grounds other than a contractual relationship with the
government." Id. (quoting Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 967-68) (recognizing that "[c]ontract issues
may arise in various types of cases where the action itself is not founded on a contract"). "[T]he
mere fact that a court may have to rule on a contract issue does not, by triggering some mystical
metamorphosis, automatically transform an action .. . into one on the contract and deprive the
court of jurisdiction it might otherwise have." Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 968; see also Transohio
Say. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rev 'd on
other grounds, Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("The
answer . .. depends not simply on whether a case involves contract issues, but on whether,
despite the presence of a contract, plaintiffs' claims are founded only on a contract, or whether
they stem from a statute or the Constitution.").
Defendants argue that the purpose of Plaintiffs' lawsuit is to force the government to
release the CoC and DOT grant funds to them, and the sources of Plaintiffs' rights to those funds
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are the CoC and DOT Grant Agreements. According to Defendants, "[t]hat means the source of
Plaintiffs' rights are [sic] contractual, and this Court lacks subject -matter jurisdiction." Dkt. No.
55 ("Defs.' Opp.") at 15. Defendants misconstrue the nature of Plaintiffs' lawsuit. Contrary to
what Defendants argue, Plaintiffs are not seeking an order from this Court directing payment of
the grant funds to them. Instead, the relief Plaintiffs seek is an order from this Court declaring
that the new funding conditions are unlawful and enjoining Defendants from imposing them in
the Grant Agreements. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek: (1) a declaration that the new funding
conditions Defendants imposed in the Grant Agreements "are unconstitutional, are not
authorized by statute, violate the APA, and are otherwise unlawful" and (2) an injunction
"enjoining [Defendants] from "imposing or enforcing [the new funding conditions] or any
materially similar terms or conditions to any [CoC or DOT] funds received by or awarded to,
directly or indirectly, [Plaintiffs]." Amend Compl. at VI. A—D. Plaintiffs contend that the
funding conditions are unlawful because they are not included in the relevant NOFOs, are
unauthorized by the statutes that created the relevant programs, are inconsistent with the
appropriations statutes that fund the programs, and do not comply with the regulations that HUD
and DOT promulgated to implement the programs. See generally Amend. Compl. Resolution of
Plaintiffs' claims will require this Court to conduct an in-depth analysis of the foregoing statutes
and regulations to determine whether Defendants acted reasonably and in compliance with
Plaintiffs' statutory and constitutional rights; resolution of Plaintiffs' claims will not require an
analysis of the respective Grant Agreements. Thus, the source of Plaintiffs' rights resides in
statutes and the Constitution, not in any contractual provisions in the Grant Agreements. See
Cmty Legal Servs. in E. Palo Alto, 2025 WL 1393876, at *2 ("[P]Iaintiffs seek to enforce
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compliance with statutes and regulations, not any government contract.. . . Seeking to ensure
compliance with statutory and regulatory commands is a matter beyond the scope of the Tucker
Act's exclusive jurisdiction."); Widakuswara v. Lake, No. 25-5144, 2025 WL 1288817, at *10
(D.C. Cir. May 3, 2025) (Pillard dissenting) ("What matters is what the court must examine to
resolve the case: If a plaintiff's claim depends on interpretation of statutes and regulations rather
than the terms of an agreement negotiated by the parties, the claim is not in essence
contractual."); Crowley, 38 F.4th at 1109-10 (claim was statutory, not contractual, when it
"require[d] primarily an examination of statutes"); Climate United Fund v. Citibank N.A., No.
25-cv-698, 2025 WL 842360, at *6 (D.D.C. March 18, 2025) ("Plaintiffs do not challenge a
contract between the parties —they challenge an action . . . Plaintiffs' claims arise under a
federal grant program and turn on the interpretation of statutes and regulations rather than on the
interpretation of an agreement negotiated by the parties.") (quoting Md. Dep't of Hum. Res. v.
Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 763 F.2d 1441, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
(ii) The Type of Relief Sought by Plaintiffs
Next, this Court must consider the nature of the relief sought by Plaintiffs in this lawsuit.
United Aeronautical Corp., 80 F.4th at 1026. If the relief sought is "akin to the traditional
remedies available for breach of contract (damages or specific performance)", the Tucker Act
applies, and Plaintiffs' claims belong in the Court of Federal Claims. Id; Crowley, 398 F.4th at
1107 ("The crux of this inquiry ... boils down to whether the plaintiff effectively seeks to attain
money damages in the suit."). If, however, the relief sought is not for money damages, then
Plaintiffs' claims do not belong in the Court of Federal Claims, which is a specialized forum to
resolve "actions based on government contracts," Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 967, for "naked money
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judgment[s] against the United States." Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 905 (1988). As
discussed above, Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief only, they do not seek money
damages based on a breach of contract claim. Indeed, the Amended Complaint expressly seeks
no monetary relief. This, alone, is sufficient to render the Tucker Act inapplicable. See Bowen,
487 U.S. at 893 ("[I]nsofar as the complaints sought declaratory and injunctive relief, they were
certainly not actions for money damages.").
Nevertheless, Defendants argue that if this Court grants the equitable relief Plaintiffs
request, it will ultimately result in the federal government having to disburse the grant funds, so
Plaintiffs' request is really one for money damages. Defendants' argument is foreclosed by
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893. In Bowen v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court was asked to address the
scope of the APA's sovereign immunity waiver where the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
challenged a final order of the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("the Secretary")
refusing to reimburse Massachusetts through the Medicaid program for services related to care
for the mentally disabled. Id. at 882. Massachusetts filed a complaint in district court alleging
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and waiver of sovereign immunity under the APA. Id.
The Secretary argued that Massachusetts could not bring its claim under the APA because it was
seeking "money damages"—i.e., reimbursement for the Medicaid services —and, as such, the
federal district court did not have jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the district court did have jurisdiction
because the relief sought by Massachusetts did not constitute "money damages" within the
meaning of the APA. Id. at 893. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he
fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay money to another is not a sufficient
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reason to characterize the relief as `money damages'. Id. In other words, the Supreme Court
held that even though the relief Massachusetts requested —reversal of the Secretary's decision to
deny reimbursement —would obligate the United States to pay Massachusetts, this did not mean
that Massachusetts' claim was for "'money damages' as that term is used in the law." Id. at 883.
The Supreme Court distinguished between compensatory damages, which "'are given to the
plaintiff to substitute for a suffered loss' and specific remedies, which "are not substitute
remedies at all, but attempt to give the plaintiff the very thing to which he was entitled." Id at
895 (quoting Md. Dep't of Hum. Res., 763 F.2d at 1446 (quoting D. Dobbs, Handbook on the
Law of Remedies 135 (1973)) (emphasis in original)). With this distinction in mind, the Supreme
Court concluded that Massachusetts' action to enforce the requirement that the govemment
'shall pay' certain amounts for appropriate Medicaid services, is not a suit seeking money in
compensation for the damage sustained by the failure of the Federal Government to pay as
mandated; rather, it is a suit seeking to enforce the statute mandate itself, which happens to be
one for the payment of money." Id at 900 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Supreme Court
determined that Massachusetts' claim was one for specific relief, not money damages; as such,
the district court had jurisdiction over the claim.I7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") faced a
similar jurisdictional issue in Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204 (Fed Cir. 1994). The plaintiff in that
case was a low-income housing developer who entered into a housing assistance payments
" The Supreme Court also noted that the legislative history of the 1976 amendment to the APA (the amendment that
added the sovereign immunity waiver) made it clear that Congress intended to authorize APA review of federal
grant-in-aid programs, and this is "surely strong affirmative evidence" that Congress "did not regard judicial review
of an agency's disallowance decision as an action for damages." Id at 898.
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contract as part of the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program of the United States Housing
Act of 1937. The Section 8 Program is administered by HUD through Public Housing Agencies
("PHAs") with whom HUD contracts to carry out the program at the local level. The Katz
plaintiff had entered into a contract with a local PHA to develop a low-income housing project
for an agreed -upon amount of rent payable to the plaintiff. The agreed -upon rent was calculated
in accordance with HUD regulations based on the plaintiffs cost of acquiring, owning,
managing, and maintaining the project. However, after the plaintiff completed the project, HUD
determined that the contract rent rate was too high, ordered that the rent be lowered, and further
ordered that the plaintiff return all overpayments. The plaintiff filed suit in federal district court,
alleging claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as breach of contract, among other
claims, and asserting that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the APA
sovereign immunity waiver. HUD challenged the district court's jurisdiction, arguing that the
lawsuit was "contractual and that money damages [were] the appropriate relief." Id at 1207. The
district court agreed with HUD and transferred the case to the Court of Federal Claims.
The plaintiff appealed and the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to the
district court. In reaching its decision, the Federal Circuit held that "Bowen v.
Massachusetts ... compels the conclusion that the relief sought by [the plaintiff] is not money
damages, but a declaratory judgment and other equitable relief." Id at 1208. The Federal Circuit
saw no distinction between the kind of relief sought by Massachusetts in Bowen and that sought
by the plaintiff in the case before it:
Like Massachusetts, [plaintiff] seeks payments to which it alleges it is entitled
pursuant to federal statute and regulations; it does not seek money as compensation
for a loss suffered. It wants to compel HUD to perform the calculation of contract
rents in accordance with [HUD regulations]. That a payment of money may flow
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from a decision that HUD erroneously interpreted or applied its regulation does not
change the nature of the case.
Id
The Federal Circuit reached the same conclusion in National Center for Mfg. Sciences v.
United States, 114 F.3d 196 (Fed. Cir. 1997) in which the National Center for Manufacturing
Sciences ("NCMS") filed suit against the United States Air Force in federal district court seeking
an order directing the Air Force to release funds appropriated by Congress pursuant to an
agreement between NCMS and the Air Force. The district court had determined that NCMS's
claim was a contract claim against the government and ordered that the case be transferred to the
Court of Federal Claims. NCMS appealed the transfer and the Federal Circuit determined that
the district court had jurisdiction, stating:
[t]he distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Massachusetts and by
this court in Katz v. Cisneros between "money damages" (as that term is used in 5
U.S.C. § 702) and other forms of monetary relief makes it clear that NCMS's
demand for the release of the remaining funds referred to in the Appropriations Act
is not a demand for "money damages" within the meaning of the exception to the
APA's waiver of sovereign immunity. Like the grant-in-aid applicants referred to
in Bowen v. Massachusetts, NCMS is seeking funds to which it claims it is entitled
under a statute; it is not seeking money in compensation for losses that it has
suffered or will suffer as a result of the withholding of those funds. Thus, the
message of Bowen v. Massachusetts and Katz v. Cisneros, as applied to this case,
is that sovereign immunity does not bar the district court from conducting APA
review of the Air Force's refusal to release funds appropriated under the
Appropriations Act.
Id. at 200.
The message of Bowen, Katz, and NCMS is crystal clear —the term "money damages" for
purposes of the APA's sovereign immunity waiver refers to "a sum of money used as
compensatory relief" that is "given to the plaintiff to substitute for a suffered loss." Bowen, 487
U.S. at 895 (quoting Md. Dep't of Hum. Res., 763 F.2d at 1446 (emphasis in original). This
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contrasts with "specific remedies," which "are not substitute remedies at all, but attempt to give
the plaintiff the very thing to which he is entitled." Id. Applying this message to the instant case,
it is beyond dispute that Plaintiffs are not seeking monetary damages to compensate them for
losses they have suffered or will suffer because Defendants have inserted the challenged funding
conditions in the Grant Agreements. Instead, they are seeking a specific remedy: the right to
enter into the Grant Agreements without the challenged funding conditions. As the Supreme
Court, the Federal Circuit Court, and numerous other courts have held, the fact that the relief
requested may eventually result in disbursement of the money to Plaintiffs does not change the
nature of the relief sought. See, e.g., Tucson, 136 F.3d at 645 ("An action for specific
performance is not an action of `money damages' under APA § 702, even if the remedy may
actually require a payment of money by the government."); Tootle v. Secretary of Navy, 446 F.3d
167, 175-76 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (the fact that plaintiff may recover monetary benefits if he prevails
does not render his lawsuit anything "more than a routine APA case —a challenge to the
reasonableness of the governmental action on the grounds that it was arbitrary, capricious,
inadequately explained, and in violation of agency regulations."); Kidwell v. Dep't of Army, Bd.
for Correction of Military Records, 56 F.3d 279, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("A plaintiff does not 'in
essence' seek monetary relief ... merely because he or she hints at some interest in a monetary
award from the federal government or because success on the merits may obligate the United
States to pay the complainant."); Pacito v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-255-JNW, 2025 WL 655075, at *
17 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 2025) ("[W]hen a party suing the federal government `seek[s] funds to
which a statute allegedly entitles it, rather than money in compensation for the losses,' such a
claim is not excepted from Section 702's sovereign -immunity waiver.").
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The Supreme Court's recent stay order in Department of Education v. California, 145 S.
Ct. 966 (2025) does not mandate a different outcome. In that case, a federal district court had
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the government from terminating education -
related grants. In addition, the order required the government to pay past -due grant obligations
and future obligations as they accrued. Id. at 968. Given the payment requirements, the Supreme
Court construed the order as effectively an order "to enforce a contractual obligation to pay
money" and stayed the temporary restraining order, finding, in part, that the government was
likely to succeed on its claim that the federal district court did not have jurisdiction to order the
payment of money under the APA. Id The Supreme Court noted that while a district court's
jurisdiction is not barred simply because "an order setting aside an agency's action may result in
the disbursement of funds," the APA's immunity waiver "does not extend to orders 'to enforce a
contractual obligation to pay money' along the lines of what the District Court ordered here." Id.
(quoting Great -West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002)). In the
instant case, while it is true that a preliminary injunction may ultimately result in payment by the
government to Plaintiffs, the injunction, itself, will not direct such payment. Thus, Department of
Education has no application where, as here, the claims sound in statute and the Constitution, not
a contract. See Cmty. Legal Servs. in E. Palo, 2025 WL 1393876, at *3 (9th Cir. May 14, 2025)
(holding that Department of Education is inapplicable to claims that sound in statute rather than
contract).
4. The Imposition of the New Funding Conditions on the Grants Is
Not Committed to Agency Discretion by Law
Next, Defendants argue that even if this Court determines that Plaintiffs' claims are not
foreclosed under the Tucker Act, the claims are not reviewable because the actions at issue are
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committed to the agencies' discretion by law. While "the APA establishes a basic presumption of
judicial review for one suffering legal wrong because of agency action, that presumption can be
rebutted by a showing that ... the agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." Dep 't
of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905 (2020) (cleaned
up); 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). Where that is the case, courts have no authority to review or set aside
the agency's action.
The Court concludes this exception to the "strong" and "basic presumption of judicial
review" does not apply in this case. Agency action is committed to agency discretion only in
those "rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no
law to apply, thereby leaving the court with no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency's exercise of discretion." ASSE Intl, Inc. v. Kerry, 803 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015);
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 168 (5th Cir. 2015), as revised (Nov. 25, 2015) (Even where
"a statute grants broad discretion to an agency," courts are empowered to review the agency's
actions under the APA "unless the statutory scheme, taken together with other relevant materials,
provides absolutely no guidance as to how that discretion is to be exercised."). As courts have
often (and recently) repeated, to "honor the [APA's] presumption of review, we have read the
exception in § 701(a)(2) quite narrowly," confining it to a "rare" and "limited category" of
"administrative decision[s] traditionally left to agency discretion." Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1905
(citing Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018);
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993)).
Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the contested conditions fall within "[t]his
limited category of unreviewable actions." Id. They broadly assert that an "agency's
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determination of how best to condition appropriated funds to fulfill its legal mandates is classic
discretionary agency action," and cite a single case, Lincoln v. Vigil, for the principle that an
agency's decision to cancel a program is unreviewable, because how to allocate funds 'from a
lump -sum appropriation' is an `administrative decision traditionally regarded as committed to
agency discretion.' Defs.' Opp. at 29 (citing 508 U.S. at 193). But the agency action at issue in
Lincoln differs materially from the actions at issue in this case.
In Lincoln, the Indian Health Service ("IHS") administered the "Indian Children's
Program," funded through a "lump -sum appropriation" from Congress with instruction to
"expend such moneys as Congress may from time to time appropriate, for the benefit, care, and
assistance of the Indians" for the "relief of distress and conservation of health." Lincoln, 508 U.S.
at 185 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 13). After IHS discontinued the program, plaintiffs filed suit under,
inter alia, the APA. The Lincoln court determined that the lack of congressional attention to any
details regarding the spending of the appropriated funds indicated that the agency receiving funds
was empowered to exercise discretion in how to spend them. Id. at 193 ("[A]s the agency
allocates funds from a lump -sum appropriation to meet permissible statutory objectives, [the
APA] gives the courts no leave to intrude."). In fact, as Plaintiffs point out, Congress's "lump
sum" appropriation did not even mention the program. See id at 190 (noting lower courts could
identify "no statute or regulation even mentioning the Program"); id at 187 ("Congress never
authorized or appropriated moneys expressly for the Program.").
In contrast, the moneys at issue in this case were not appropriated in an undifferentiated
"lump sum." To the contrary, the grants at issue here abound with specific directives. For
instance, the Homeless Assistance Act specifically authorized the CoC Program to provide
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services to those experiencing homelessness with the goal of achieving long-term stability, and
expressly sets forth directives that specify the types of programs that are eligible for funding and
the criteria for selecting grant recipients. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11383(a) (eligible activities
include construction of new housing units to provide transitional or permanent housing,
acquisition or rehabilitation of existing structure to providing housing or supportive services,
provision of rental assistance, and payment of operating costs); id. § 11386(a) (selection criteria
include past performance of recipients, the extent that the recipients address the needs of
subpopulations, sets quantifiable performance measures, maintains implementation strategies).
Likewise, the FTA grants in question here expressly and specifically allotted funds for (1) the
operation of public transit facilities and equipment in urban areas, (2) public transit systems that
operate on fixed rights -of -way such as rail or passenger ferries, (3) replacement of rail rolling
stock, and (4) the purchase and maintenance of buses and bus facilities. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5302(8),
5307(a)(1), 5337(b), 5339(a)(2), (b), (c). And the DOT SMART program establishes a set of
selection criteria that requires, among other things, that the funded projects reduce congestion and
delays for commerce and the traveling public, improve safety for pedestrians, bicyclists, and the
traveling public, and connect access for underserved or disadvantaged populations. Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, § 25005,135 Stat. 840-41 (2021).
As discussed further below, each of these enabling statutes provides substantial guidance
as to how the agencies' discretion should be exercised in implementing these programs, and for
the Court to evaluate whether that discretion is being exercised in a reasonable manner. Plaintiffs'
claims thus do not involve the "narrow category" of agency actions that are unreviewable under
the APA.
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For the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that the APA waives federal sovereign
immunity for Plaintiffs' claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants'
agency action and this Court has subject -matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve
the merits of Plaintiffs' claims.
B. Injunctive Relief Is Warranted
1. Legal Standard
A preliminary injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is "an extraordinary
remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such
relief." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). "A plaintiff seeking
preliminary injunctive relief must establish that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [it] is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities
tips in [its] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Id. at 20. Alternatively, an
injunction may issue where "the likelihood of success is such that serious questions going to the
merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [the plaintiff's] favor," provided
that the plaintiff can also demonstrate the other two Winter factors. All. for the Wild Rockies v.
Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Under either standard, Plaintiffs bear the burden of making a clear showing that they are entitled
to this extraordinary remedy. Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010). The
most important Winter factor is likelihood of success on the merits. See Disney Enters., Inc. v.
VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017).
2. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Their APA Claims
The APA broadly "sets forth the procedures by which federal agencies are accountable to
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the public and their actions subject to review by the courts." Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1905 (quoting
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992)). Under the APA, agencies must "engage in
reasoned decisionmaking," and the Court is empowered to "hold unlawful and set aside agency
action18. . . found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right; [or] (C) in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Plaintiffs
challenge Defendants' actions as "contrary to constitutional right" and "in excess of statutory
authority," and as arbitrary and capricious. See Amend. Compl., Counts 5, 6, 7, 7 276-303.
a. Defendants' Actions Violate APA as Contrary to Constitution
and in Excess of Statutory Authority (Counts 6 & 7)
(i) Separation of Powers Doctrine
Under the APA, a court may set aside an agency action that is "contrary to constitutional
right, power, privilege, or immunity" or "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B), (C). Plaintiffs challenge
Defendants' conditions as both contrary to the Constitution's Separation of Powers doctrine and
in excess of any authority conferred by Congress. Amend. Compl., ?II 291-95; 296-303. Because
the Separation of Powers doctrine and the APA's "in excess of statutory authority" standard both
turn on the same essential question —whether the agency acted within the bounds of its authority,
either as conferred by the Constitution or delegated by Congress —the Court addresses the claims
18 For agency action to be final and thus reviewable under the APA, that action must ( I) "mark the consummation
of the agency's decisionmaking process," meaning not "tentative or interlocutory" and (2) "be one by which rights
or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
177-78 (1997) (quotations omitted). Plaintiffs assert, Defendants do not dispute, and the Court finds that under this
standard, the new funding conditions at issue here are "final agency actions" for purposes of APA review.
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in a single analysis.
The Separation of Powers doctrine recognizes that the "United States Constitution
exclusively grants the power of the purse to Congress, not the President." City & Cnty. of San
Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing the Appropriations Clause, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.")). "The [Appropriations] Clause has a 'fundamental and
comprehensive purpose . to assure that public funds will be spent according to the letter of the
difficult judgments reached by Congress as to the common good and not according to the
individual favor of Government agents.' United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1175 (9th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427-28, 2473 (1990)).
In contrast, "[t]here is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to
enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes." Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998).
"Aside from the power of veto, the President is without authority to thwart congressional will by
canceling appropriations passed by Congress." San Francisco, 897 F.3d at 1231. It follows that an
executive agency "literally has no power to act ... unless and until Congress confers power upon
it." La. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986); see California v. Trump, 379 F.
Supp. 3d 928, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff'd, 963 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2020). When an agency is
charged with administering a statute, "both [its] power to act and how [it is] to act [are]
authoritatively prescribed by Congress." City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013).
"Absent congressional authorization, the Administration may not redistribute or withhold
properly appropriated funds in order to effectuate its own policy goals." San Francisco, 897 F.3d
at 1235.
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Against this backdrop, Plaintiffs argue that in attempting to condition disbursement of
funds in part on grounds not authorized by Congress, but rather on Executive Branch policy,
Defendants are acting in violation of the Separation of Powers principle and "in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B),
(C). Plaintiffs argue that neither the Homeless Assistance Act nor any other statute authorizing the
grants at issue confers on Defendants the kind of authority they are attempting to assert. For the
reasons explained below, the Court agrees.
(ii) The New HUD Funding Conditions
Plaintiffs contend that the contested conditions must be set aside because there is no
legislation that "authorizes HUD to impose conditions on CoC grant funding related to
prohibiting all forms of DEI policies and initiatives, promoting aggressive and lawless
immigration enforcement, requiring exclusion of transgender people, or cutting off access to
information about lawful abortions." Amend. Compl., ¶ 300. In response, Defendants do not
dispute that such authorization is required, but fail to identify a statutory source conferring it.
Instead, they refer to several agency regulations for the proposition that Defendants "may
terminate their grants merely based on a change in policy priorities." Defs.' Opp. at 27 (citing 2
C.F.R. § 200.340(a)(4)). As Plaintiffs point out, however, an agency regulation cannot create
statutory authority; only Congress can do that. Whatever actions HUD chooses to take based on a
change in its policy priorities must still be rooted in a congressional delegation of authority, a
limitation that the cited regulation itself makes clear. See 2 C.F.R. § 200.340(a)(4) (award may be
terminated if it "no longer effectuates the program goals or agency priorities," but only "to the
extent authorized by law.").
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Defendants do not and reasonably could not argue that any of the new funding conditions
were explicitly authorized by the Homeless Assistance Act. That legislation does outline several
conditions that grant recipients must agree to. These enumerated conditions require recipients,
among other things, "to monitor and report to the Secretary the progress of the project"; "to
ensure .. . that individuals and families experiencing homelessness are involved" in the project;
and to "monitor and report" the receipt of any matching funds. 42 U.S.C. § 11386(b). But the
Homeless Assistance Act does not make direct (or even indirect) reference to any of the new
conditions Plaintiffs are challenging in this case.
While the Act includes a limited "catchall" provision, which allows HUD to impose "such
other terms and conditions as the Secretary may establish to carry out this part in an effective and
efficient manner," Defendants have not argued that this provision confers the authority to impose
the conditions at issue here. Applying basic rules of statutory interpretation, the Court concludes
in any event it does not. Under the canon ejusdem generis, or "of the same kind," "[w]here
general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed
to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific
words." Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001). Substantive conditions
implicating controversial policy matters that are unrelated to the authorizing statute, such as
prohibitions on DEI initiatives and "promot[ing] elective abortion," are simply not "of the same
kind" as conditions that require recipients to monitor and report the progress of their program.
Moreover, Defendants have not even attempted to explain to this Court how the proposed funding
conditions might actually fall within this catchall provision —how they would, in other words,
support the Secretary in carrying out the CoC program "in an effective and efficient manner."
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Given the stated objectives of the Homeless Assistance Act, including to "meet the critically
urgent needs of the homeless of the Nation," and "to assist the homeless, with special emphasis
on elderly persons, handicapped persons, families with children, Native Americans, and
veterans," the Court is skeptical that Defendants would be convincingly able to do so. 42 U.S.C. §
11301(b). The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail in their claim that in attempting
to impose the new funding conditions on recipients of the CoC funds, Defendants have run afoul
of the Separation of Powers doctrine, and were acting in excess of statutory authority, and that
under the APA, those conditions must be set aside.
NO The New DOT Funding Conditions
Defendants' attempts to identify statutory authority for imposing the contested conditions
on the DOT grants administered through FTA, FHWA, FAA, and FRA suffer from similar
deficiencies. As noted above with respect to the new funding conditions in the CoC Grant
Agreements, agency regulations cannot create or confer statutory authority, and the DOT
Defendants' attempt to rely on them also fails.
Nor have Defendants identified any statutoryauthority for imposing the new DOT funding
conditions. Plaintiffs have identified the statutory sources of the various DOT grant funds at issue
in this case, and while many of those statutes contain explicit conditional prescriptions, none of
those prescriptions relate to the conditions challenged here. See Amend. Compl., TR 85-120. The
statute authorizing FTA's Urban Area Formula Grants, for example, imposes a number of
conditions on grant recipients, providing that they will not be eligible to receive funding for a
program unless, among other things, they "have the legal, financial, and technical capacity to
carry out the program," and "have satisfactory continuing control over the use of equipment and
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facilities." 49 U.S.C. § 5307(c)(1)(A)—(B). In another similar example, the statute authorizing the
FHWA's Bridge Investment Program provides financial assistance for improving the condition of
the nation's bridges. That statute directs DOT to consider, among other factors, "the average daily
person and freight throughput supported by the eligible project," "the extent to which the eligible
project demonstrates cost savings by bundling multiple bridge projects," and "geographic
diversity among grant recipients, including the need for a balance between the needs of rural and
urban communities." 23 U.S.C. § 124(c)(5)(A); see also § 124(g)(4)(B) (authorizing grants only
for projects that generate "safety benefits, including the reduction of accidents and related costs,"
"national or regional economic benefits," and "environmental benefits, including wildlife
connectivity"). Defendants have not claimed that any of the DOT grant -authorizing statutes
explicitly, or even implicitly, relate even remotely to the newly imposed DOT funding conditions.
The only statute Defendants cite in support of DOT's claimed statutory authority is 49
U.S.C. § 5334. That section authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to "prescribe terms for a
project that receives Federal financial assistance under this chapter," and "include in an agreement
or instrument under this chapter a covenant or term the Secretary of Transportation considers
necessary to carry out this chapter." 49 U.S.C. § 5334(a)(1),(9). These provisions do not carry the
weight Defendants suggest they do. First, they are contained in a section titled "Administrative
provisions," clearly signaling a limit on what kind of authority is being delegated: to wit,
authority to administer the programs, not to inject substantive policies into them. This is
particularly true in this case given that the challenged conditions not only are unrelated to the
subject matter of the statutes at issue, but also reflect divisive and hotly debated policy choices.
Furthermore, as with the proposed CoC funding conditions, these seemingly broad delegations of
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authority must be interpreted under the ejusdem generis canon of construction. The specifically
enumerated authority outlined in Section 5334 includes such "administrative provisions" as
granting the Secretary authority to "sue and be sued," to "foreclose on property," and to "collect
fees to cover the costs of training." Id. § 5334 (a)(2),(3),(10). The seemingly broad authority that
follows —to "prescribe terms for a project" —on which Defendants rely in imposing their
conditions must be read in the limiting context of these specific grants of authority that precede it.
Properly read, the statute does not confer the unbounded discretion that Defendants claim and
indeed, require. And again, Defendants have not even attempted to explain how the conditions
challenged here might be "necessary" to carry out the DOT grant programs —for example, how
requiring grant recipients to certify that they do not "operate any programs promoting diversity,
equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives," might be necessary to carry out the "development and
revitalization" of the nation's "public transportation systems." 49 U.S.C. § 5301.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claim that in
attempting to impose on Plaintiffs the conditions in the Master Agreement, Defendants have acted
in a manner that violates the Separation of Powers doctrine and exceeds statutory authority, and
that under the APA those conditions must be set aside.
b. Defendants' Actions Were "Arbitrary and Capricious," 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (Count 5)
Plaintiffs have also asserted that the funding conditions must be set aside as "arbitrary"
and "capricious." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Amend. Compl., 1111276-90. The APA requires agencies
to engage in "reasoned decisionmaking," and their actions must be "reasonable and reasonably
explained." Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015); Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. 279, 292 (2024)
(cleaned up). An agency must offer "a satisfactory explanation for its action," and cannot rely on
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"factors which Congress has not intended it to consider." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass of U.S., Inc.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants
have not followed these prescriptions, and have failed to provide reasonable explanations for any
of the new funding conditions.
The Court concludes that Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the new funding
conditions were the result of "reasoned decisionmaking," let alone have been "reasonably
explained." In fact, they have not been explained at all. The CoC Program Grant Agreements and
the new DOT agreements proffer no explanation for adoption of the new conditions. Several of
the conditions make reference to certain Executive Orders. See, e.g., Abortion Condition,
Marshall Decl., Ex. B (providing grant recipient "shall not use any Grant Funds to fund or
promote elective abortions, as required by E.O. 14182"). But rote incorporation of executive
orders —especially ones involving politically charged policy matters that are the subject of intense
disagreement and bear no substantive relation to the agency's underlying action —does not
constitute "reasoned decisionmaking." For this reason, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are
likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that Defendants' insistence on the new funding
conditions was arbitrary and capricious, which is independent grounds for setting aside those
conditions. ' 9
19 Plaintiffs have asserted several other claims both under the APA and under the Constitution. See Compl., ¶¶ 116-
95. The Court does not reach all claims at this stage, in part because "[t]he Court need only find that Plaintiffs are
likely to succeed on one of [their] claims for [the likelihood -of -success] factor to weigh in favor of a preliminary
injunction," and a ruling on Plaintiffs' additional claims would not affect the relief afforded. Aids Vaccine Advoc,
Coal. v. United States Dep't of State, No. CV 25-00400 (AHA), 2025 WL 752378, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2025).
Furthermore, the Court adheres to the "fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint" that requires
courts to "avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them." AI Otro Lado v.
Exec. Off for Immigr. Rev., No. 22-55988, 2024 WL 5692756, at * 14 (9th Cir. May 14, 2025) (vacating district
court's "entry of judgrnent for Plaintiffs on the constitutional due process claim" where judgment was granted in
Plaintiffs' favor on APA claim) (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988));
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3. Irreparable Injury
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that it is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Such harm "is
traditionally defined as harm for which there is no adequate legal remedy, such as an award of
damages." Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Rent—
A—Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir.1991)).
Plaintiffs here have alleged several forms of irreparable harm that are either presently
occurring, or are likely to occur, in the absence of injunctive relief. They are facing a choice
between two untenable options; as this Court has already determined, "Defendants have put
Plaintiffs in the position of having to choose between accepting conditions that they believe are
unconstitutional, and risking the Toss of hundreds of millions of dollars in federal grant funding,
including funding that they have already budgeted and are committed to spending." TRO Order at
3; see San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. AmeriCorps, No. 25-CV-02425-EMC, 2025 WL
974298, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2025) ("[H]aving to decide between two losing options
constitutes irreparable injury because "very real penalty attaches to [Plaintiffs] regardless of how
they proceed."). On the one hand, being forced to accept conditions that are contrary either to
statute or to the Constitution (or both) is a constitutional injury, and constitutional injuries are
see also Washington v. Trump, 441 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2020) ("[A] court should not reach a
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case. Given that this Court has
already determined that Defendants' [action] violates the APA and, therefore, can dispose of the case on that basis,
the Court exercises restraint and declines to reach the constitutional claims raised by Washington.") (cleaned up,
citing Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 205 (2009); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579,
581 (1958)). Because Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on Counts 5, 6 and 7 of their Amended Complaint —that the
challenged actions were arbitrary and capricious, contrary to the constitutional Separation of Powers doctrine, and in
excess of Defendants' statutory authority, and must therefore be set aside under the APA—the Court's inquiry into
the likelihood -of -success factor is at an end.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
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"unquestionably" irreparable. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017) ("It is
well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights unquestionably constitutes irreparable
injury."); Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 537-38 (N.D. Cal. 2017) ("[B]eing
forced to comply with an unconstitutional law or else face financial injury" constitutes a
constitutional injury) (citing Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046,
1058-59 (9th Cir. 2009) (plaintiffs were injured where they were faced with the choice of signing
unconstitutional agreements or facing a loss of customer goodwill and significant business.)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the new funding conditions would
in fact deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, arguing that at least some of the conditions
are not on their face illegal. Defs.' Opp. at 29. This contention ignores the Court's conclusion
that, as outlined at some length above, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in demonstrating that the
new funding conditions were imposed in violation of the APA, and are contrary to the
Constitution's Separation of Powers doctrine. See supra, § IV.B.2.; Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d
at 538 ("[E]ven where the constitutional injury is structural," e.g. a violation of the Separation of
Powers doctrine, "the constitutional violation alone, coupled with the damages incurred, can
suffice to show irreparable harm.") (quoting Am. Trucking, 559 F.3d at 1058-59).
On the other hand, avoiding the constitutional offense by refusing to agree to the new
funding conditions may very well result in the loss of access to promised grant funds. And indeed,
Defendants have not denied that Plaintiffs would be assuming this risk by not signing the
agreements. They merely complain that Plaintiffs have not provided details as to when exactly
that loss will occur. But this argument misses the point. It is this looming risk itself that is the
injury, and one that Plaintiffs are already suffering. Courts evaluating similar circumstances have
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recognized that this injury of acute budgetary uncertainty is irreparable; "[w]ithout clarification
regarding the Order's scope or legality, the Counties will be obligated to take steps to mitigate the
risk of losing millions of dollars in federal funding, which will include placing funds in reserve
and making cuts to services. These mitigating steps will cause the Counties irreparable harm."
Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 537 ("The threat of the Order and the uncertainty it is causing
impermissibly interferes with the Counties' ability to operate, to provide key services, to plan for
the future, and to budget. The Counties have established that, absent an injunction, they are likely
to suffer irreparable harm.") (citing United States v. North Carolina, 192 F.Supp.3d 620,629
(M.D.N.C. 2016)). While a preliminary injunction will not eliminate these risks entirely, Plaintiffs
have demonstrated it will at least mitigate them pending resolution of this case on its merits.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs have submitted substantive and detailed evidence illustrating the
ways in which a loss of grant funds would be devastating and irreparable, if these risks in fact
materialize. With respect to the HUD Plaintiffs, the resulting irreparable injuries would be both to
Plaintiffs and their operations, and to the vulnerable populations they serve. See, e.g., Marshall
Decl., 111117-21 (King County) ([T]he loss of [CoC] funding would negatively impact King
County because King County has already begun the contracting process with service providers in
reliance on receiving the CoC funds.... It is important to remember that the key focus in this
work is keeping people in housing. In order to do that, it is imperative that housing providers,
with whom King County contracts, receive the funds necessary to support the housing. 2144
households in King County will be impacted by the loss of CoC funds."); Dillon Decl., In 12-14
(Boston) ("Without CoC funds, the approximately 2,000 households served would lose assistance
that is integral to their ability to maintain stable housing, most likely leading to evictions and
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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homelessness."); Semonoff Decl., ¶ 31 (Cambridge) ("Without grant funding to support the CoC
projects, over 200 individuals currently enrolled in CoC . . . projects would potentially lose their
housing and access to critical supportive services. The loss of supportive housing capacity would
further strain the City's emergency shelter system, resulting in longer durations of homelessness
and reduced exits to stable housing."); McSpadden Decl., frif 16-19 (San Francisco) ("Without
CoC funding, close to 2,000 program participants will lose their housing subsidies and services
and will be at risk of imminent evictions. These individuals and families may slip back into
homelessness, which would be profoundly detrimental. Rehousing these individuals and families
will come with enormous challenges and costs, adding to the homelessness crisis in San
Francisco."). The administration's attempt to compel Plaintiffs' compliance with unrelated policy
objectives by leveraging the needs of our most vulnerable fellow human beings is breathtaking in
its callousness. Defendants' argument that these harms are not irreparable is simply wrong.
The harms threatening the DOT Plaintiffs are also demonstrably irreparable. While
perhaps emotionally less compelling than injury to the homeless and the local agencies who serve
them, injury to the continued operation of the nation's transportation projects can hardly be
considered less important. One need not conjure the most extreme cases of bridges collapsing and
train derailments to understand instinctively that maintaining the health of the systems by which
this nation —its goods and its people —get from one place to another safely, efficiently, and
predictably, is critical. Plaintiffs have submitted evidence supporting their contention that "loss of
DOT funding would force Plaintiffs to substantially curtail existing and planned transportation
safety and other improvements and operations." Pls. Sec. Mot. at 13 (citing, inter alia, Franklin -
Hodge Decl. (Boston) ("The unpredictability injected into these complex road -safety projects
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
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through new grant terms hinders the City of Boston's ability to complete such projects.
Specifically, the City is unable to provide stability to its partners in this work, including vendors
and other governmental entities."); Davis Decl., ¶ 22 (Chicago) ("The loss of the pending and
expected DOT grant funds will cause severe hardship for [the Chicago Department of
Transportation] and its ability to maintain Chicago's roadways and transportation systems safely.
CDOT relies on DOT for a large portion of its budget and Chicago uses the funds to repair and
expand bridges and roadways to prevent accidents, to make pedestrian walkways safer and more
accessible, and to update outdated transit stations. These funds are critical to Chicago's ability to
implement and maintain safe and effective means of transportation for millions of Chicagoans and
its annual visitors.")); see also Morrison Decl., ¶ 12 (King County) ("Given the amount of money
at stake, it is almost impossible to overstate how important these FTA grant programs are to
Metro's ongoing transit operations.... Given the range and depth of Metro transit operations that
are funded by these four FTA grant programs, it is plain that those FTA grant funds are absolutely
mission -critical to Metro's existing and planned transit operations. To be clear, the scope and
scale of Metro's existing and near -future planned transit operations would almost certainly have
to be substantially curtailed, and some elements likely entirely abandoned, if any substantial
portion of this FTA grant funding were to be withheld or eliminated. As of the date of this
declaration, 1 know of no other existing or proposed funding source that could replace FTA's
grant funds.... To put it plainly, without FTA grant funds, Metro's service network would likely
have to be cut back in ways that could significantly reduce mobility options for a large portion of
King County's population while potentially increasing traffic congestion and slowing the
movement of freight and goods across our region.").
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Plaintiffs have provided substantial evidence demonstrating that these likely harms are
not, as Defendants suggest, merely monetary in nature. Adequate financial compensation for
hundreds of shelter -unstable families losing access to housing does not exist; the same must be
said of the incalculable effects of forcing unforeseen reductions in transportation spending.
Homeless assistance and transit grants are essential tools in addressing these urgent community
needs. Congress has consistently affirmed their importance by repeatedly authorizing these grants,
underscoring the federal government's vital role in supporting local governments as they confront
the challenges of homelessness and maintenance of critical transportation infrastructure. The
Court concludes that the harms Plaintiffs have alleged are quintessentially irreparable in nature,
and can be avoided only by entry of the requested injunction.
4. The Balance of Equities Weighs in Plaintiffs' Favor
In deciding whether to grant an injunction, "courts must balance the competing claims of
injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested
relief." Disney Enters, 869 F.3d at 866 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24). Courts "explore the
relative harms to applicant and respondent, as well as the interests of the public at large." Barnes
v. E-Sys., Inc. Grp. Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1991) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Where the government is a party, the balance of equities
and public interest factors merge. Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir.
2014) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).
Based on the Court's conclusions discussed above, the Court finds that the balance of
equities tips sharply in Plaintiffs' favor. Defendants' argument to the contrary hinges on their
position that "Plaintiffs could be compensated for any lost money after a ruling on the merits."
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Defs.' Opp. at 32. The Court has already squarely rejected this contention in discussing the
irreparable harm Plaintiffs are likely to suffer in the absence of an injunction. See supra, § IV.B.3.
Moreover, Defendants have not posited any anticipated (let alone likely) non -monetary harm they
will experience if an injunction were to issue, stating only that the "federal government maintains
an interest in ensuring that its funds are spent pursuant to the conditions it attaches to those
federal dollars." Defs.' Opp. at 29. Of course, Defendants do not have a legitimate interest in
ensuring that funds are spent pursuant to conditions that were likely imposed in violation of the
APA and/or the Constitution. See Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir.
2013) (there is no legitimate government interest in violating federal law). For the reasons
outlined above, the irreparable harms Plaintiffs face in the absence of an injunction tip the balance
of equities sharply in their favor.
C. The Court Denies Defendants' Request for a Bond and Request to Stay
Defendants request that if this Court grants Plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary
injunction, the Court require Plaintiffs to post a bond for the value of the specific grants subject to
the injunction and stay the injunction pending "a determination by the Solicitor General whether
to appeal and, if appeal is authorized, pending any appeal." Defs.' Opp. at 33. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(c) states that courts "may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary
restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to
pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or
restrained." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). "Despite the seemingly mandatory language, Rule 65(c) invests
the district court with discretion as to the amount of security required, if any." Johnson v.
Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Case 2:25-cv-00814-BJR Document 169 Filed 06/03/25 Page 46 of 49
"In particular, the district court may dispense with the filing of a bond when it concludes there is
no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from enjoining his or her conduct." Id. (cleaned
up). Defendants have not argued, let alone demonstrated, that they will suffer any material harm
from the injunction the Court issues today. Nor have Defendants met the standard for a stay. See,
e.g., Maryland v. Dep't of Agriculture, JKB-25-0748, 2025 WL 800216, at *26 (D. Md. Mar. 13,
2025) ("It is generally logically inconsistent for a court to issue a TRO or preliminary injunction
and then stay that order, as the findings on which those decisions are premised are almost perfect
opposites."). Therefore, the Court denies Defendants' requests for a bond and to stay the
injunction.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED;
3. HUD and its officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and any other persons
who are in active concert or participation with them (collectively "Enjoined HUD Parties"), are
enjoined from (1) imposing or enforcing the CoC Grant Conditions, as defined in the Motions, or
any materially similar terms or conditions with respect to any CoC funds awarded to the HUD
Plaintiffs or members of their Continuums; (2) as to the HUD Plaintiffs, rescinding, withholding,
cancelling, or otherwise not processing any CoC Agreements, or pausing, freezing, impeding,
blocking, cancelling, terminating, delaying, withholding, or conditioning CoC funds, based on
such terms or conditions, including without limitation failing or refusing to process and otherwise
implement grants signed with changes or other objection to conditions enjoined by this
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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preliminary injunction; (3) requiring the HUD Plaintiffs to make any "certification" or other
representation related to compliance with such terms or conditions; or (4) refusing to issue,
process, or sign CoC Agreements based on HUD Plaintiffs' participation in this lawsuit;
4. The Enjoined HUD Parties shall immediately treat any actions taken to implement or
enforce the CoC Grant Conditions or any materially similar terms or conditions as to the HUD
Plaintiffs or their Continuums, including any delays or withholding of funds based on such
conditions, as null, void, and rescinded; shall treat as null and void any such conditions included
in any grant agreement executed by any Plaintiff or member of a Plaintiff Continuum while this
PI or the previous TROs are in effect; and may not retroactively apply such conditions to grant
agreements during the effective period of this PI or the previous TROs. The Enjoined HUD
Parties shall immediately take every step necessary to effectuate this order, including clearing any
administrative, operational, or technical hurdles to implementation;
5. DOT, the DOT OAs, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and
any other persons who are in active concert or participation with them (collectively "Enjoined
DOT Parties"), are enjoined from (1) imposing or enforcing the DOT Grant Conditions, as
defined in the Motions, or any materially similar terms or conditions to any DOT funds awarded,
directly or indirectly, to the DOT Plaintiffs or their subrecipients; (2) as to the DOT Plaintiffs or
their subrecipients, rescinding, withholding, cancelling, or otherwise not processing the DOT
grant awards, or pausing, freezing, impeding, blocking, canceling, terminating, delaying,
withholding, or conditioning DOT funds, based on such terms or conditions, including without
limitation failing or refusing to process and otherwise implement grants signed with changes or
other objection to conditions enjoined by this preliminary injunction; (3) requiring the DOT
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
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Plaintiffs or their subrecipients to make any "certification" or other representation related to
compliance with such terms or conditions; or (4) refusing to issue, process, or sign grant
agreements based on DOT Plaintiffs' participation in this lawsuit;
6. The Enjoined DOT Parties shall immediately treat any actions taken to implement or
enforce the DOT Grant Conditions or any materially similar terms or conditions as to DOT funds
awarded, directly or indirectly, to the DOT Plaintiffs or their subrecipients, including any delays
or withholding of funds based on such conditions, as null, void, and rescinded; shall treat as null
and void any such conditions included in any grant agreement executed by any DOT Plaintiff or
subrecipient while this PI or the previous TROs are in effect; and may not retroactively apply
such conditions to grant agreements during the effective period of this PI or the previous TROs.
The Enjoined DOT Parties shall immediately take every step necessary to effectuate this order,
including clearing any administrative, operational, or technical hurdles to implementation;
7. Defendants' counsel shall provide written notice of this Order to all Defendants and
their employees by the end of the second day after issuance of this Order;
8. By the end of the second day after issuance of this Order, the Defendants SHALL FILE
on the Court's electronic docket and serve upon Plaintiffs a Status Report documenting the
actions that they have taken to comply with this Order, including a copy of the notice and an
explanation as to whom the notice was sent;
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II
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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9. This order remains in effect pending further orders from this Court.
It is so ordered this 3rd day ofJune, 2025.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Barbara Jacobs Rothstein
U.S. District Court Judge
ITEM TITLE:
SUBMITTED BY:
SUMMARY EXPLANATION:
BUSINESS OF THE CITY COUNCIL
YAKIMA, WASHINGTON
AGENDA STATEMENT
Item No. 9.C.
For Meeting of: August 4, 2025
Resolution authorizing the acceptance of an FAA Airport Terminal
Program (ATP) grant for construction of terminal baggage claim and
restroom upgrades
Robert Hodgman, Director of Yakima Air Terminal
Resolution authorizes the City Manager to sign a grant offer from the Federal Aviation Administration for
$1,000,000 to construct the terminal building baggage claim and restroom upgrades.
ITEM BUDGETED: Yes
STRATEGIC PRIORITY 24-25: A Resilient Yakima
RECOMMENDATION: Adopt Resolution.
ATTACHMENTS:
Resolution - YKM - ATP grant acceptancexdocx
Grant Agreement.pdf